

THE INHAMUNS: A COMMUNITY IN THE
SERTÃO OF NORTHEAST BRAZIL, 1707-1930

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PREFACE

This study is intended as a general history of a community in the sertão of Northeast Brazil from the era of colonization until 1930. Secondarily, the attempt is made to present some of the changing aspects of the relationship between the private power of the dominant families in the area and the agents of external authority. No claim is made that the Inhamuns, in all its aspects, is a typical Brazilian community; yet, the basic structural framework of the society of the area appears to have contained a large proportion of the characteristics which generally are attributed to rural Brazil. Thus, in spite of peculiarities dictated by geographical setting and historical development, the Inhamuns may be more typical of Brazil than, at first glance, its isolation might suggest.

The community of the Inhamuns, as defined here, refers to a rather large physical area whose parts have been historically interrelated, rather than to a more limited area in which the inhabitants maintain frequent primary contacts with one another.¹ The boundaries of the community are both geographically and historically determined. Geographically, the Inhamuns is that portion of Ceará lying along the Rio Jaguaribe and its tributaries to the west and north of São Matheus (renamed Jucás in recent years). Historically, it is the area which was settled chiefly under the domination of the Feitosa family and in which that family maintained preeminence for many years thereafter.

1. The Inhamuns is currently divided into the Municípios of Tauá, Parambú, Cococy, Arneirós, Aiuaba, and Saboeiro.

Within the confines of these definitions, at least three limitations have been imposed. First, the area of São Matheus has been excluded. Although it was considered a part of the Inhamuns in the era of colonization, its subsequent development was but little related to the history of that community. Second, although Saboeiro is included, it is given less attention than other portions of the area. In the first place, it was the initial part of the Inhamuns to be separated from the dominion of the Feitosas, after which it tended to evolve as a distinct community. Considerable attention is devoted to Saboeiro only in the period of the Empire, years in which political factors often brought it into conflict with the remainder of the Inhamuns. In addition, the lack of attention given to the internal development of Saboeiro was not wholly determined by choice, for the sources for the study of that area were found to be less abundant than those for the other areas. Third, this study is, in many ways, a history of the Feitosa family. Entirely apart from the fact that the Feitosas have constituted the most colorful element in the history of the Inhamuns, they were, for many years, the dominant one.

A termination date short of the present was imposed not by a lack of interest in the more recent years but largely by the limited amount of time which could be devoted to the research. The year chosen--1930--was not entirely arbitrary, for it appears to be a convenient point at which to close out a period in the history of the Inhamuns, as well as of the nation;

Certain difficulties may present themselves in the study, the first of which might well be organization. A chronological organization was judged to be unfeasible, while, on the other hand, the long time span did not lend itself to a topical arrangement. The resolution of the

problem, a shifting combination of the two which often leans heavily toward the latter, is not wholly satisfactory, and, to partially compensate for the difficulties, cross-referencing frequently has been utilized. Second, the wealth of names of persons and of references to kinship relations is certain to bewilder all but the most painstaking reader; but, for those who have the interest and fortitude to wind through the maze, many of these references document the importance of the family in the society of the Inhamuns. For others, they may be skipped over as just so many extraneous data. Third, an explanation regarding names is necessary. Parents not infrequently assigned them arbitrarily to their offspring. Thus, Manoel Ferreira Ferro was the legitimate son of Francisco Alves Feitosa, just as Eufrásio Alves Feitosa and José do Vale Pedrosa were the legitimate sons, respectively, of João Bezerra do Vale and José Alves Feitosa. In addition, other inhabitants of the Inhamuns also were acknowledged members of families whose names they did not bear, a situation resulting from the tendency of the dominant families to absorb the descendents of male outsiders who married into them. Thus, regardless of their legal names, the descendents of Leandro Custódio de Oliveira Castro, an outsider who married a Feitosa, were popularly known as Feitosas rather than Oliveira Castros. Fourth, variations in spelling, including usage of distinctive markings, of Portuguese words will be noted. No alternations of words appearing in quotations have been made from the original, while, outside of quotations, current usage in regard to persons' names usually has been adopted. Finally, a glossary of Portuguese words used frequently in the text is appended.

The debts of gratitude which I incurred to people and institutions during the course of my research are numerous. The initial plan for the project was worked out in collaboration with Dr. José Arthur Rios, a Visiting Professor of Sociology at the University of Florida in 1964. He suggested Ceará as the area for the study, and, after my arrival in Brazil, aided my efforts in many ways. I am deeply indebted to my supervisory committee, particularly to its chairman, Professor David Bushnell, whose wise and friendly counsel made the task much more pleasant, as well as profitable. I am grateful to Professor Alfred Hower, who, in addition to teaching me Portuguese, first urged me to choose Brazil as my field of research, and to Professor L. N. McAlister, who has worked on my behalf in numerous ways. I also wish to acknowledge my debts to the two organizations which jointly sponsored my research in Brazil: first, The Henry L. and Grace Doherty Charitable Foundation, Inc., and, second, the Mutual Education and Cultural Exchange program of the Department of State of the United States Government.

After my arrival in Brazil, personnel at the following institutions lent me valuable assistance: the Biblioteca Nacional, Instituto Histórico, Arquivo Nacional, and the library of the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (all located in Rio de Janeiro); the Biblioteca Pública, Arquivo Público, Instituto do Ceará, the archives of the Assembleia Estadual, Instituto de Antropologia of the Universidade Federal do Ceará (all in Fortaleza); the two cartórios and the prefeitura in Tauá and the first cartório in Saboeiro. In addition, special mention should be made of the following persons: General Carlos Studart Filho, Professors Francisco de Alencar and Mozart Soriano Aderaldo, and Antonio Teixeira Cavalcante, all of Fortaleza, Dr. Derval Peixoto, of

Crato, and Manoel Gomes de Freitas, a former state deputy from the Inhamuns who now resides in Rio de Janeiro. I am very much indebted to two sons of the Inhamuns, who currently reside in Fortaleza, for sharing with me their knowledge of the area and enabling me to use their personal historical collections: State Deputy Antonio Gomes de Freitas and Judge Carlos Feitosa.

Above all, I remember nostalgically the many residents of the Inhamuns who made my stay in the area in November, 1965, and from March to August, 1966, the most pleasant and rewarding part of the 15 months which I spent in Brazil. Especially, I acknowledge my gratitude for the gracious hospitality and warm friendship of: Colonel Antonio Vieira Gomes of Tauá; Dr. Lourenço Alves Feitosa and Dona Eufrásia of the Fazenda Canã, Cococy; Colonel Armando Arrais Feitosa of Aiuaba; and Oziel Freire Cidrão and his numerous and charming family of the Fazenda Alagoas in the Marruás area of Tauá.

Finally, I wish to thank Dr. Charles Nissly, for his direction of the preparation of the maps, and Mrs. Mary Alice Cullen, for the discriminating care with which she typed the manuscript.

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I. THE SOCIETY TAKES SHAPE, 1707-1832

Effective Portuguese colonization of Ceará, located on the upper side of Brazil's Northeast, began in the last quarter of the 17th century. Efforts to establish footholds in the area dated from before the arrival of the Dutch to that region in the 1620's, but these attempts were confined to the coast and were of a strategic or military nature. In contrast, those who came in the last decades of the century were seeking land on which to establish cattle fazendas. It was they, together with their vaqueiros and slaves, who conquered the interior of Ceará. The first of them settled along the Rio Jaguaribe from Aracaty south to the confluence with the Salgado, in this latter location founding Icó.¹ From this base, they began to ascend the river and its tributaries, reaching the Inhamuns by 1707.

The Inhamuns, an area extending in its extreme points some 70 miles from east to west by 95 from north to south, is located in the southwestern portion of Ceará in the headwaters of the Jaguaribe. Separating it from neighboring areas is a rim of serras, among them the Joanhina and Guaribas on the north, the Flamengo on the east, the Bastiões in the south, and the high Serra Grande, forming the border with Piauí on the west. The Inhamuns, with altitudes varying from 750 to 1600 feet, is the highest portion of Ceará's central sertão. The nature of the topography varies considerably within the Inhamuns, some portions being

1. Cruz Filho, História do Ceará (São Paulo, 1931), pp. 46-76.



Map No. 1

characterized by rolling, open country, especially in the upper half, while, particularly in the south, the landscape is rendered highly irregular by numerous serras and serrotes. The Jaguaribe is born in the upper portion with the confluence of the Trici and the Carrapateira; its other principal tributaries in the Inhamuns are the Favelas, Puiú, Jucá, and Umbuzeiro.

The Inhamuns, like much of Northeast Brazil, is a hot, wind-swept, semiarid land, crippled by a climate which limits rainfall to the winter months from January to June and which occasionally denies even these months of moisture. Rain rarely falls during the other half of the year, known as the summer, as a consequence of which rivers become dry and the luxuriant grasses and other plants die, except for those species specially suited to the seasonal changes. These hardy, deep-rooted plants and trees, some with perpetually green foliage, save the landscape from giving the appearance of complete desolation during the summer. The density of the vegetation varies, some portions being made virtually impenetrable by a low scrub forest, while others are comparatively open with only scattered trees and cactuses. Bathed by a sun which seldom fails to appear, the days are hot during whatever season, though the nights often bring a refreshing coolness, which, particularly during the months from June to November, may become decidedly chilly. Actual temperatures vary from 60 to 95 degrees Fahrenheit.²

The rigorous natural characteristics of the Inhamuns did not prevent the entrance of settlers into the area, most of whom, coming from

2. The description of the geography of the Inhamuns is based, in part, on Thomaz Pompeu Sobrinho, Esboço Fisiográfico do Ceará (3rd. ed.; Fortaleza, 1962), pp. 48, 65-68, 109-110, and Joaquim Moreira de Sousa, Estudo sobre Ceará (Rio de Janeiro, 1955), pp. 57-58, and, in part, on the writer's observations.

Pernambuco and Bahia were already acquainted with similar terrain and climate. Ascending the Jaguaribe, they discovered the Inhamuns and soon spread the news of an area with lush winter pastures. In this manner, a movement began which, in time, turned the Inhamuns into one of the chief cattle producing sections of the Northeast.

The sesmarias, Portuguese land grants, afford a picture of how discovery and settlement proceeded.³ The sesmaria had been used since the 14th century in Portugal, where it was a means of granting abandoned or uncultivated lands to those who would utilize them. This served as a precedent for a similar practice in Portugal's new-world colony, where land was so abundant. The sesmarias were granted by the capitão-mor, the chief military and administrative officer of the Captaincy of Ceará. The size of the property was generally one league in width by three in length, though much more than this was sometimes awarded in one sesmaria.⁴ Of greater consequence, no limit was placed on the number of sesmarias that one person could be given. Basic to the description of the land was frontage on a river or riacho or the existence of a spring, a factor of importance in a land where water was scarce.

The first sesmaria in the Inhamuns was given in 1707, the last in 1821, two years before this system of granting possession of land was abandoned. The first one was granted by Capitão-mor Gabriel da Silva do Lago on January 26 to Lourenço Alves Feitosa, his brother, Francisco, Domingos Alves Esteves, Lourenço Gonçalves de Moura, Antonio Pinto

3. The sesmarias for Ceará are found in: Estado do Ceará, Datas de Sesmarias, 14 vols. (Fortaleza, 1920-1928), hereinafter referred to as Sesmarias. The following general description of the sesmaria is based on Tristão de Alencar Araripe, História do Ceará desde os Tempos Primitivos até 1850 (2nd. ed.; Fortaleza, 1958), pp. 96-101.

4. A league is 3.72 miles, while a legua de sesmaria is 4.10 miles.

Correia, and Simão Rodrigues Ferreira, each one receiving three leagues along the Rio Jucá. As was commonly done, the request noted that the lands were unused and, as such, were producing no revenues for the royal treasury.⁵ The next oldest sesmarias were granted on September 30 of the same year: one awarding Cosme Ferreira, Venceslau Gomes da Silva, and João Martins Fragoso nine leagues, three to each one, in the northern area of the Inhamuns along the Carrapateira; and the other giving to the same Simão Rodrigues mentioned above, Raulino Gomes da Silva, and Manoel Gomes Teixeira lands in the area of the Carrapateira and the Trici.⁶ The latter request stated that the petitioners were residents of the Jaguaribe, that they were prepared to defend themselves against Indians, that they had risked their lives and fortunes to discover these lands never before seen by white men, and that they had no lands on which to pasture their cattle. Moreover, they had planted crosses in the area, and, presenting an accomplished fact, added that they had established two fazendas on the lands requested and had constructed a fortified village for the defense of the settlers. All this at their own expense and to the glory of His Majesty. In answer to such achievements and determination, the capitão-mor granted to each one of the three the nine leagues he requested.

From 1707 to 1744 numerous sesmarias were granted within the Inhamuns to the above and other supplicants. Prominent among the largest landholders were Lourenço and Francisco Alves Feitosa, Francisco Ferreira Pedrosa, brother-in-law of the Feitosas, and Simão Rodrigues Ferreira. These and others of the sesmeiros held additional

5. Sesmarias, IV, 31-32.

6. Ibid., V, 14-15, 34.

lands outside the area; Lourenço Alves Feitosa was awarded a total of some 20 sesmarias scattered along the Jaguaribe and its tributaries from the Inhamuns to near Icô.⁷ Only a few sesmarias were granted after 1744, and the greater portion of these were awarded to persons already resident in the Inhamuns. By mid-century the basic framework of an economic and social structure was built, a structure in which the latifúndio was the principal characteristic and in which the Feitosas were the most powerful element.

The sesmeiros, along with their vaqueiros and slaves, were not the first humans to confront the Inhamuns. The history of Ceará's Indians of the 17th and 18th centuries is not easy to write, for they handed down no written documents and left very few traces of their existence, excepting those which can be found in the customs and physical features of today's cearense.⁸ Within the Inhamuns, all that remains of their history during these centuries are a few references made by their conquerors. The groupings mentioned by the early settlers were the Jucás and the Inhamuns, though there is little assurance that these were not the same Indians, since nomenclature given by the pioneers was very imprecise.⁹ Similar to other Indians of the region, they were nomadic in habit and limited their industry to simple agriculture and hunting and fishing. The characteristics which most impressed the settlers of Ceará were their warlike nature, their disdain for the white man's work, and their disregard of his laws.

7. Antonio Bezerra, Algumas Origens do Ceará (Fortaleza, 1918), p. 131.

8. An historical account of Ceará's Indians is given in Carlos Studart Filho, Os Aborígenes do Ceará (Fortaleza, 1956).

9. Ibid., p. 97.

Major efforts to eliminate the Indian threat to settlement were made between 1708 and 1727. After the last of these, an expedition which ascended the Jaguaribe to its headwaters, no more major Indian raids occurred against villages and fazendas.¹⁰ References to major Indian wars in the Inhamuns are few. The first capitão-mor of Icô, Bento da Silva e Oliveira, stated in 1741 that he was made a judicial official of that vila largely because of services rendered in 20 years of fighting the Inhamuns Indians,¹¹ and the descendants of Francisco Ferreira Pedrosa later claimed that that pioneer made various conquests of Indians, among them the Jucás.¹²

That the warlike propensities of the natives could be useful is attested by the fact that the Portuguese frequently used them to fight not only other Indians, but, on occasions to be related later, fellow settlers as well. In at least one case, the services of Ceará's warriors were requested by the authorities in Piauí. In an appeal in 1733 to the Capitão-mor of Ceará, the Piauí officials stated that Indians were destroying fazendas and killing cattle and settlers, by their actions impeding mining, commerce, and the coming of additional colonists. He then named six aldeias in Ceará, including the one inhabited by the Inhamuns Indians, and asked that 150 braves from them be sent to his aid,

10. Araripe, História do Ceará, p. 55.

11. Pedro Theberge, "Extractos dos Assentos do Antigo Senado do Icô desde 1738 até 1835," Revista do Instituto do Ceará, XXVI (1912), 224. The Revista is hereinafter referred to as RIC. The formal structure of colonial government is outlined in Ch. I, pp. 34-44.

12. Petition of José Alves Feitosa, Sept. 15, 1807. This document is from the Studart Collection, a massive accumulation of historical materials brought together during the late 19th and early 20th centuries by Guilherme Studart and now held by the Instituto do Ceará in Fortaleza. References herein to unpublished items in this collection identify the item and give the date and following designation: SC.

adding that while there were sufficient men in his comarca to fight, a war could not be waged without "gentio." The report made by the capitão-mor to the Governor of Pernambuco in regard to the matter sheds light on attitudes toward Indians. It was with "muito grande gosto," he wrote, that he ordered the local officials to gather the warriors and their women and children and march them to the neighboring captaincy. Noting that they were Indians who had escaped death in the late wars, he recommended that they remain in Piauí. Being few in number, he added, their continued presence in the captaincy could serve little purpose.¹³

Extermination and forced emigration were not the only answers the Portuguese had for the Indian problem in Ceará. Whether for religious motives, for the hope of using their labor, or merely to keep them from being a nuisance, or for a mixture of these reasons, attempts were made to gather surviving natives into aldeias. Such settlements were under the jurisdiction of a missionary, though it was custom to name a civil administrator to assist him. Theoretically, the missionary was the absolute authority in the aldeia, civil and military authorities and secular clergy being barred from entry without his permission. Royal orders required that each aldeia be given one square league of land, on which a church was to be constructed and on which the Indians were to build houses for themselves and for the missionary, as well as make their plantings.¹⁴

A number of missions were established in the captaincy, including several in the south. The Indians of the Inhamuns were placed in a

13. Capitão-mor of Ceará to Governor of Pernambuco, Feb. 1, 1733, SC.

14. Pedro Theberge, Esboço Histórico sobre a Província do Ceará, Pt. I (Fortaleza, 1869), pp. 104-105.

mission at Telha (later Iguatu),¹⁵ located between the Inhamuns and Icô, at São Matheus, at the entrance to the Inhamuns, and at Arneirôs. The last named, then known as the Mission at Jucás, was established where the Rio Jucá meets the Jaguaribe in the heart of the lands granted to the Feitosas. The traditional date given for its foundation is 1727, while surviving records of the mission date from 1733.¹⁶

The mission Indians, as the story is told by their conquerors, proved to be unwilling pupils. The residents of the Telha area registered a complaint in 1742 against the Indians there, who, they said, used their fishing trips outside the mission as pretext for stealing cattle and pillaging whatever else they found, this with the tolerance of the missionary.¹⁷ The Governor of Pernambuco, the following year, ordered an investigation of charges that the Feitosas had persuaded the Indians at Telha to desert their mission, presumably to live on the lands of that family, leaving the mission virtually uninhabited as a result.¹⁸ In 1749, because of continued raids on cattle, permission was given civil and military authorities to enter the missions at Telha and Jucás, among others, in order to arrest the erring Indians.¹⁹

By the late 1770's the Feitosas tired of their Indian friends, who continued to disregard the white man's laws in regard to property, and began to exterminate them.²⁰ Within the Feitosa family, there is the tradition that the persecution of the Indians, in at least one case, was

15. Studart Filho, Aborígenes do Ceará, p. 152.

16. Francisco de Assis Couto, Origens de São Mateus (Crato, 1966), pp. 11-12.

17. Theberge, "Extractos," pp. 225-226.

18. Theberge, Esboço Histórico, pp. 165-166.

19. Theberge, "Extractos," p. 227.

20. Theberge, Esboço Histórico, p. 194.

caused by their mistreatment of a Negro vaqueiro who had pursued them as a result of their raid on cattle. The Indians, according to the story, captured the vaqueiro, broke his arms and legs and gouged his eyes. Another story handed down by the family relates that the Indians killed cattle only when they were hungry.²¹ At any rate, the attitude of the Feitosas led the authorities to direct that the Indians at Arneirós be removed to an area near the coast, an order reported carried out in 1780 by Lieutenant Colonel Eufrásio Alves Feitosa, grandson of Francisco Alves Feitosa, the colonizer.²²

The Montes and Feitosas

Scarcely had the first colonizers of the Inhamuns time to concentrate on their major business of breeding cattle when, in 1724, the conflict which came to be known as the war between the Montes and Feitosas brought fear, turmoil, and, not infrequently, death to the headwaters of the Jaguaribe, as well as to the entire southern portion of the captaincy. It was a severe shock to a society in formation; more profoundly, it was a rigorous test of royal authority in an outlying area of Portugal's new world empire. On opposing sides in the struggle were powerful family groupings, constituting centers of social, economic, and military might, in the face of which the capitão-mor at the fort on the coast was virtually helpless.

The first of the Montes to arrive in Ceará preceded the Feitosas by several years, settling in the Icó area in 1682. By 1707, the year of

21. Leonardo Feitosa, "Para a História do Ceará" (unpublished manuscript, written in Arneirós in 1923-1924, now held by the Instituto do Ceará), Chapters XV-XVI. Pages are unnumbered.

22. Bezerra, Algumas Origens do Ceará, p. 233.

the appearance of the Feitosas, the Montes, their number still increasing by new arrivals, were counted among the potentates (potentados) of the land.²³ Their future antagonists achieved an equally prominent position in the years prior to the opening of the conflict, one well fortified by landholdings and military commissions. Francisco Alves Feitosa was appointed commanding officer in 1719 of the cavalry of Quixelô and the Inhamuns, while Lourenço, his brother, held the post of comissário.²⁴ Initial relations between the two families appear to have been at least moderately peaceful, since Francisco Alves Feitosa chose as his first wife the widowed sister of one of the Montes.²⁵

The origins of ill will between the Montes and Feitosas are obscure. The oldest known story of the war, first published in 1867, mentions a matter of honor between Francisco and his first wife's family and gives an account of rivalries over land grants.²⁶ The second oldest story of the struggle, published in 1869 and written by Pedro Theberge, a French-born physician who lived in Icô, treats of the war in greater detail, furnishing additional information on the land questions, but also only mentioning the matter of honor.²⁷ Both of these histories lack references to sources in their considerations of the origins of the war, and other portions of their accounts of the conflict, when compared to contemporary documents, are found to contain information of doubtful veracity.

23. Francisco de Assis Couto, História do Icô (Crato, 1962), pp. 37-39.

24. Antonio Bezerra, "Algumas Origens do Ceará," RIC, XV, Nos. 3 and 4 (1901), 265. The militia, a civilian army to which most men belonged, was the chief military force in Ceará during the colonial era. See Ch. I, pp. 34-38.

25. Leonardo Feitosa, Tratado Genealógico da Família Feitosa (Fortaleza, 1952), p. 7.

26. Araripe, História do Ceará, pp. 159-160.

27. Esboço Histórico, pp. 127-130.

Succeeding studies of the causes of the conflict either repeat the two earlier histories or are based on the sesmarias. The latter approach buttresses the contention that land rivalries occupied a prominent position among the causes. The fact that the Feitosas and the Montes were given large numbers of sesmarias in the same or neighboring areas strengthens the supposition that they were engaged in a race--perhaps friendly but, in any case, potentially explosive--to acquire as much land as possible. Specifically, the Feitosas were granted lands which the Montes earlier had been given, this on the contention of the former that the lands had not been used, a practice authorized by provisions governing the awarding of sesmarias. The sesmarias in question, located along the Riacho Truçu in the vicinity of Telha and along the Rio Cariús, were given to the Montes between 1706 and 1709, and to the Feitosas from 1720 to 1723.²⁸

The one known contemporary document that deals specifically with the causes of the conflict suggests that ill feeling may have existed between the chief contenders even before they made their appearances in Ceará. Desembargador Antonio Marques Cardozo, a judicial official who investigated the conflict, noted in a report presented in 1738 that rivalries existed between the two families when both were residents along the Rio São Francisco in the Captaincy of Pernambuco.²⁹

Whatever the causes may have been, their results engulfed the south of Ceará in a struggle of no small import during 1724 and 1725

28. Bezerra, "Algumas Origens do Ceará," pp. 265-266, and Couto, História do Icô, pp. 37-40. Among the newer accounts of the war, in addition to those of Bezerra and Couto in the aforementioned items, is L. A. Costa Pinto, Lutas de Famílias no Brasil (São Paulo, 1949), pp. 150-172.

29. Ofício of Antonio Marques Cardozo, Apr. 20, 1738, in "Documentário," RIC, LXXVIII (1964), 167.

and continued to threaten the peace of the region for many years thereafter. The first official notice of trouble in the valley of the Jaguaribe was an ofício (official letter) dated May 21, 1724, from a local magistrate of that area to the câmara at Aquiraz.³⁰ Juiz Ordinário Clemente de Azevedo related that on the previous day a "grossa tropa de gente," led by Lourenço and Francisco Alves Feitosa, had arrived in Cariri Novo, there combining with Colonel João da Fonseca Ferreira, a pioneer sesmeiro in the Rio Salgado area,³¹ and his Genipapes³² to launch an attack on the local residents. Sacking homes and fazendas and killing four persons on the first day of the raid, they kidnapped Negroes, married women, and "viuvas honradas." The judge further reported that the attackers claimed they were carrying out orders of the ouvidor, a royally appointed judicial official, and he lamented that they paid him very little attention, even threatening to expel him and his officials from the area. Azevedo ended his letter with an appeal for aid and instructions.³³ In reply Capitão-mor Manoel Frances, the highest ranking official in the captaincy, ordered Sargento-mor Antonio Lopes Teixeira to proceed to the area with 20 men to investigate the matter and to consult with the ouvidor, who should be, the capitão-mor added, already nearby with a contingent of men.³⁴

30. Until 1738 all of Ceará was within the jurisdiction of the câmara (also called senado) or municipal council at Aquiraz, located near the coast. See Ch. I, p. 38.

31. Couto, História do Icô, pp. 29-33.

32. The Genipapos were one group of Indians which took part in the conflict between the Montes and Feitosas; others were the Inhamuns, Jucás, Cariús, Tapuyas, Icôs, and Quixerarius.

33. From "Inéditos Relativos ao Levante Occorrido na Ribeira do Jaguaribe no Tempo de Manoel Frances e do Ouvidor Mendes Machado que Fazem Parte da Collecção Studart," introd. by Guilherme Studart, RIC, X, No. 1 (1896), 157-158, hereinafter cited as "Inéditos."

34. Ofício, June 5, 1724, ibid, p. 158.

The ouvidor whose presence was awaited in Cariri Novo was José Mendes Machado. Named the first head of the newly created Comarca of Ceará³⁵ in April, 1723, he was a center of controversy almost from the time of his arrival from Portugal the following September. Charged with policing the collection of taxes as well as exercising judicial functions, his vigorous actions and apparent zeal to enforce the letter of the law stirred up strong opposition in an area unaccustomed to both taxes and justice.³⁶ The capitão-mor took notice of Mendes Machado's activities in the sertão in mid-August of 1724, stating that he had received complaints concerning the new magistrate's conduct.³⁷

The complaints were many, according to the ouvidor's enemies. A letter to the capitão-mor written early in 1725 in the name of the residents of the valley of the Jaguaribe gave an account of the ouvidor's activities during the preceding year. In all the captaincy, the letter reported, the ouvidor conducted inquiries, demanding that the persons investigated pay costs of 80\$000 reis each, even in those cases in which several persons were involved in the same case. Moreover, the complainants charged, he condemned single men who cohabited with single women to fines of 4\$000 reis each, and, even worse, those who "se peccavam com duas" were fined double the amount. Besides these affronts, they continued, he initiated legal action against those who had killed cattle not theirs even though the owner consented, ordered men in the Inhamuns to be bound and undergo indignities even though their guilt had not been legally established, and verbally injured various persons without cause.

35. A judicial district embracing all of Ceará. A fuller discussion of the ouvidor's duties is found in Ch. I, p. 39.

36. Introd. to "Inéditos," pp. 145-146.

37. Ofícios, Aug. 18, 1724, ibid., pp. 159-160.

The most serious charge against José Mendes Machado centered around the alliance he had made with the Feitosas. According to the letter, the ouvidor encountered the Feitosa brothers, accompanied by their relatives and sequazes (partisans), and Colonel Ferreira at São Matheus. They had just returned from an attack on the Montes, a raid in which they used Indians to sack fazendas and murder vaqueiros, the Montes themselves being forced to flee for their lives. The ouvidor, in the face of such acts, the petitioners indignantly reported, not only did not arrest the leaders, but entered into an alliance with them, integrating his troops with theirs. The combined forces then launched new attacks on their enemies, sacking and killing and stealing the arms which the people had as defense against Indians. Nor again were women exempt. Their gold and clothing were taken and they were insulted by words and actions, the raiders "mettendo-lhes as mãos pelas maneiras das saias" and firing on them as they sought to flee.

The magistrate on his own initiative, the letter continued, gathered a force of 80 Genipapos and 200 soldiers in an attempt to force his will on the people of the captaincy. They, fearing they would be totally destroyed, offered him gifts of gold, silver, and other valuables, but, this not satisfying him, he continued his attacks, "não lhe escapando coisa viva...."³⁸

The known official documents furnish only scant information on the reaction of the Montes and their allies to the alleged depredations of those grouped around the Feitosas, and they give little insight into whatever defense the ouvidor and the Feitosa group may have given of

38. "Requerimento do Povo," Feb. 3, 1725, ibid., pp. 185-189.

their actions. With few exceptions--those few to be noted in due course--the documents contain only information furnished by enemies of the ouvidor and the Feitosas, a fact which led Leonardo Feitosa, the genealogist as well as one of the chief apologists of his family, to contend that accounts of the struggle based on these documents treat unfairly of his ancestors.³⁹

Theberge's history may be used as an antidote to the version revealed by the documents, though it would be helpful to know where he found his information. He wrote that the Montes and their allies, tiring of being mauled by their enemies, resolved to end the war with one great blow, amassing their forces and marching toward the Inhamuns with a "verdadeiro exército." Passing by the aldeia at São Matheus, they added the Inhamuns Indians to their forces, who, being long-time enemies of the Jucás Indians, partisans of the Feitosas, were more than willing to participate in the planned massacre. All did not go as planned. The Feitosas, warned of the army's approach, gathered their people and awaited its arrival. At the place later christened Bom Sucesso, they surprised the would-be surprisers with a rout that was complete. Flushed with success, the Feitosas and their Indian allies marched to São Matheus the following Sunday, where, surprising the Inhamuns Indians at mass, they massacred all of them.

Theberge also wrote that the Montes assassinated a judicial official who was sent south to investigate their conflict with the Feitosas, and that they attacked the ouvidor's forces after their request for his recall had gone unheeded.⁴⁰

39. Feitosa, Tratado Genealógico, p. 9.

40. Esboço Histórico, pp. 131-133.

Meanwhile, Capitão-mor Frances, alarmed by events in the sertão and having been unable to influence their course, unleashed a barrage of orders in August and September of 1724. Lamenting that colonels and other officials of the militia were involved in the war, he decreed on August 18 that any such officials persisting in these activities would be condemned to death and their wealth confiscated. In the same order, he forbade that arms belonging to the militia should be used in the conflict.⁴¹ Four days later in a joint *ofício* with the *câmara*, he appealed to the *ouvidor* to retire from the area in the interest of his personal safety, advising him that in tumults such as those sweeping the sertão one must use prudence in the performance of his duties.⁴² Apparently not sure of his sources of information and wanting to use caution in his relations with the *ouvidor*, Frances requested on September 11 that local magistrates and other officials of the *câmara* inform him as to why the people were dissatisfied with the *ouvidor's* actions and why so many deaths had occurred in the areas in which he had been present.⁴³ Frances, on the following day, ordered Colonel João de Barros Braga to go to the valley of the Jaguaribe, where he was to locate the principal residents and forbid them to take any actions against the *ouvidor*, who, he warned, was sent by His Majesty to administer justice.⁴⁴

Before his order to prevent reprisals against the *ouvidor* had time to be executed, the capitão-mor took stronger action. On September 13, he ordered the *ouvidor* to retire from the sertão by the best means possible, leaving his followers behind, since, Mendes Machado was warned,

41. "Inéditos," p. 161.

42. *Ibid.*, pp. 161-162.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 160.

44. *Ibid.*, pp. 162-163.

they were in his company more for the purpose of exercising their vengeance than for service to the king. He added that should the ouvidor not heed the order he would use force to insure that it was carried out.⁴⁵ And two days later an order was addressed to Colonel Ferreira, Comissário Lourenço Alves Feitosa, and Captain Antonio de Souza Gularte directing them to abstain from committing any actions, under penalty of being declared disloyal to the king, which would impede the ouvidor's exit.⁴⁶

The capitão-mor apparently was convinced by mid-September that the ouvidor was largely responsible for the conflicts in the interior. On the 13th, in an order directed to an official of the militia, he stated that the residents of the sertão were in arms because the ouvidor had allowed his office to become a shield for private vengeance. As a result of such imprudence, he continued, more than 400 persons had been killed.⁴⁷

During the next several weeks, relations between Mendes Machado and the other officials of the captaincy did not take a turn for the better. On September 15, the câmara at Aquiraz, which throughout the struggle opposed the ouvidor and his allies, sent a report to the Governor of Pernambuco in which its members stated that the ouvidor had ordered the arrest of the Montes and joined his forces with those of their enemies. The combined forces, the report continued, invaded the home of Francisco de Montes and engaged in killing and looting.⁴⁸ In

⁴⁵. Ibid., p. 163.

⁴⁶. Ibid., pp. 167-168.

⁴⁷. Ibid., pp. 163-164.

⁴⁸. Ibid., pp. 165-167. The report was sent to the Governor of Pernambuco, for until 1799 the Captaincy of Ceará was, in effect, a sub-captaincy of Pernambuco.

the first week of October, an appeal in the name of the people of the Jaguaribe was directed to Frances requesting that all of the official acts of the ouvidor be repudiated and that he be arrested.⁴⁹

Though not as yet prepared to order the arrest of the royal magistrate, the capitão-mor did move to curtail his power by directing Comissário Pedro da Rocha Franco on October 8 to deny him troops to further his ends. He also stated in the ofício that the câmara had elected a new ouvidor to replace Mendes Machado.⁵⁰ The election of Captain Valentim Calado Rego, the oldest juiz ordinário of the câmara, was highly irregular, although it was consented to by the capitão-mor.⁵¹ In effect, the potentates of Aquiraz usurped the power of the crown in their desire to rid themselves of the official it had appointed. The same ofício of October 8 indicated that the struggle in the interior still continued, the capitão-mor stating that half of the population was found in the camp of the ouvidor. Before the end of October, he dispatched two more ofícios.⁵² The first, dated the 22nd, informed Mendes Machado that before his arrival the captaincy had been peaceful, but because of his actions the sertão was now in war. And on the following day, he took the long-demanded action, directing Lieutenant Colonel Manoel Pereira Pinto to conduct the ouvidor to the fort. He ordered that the best security measures be employed and cautioned the official to take no action which might offend His Majesty's appointee. Three days later, Frances wrote the câmara that should his previous

49. "Requerimento do Povo," Oct. 3, 1724, *ibid.*, pp. 171-172.

50. *Ibid.*, pp. 172-173.

51. Ofício, Oct. 27, 1724, *ibid.*, pp. 175-176.

52. *Ibid.*, pp. 173-175.

action not be sufficient he did not possess sufficient troops to bring about the ouvidor's retirement from the sertão by force.⁵³

The order for the detainment of Mendes Machado--it was not to be an arrest, according to the capitão-mor--may have made a belated impression on him. It was later reported that he retired to Piauí with his officials, though it appears that he did not do so until near the end of the year. When José Mendes Machado did leave, his enemies were convinced, he bade his allies goodbye with orders to continue the fight.⁵⁴

As indicated by official correspondence, the fight, indeed, did continue. Three days before Christmas, the capitão-mor stated that it appeared the people were determined to perish in battle rather than heed his orders,⁵⁵ this opinion following a proclamation of late November in which he had ordered the residents of the Jaguaribe to return to their fazendas and comport themselves as good vassals.⁵⁶ On the 26th, noting that peace still did not reign in the valley and that many killings continued to be reported, he repeated the order and further directed that Indians participating in the conflict be returned to their aldeias.⁵⁷ The next ofício, dated January 27, 1725, directed that no more than seven persons in one group would be allowed to travel in the theatre of the conflict, excepting those conducting official business.

53. Letter referred to in: Valentim Calado Rego to Capitão-mor Manoel Frances, Sept. 28, 1724, *ibid.*, pp. 170-171. Apart from the militia, military forces in Ceará during the 18th century generally consisted of 50 to 60 regular troops, who manned the fort on the coast. Araripe, *História do Ceará*, p. 85.

54. "Requerimento do Povo," Feb. 3, 1725, "Inéditos," pp. 185-189.

55. *Ibid.*, pp. 177-178.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 177.

57. *Ibid.*, pp. 178-179.

As if he had little hope that his newest move would be effective, he added that "tão repetidas vezes" his orders had been disregarded.⁵⁸

Manoel Frances, nonetheless, continued his release of instructions relative to the war, two of them during January and February, 1725, directed at the Feitosas.⁵⁹ The first of these, a proclamation dated January 28 to be posted in the Inhamuns, suspended Lourenço and Francisco from their posts in the militia, ordered the residents of the area not to obey them, and gave Capitão-mor José de Araujo Chaves temporary command of the Inhamuns. The new commander was not a stranger in the dominion of the Feitosas. A founder of one of colonial Ceará's most distinguished families, Chaves held land grants in the Inhamuns, though his residence and principal seat of power were in the region later to become Vila Nova d'El Rey (later called Ipu).⁶⁰ The second of Frances' orders, dated February 18 and addressed to the Feitosa brothers, threatened to declare them public enemies if they did not terminate their aggressions.

News from the Inhamuns during late February, 1725, was not of a nature to cheer the capitão-mor. He was informed on February 25 by Padre Domingos Dias da Silveira, a sesmeiro in the Inhamuns, that the Feitosas continued to destroy those who opposed them. According to the padre's letter, they had gathered a band of Genipapos and Cariús, which, under the guidance of a son of Francisco Alves Feitosa, murdered several residents of the Inhamuns, among them Captain Luiz Coelho Vital, a

58. *Ibid.*, p. 179.

59. *Ibid.*, pp. 180-181.

60. See Ch. I, pp. 58-59.

sesmeiro since 1717 near the confluence of the Trici and the Carrapa-teira.⁶¹ As a result of recent events, the padre told Frances, the greater part of the inhabitants of the area were remaining close to their fazendas or had fled to the church in fear that the Feitosas and their Indian allies would launch new attacks.⁶² That the Inhamuns continued in a state of turmoil appears to be indicated in officios released March 10 directing various officers of the militia to aid efforts to bring peace to the strife-torn area.⁶³

While the Feitosas were drawing fire from the pen of the capitão-mor as a result of their raids, their antagonists attempted to improve their position relative to that royal official. In the appeal to him dated February 3, 1725, in which they gave the review of the history of the war referred to before, they apologized for some of their misdeeds. They had taken Indians from the aldeias to use against the forces of the ouvidor and his allies, even without the consent of the capitão-mor, they confessed, but only because their forces alone could not hold back the enemy and only as a last resort to defend their lives, honor, and property. Excessive deaths and destruction had occurred, they admitted, but only because of the tumult, the just grievances of the people, and the exigencies of war. After having explained in this manner the reasons for their disregard of the capitão-mor's instructions, they brought their appeal to a close with a moving plea for a general pardon in the name of His Majesty.⁶⁴

61. Sesmarias, X, 101-102.

62. Letter referred to in an officio of Feb. 28, 1725, in "Inéditos," pp. 183-184.

63. Ibid., p. 192.

64. Ibid., pp. 185-189.

The only immediate reply to their petition was the capitão-mor's ofício of February 23 directing Antonio Mendes Lobato, son of a recently deceased, leading potentate of the south of Ceará,⁶⁵ and Manoel de Souza Barbalho, along with their relatives and other allies of the Montes, to end their aggressions and subject themselves to the law as good vassals should.⁶⁶ Possibly affecting Frances' actions was a letter he had received some two weeks earlier from the Indians of the Jaguaribe complaining that they had been called upon to fight the Genipapos, allies of the Feitosas, having been shown false orders to that end said to have been signed by the capitão-mor.⁶⁷

A measure of peace began to return to the south of Ceará before the end of 1725, if the diminishing number of orders relative to the conflict was a reliable indication. Several events occurring during the year may have contributed to a lessening of the struggle, the first being action taken by the Governor of Pernambuco, Dom Manoel de Rolim de Moura. This official issued a proclamation on April 10, 1725, ordering the residents of the Jaguaribe to return to their homes, to abstain from violence, and to obey Frances, under penalty of being declared rebels and having their fazendas confiscated by the crown. He then extended a piece of the olive branch in conceding a general pardon to the participants in the war, excluding from it the principal leaders.⁶⁸

Also during the month of April, it was reported that one of the chieftains in the war, José Mendes Machado--the ex-ouvidor--had arrived in Bahia several weeks previously "muito satisfeito" with the glories

65. Bezerra, "Algumas Origens do Ceará," p. 255, and João Brigido, "História," *Cearense* (Fortaleza), Aug. 15, 1875.

66. "Inéditos," pp. 182-183.

67. "Requerimento dos Índios," *ibid.*, pp. 189-190.

68. *Ibid.*, pp. 193-194.

he had acquired in Ceará. The judicial officials there did not think that he would attempt to return to Ceará, but in the event that he should want to do so, they stated, he would be ordered not to leave Bahia without royal permission.⁶⁹

Now armed with the proclamation of the governor, Manoel Frances resolved to assume a more active role in the pacification of his jurisdiction. On May 30 he reported to the câmara his intention to journey to the Inhamuns, taking in his company a force of 10 regular soldiers, 24 cavalrymen, and 30 Indians, for the purpose of reinforcing the troops already there and personally giving the orders of the governor to Francisco Alves Feitosa and other residents of the area. The plan to go to the Inhamuns, Frances told the câmara, was occasioned by several factors. First, it was evident, according to reports from that area, that the Feitosas would disregard a recent order directing them to deliver their Indian allies to officials designated by the capitão-mor. Second, Frances said, the Feitosas had not repented of their misdeeds. Francisco had written him, he continued, that an unfriendly attitude ought not to be taken toward his activities, that, if he was guilty of wrongdoing, it was only a result of his zeal to defend the ouvidor, and that, in whatever case, his faults were not as ugly as his enemies claimed. Such obstinacy, the capitão-mor told the câmara, indicated insufficient fear of the king and that in all likelihood the Feitosas would continue their hostilities, which, indeed, he added, they had as yet shown no desire to bring to a conclusion. Recent complaints from the Inhamuns, he said, indicated that the Feitosas and their Indian allies were con-

⁶⁹. Ofício of Vasco Frz. Cezar de Menezes, Apr. 6, 1725, *ibid.*, p. 193.

tinuing to employ violence against those who refused to cooperate with them.⁷⁰ Hence, the determination of Frances to confront the potentates of the Inhamuns face to face.

Meanwhile, on July 30 the governor extended the pardon to the leaders of the uprising and, at the same time, further strengthened the hand of the capitão-mor by declaring that no person of whatever "qualidade ou condição que seja" would henceforth be permitted to possess troops, even though they be as few as six, without official permission.⁷¹ In another order, later reported by the capitão-mor to have been given at the same time, the governor directed Frances to arrest or exterminate any Indians who failed to obey him.⁷²

The capitão-mor reported on December 10, 1725, that his moves had been only partially successful. All obeyed the orders to abstain from violence and relinquish their Indian followers and other troops, he informed the câmara, except Colonel Ferreira and the Feitosas. Ferreira had fled to Piancó, in nearby Paraíba, with his Tapuyas, Frances said, and the Feitosas also had retired with their followers. But both the colonel and the Feitosas, he affirmed, had made their moves only so as to be able to return at a later date to continue the destruction to which they had become accustomed. Frances mentioned in his report that he had gone to the Inhamuns in an attempt to punish the criminals, but he failed to give information as to what had happened on the expedition.⁷³ If, as appears likely, the Feitosa chieftains retreated from the area before his arrival, the journey may have been rather uneventful.

70. *Ibid.*, pp. 194-195, 197-198.

71. *Ibid.*, pp. 195-196.

72. Referred to in an ofício of Dec. 10, 1725, *ibid.*, pp. 197-198.

73. *Ibid.*

Although it appears that the war diminished during its second year, at least in part as a result of the intervention of the governor and the succeeding moves of the capitão-mor, its aftermath threatened to plunge the sertão into a bloody encore for many years. On March 8, 1726, Manoel Frances ordered a proclamation posted in all public places of his jurisdiction which indicated that stringent orders and pardons had not been sufficient to repress rancors and passions. Giving a brief review of the struggle between "uns chamados Feitosas contra os Montes," Frances argued that his efforts to suppress the hostilities had been made difficult by the imprudence of the ouvidor, the use of Indians by both sides, and the 130 leagues separating his fortress from the home of the Feitosas. Then proceeding to the reason for the proclamation, he stated that the opposing sides were threatening to reopen the war, and, having met with his officials, he had resolved to issue a number of orders. First, he directed that the Genipapos, Icós, and Quixerarius be removed to Piauí. Second, he ordered Colonel Ferreira, Francisco Alves Feitosa and his son by the same name, and Lourenço, the chiefs of one side, and Antonio Mendes Lobato, Manoel de Souza Barbalho, Theodósio Nogueira, and Antonio Gonçalves de Souza, from the opposing side, to absent themselves from the captaincy. Third, he directed persons in possession of horses or other animals belonging to either of the two factions to restore them to their owners, already having stated that those expelled could leave their fazendas in the care of legally appointed administrators. Persons disobeying these orders were to have their wealth confiscated, and they were to be declared rebels and condemned to suffer the ultimate penalty.⁷⁴

⁷⁴. Antonio Bezerra, "Algumas Origens do Ceará, Parte Documental," PIC, XVI (1902), pp. 154-155.

By 1727 news of the conflict had reached officials in Portugal, for in that year the crown ordered the Relação of Bahia, the colony's highest judicial body, to conduct an investigation of the recent uprising in Ceará.⁷⁵

On April 2, 1731, seven years after the outbreak of the war, Ouvidor Pedro Cardozo de Norvões of Ceará informed his superiors that he had encountered evidence that a new uprising was in the offing, even though, he added, he had been told that the principal leaders of the previous hostilities were dead. The ouvidor stated that the only definitive answer to the threatened reopening of the conflict was the destruction of the potentates of the captaincy, in which case the area would be left deserted and lost to the crown. Before taking such a harsh move, he recommended, it would be wiser to give some lesser demonstration of royal power in the hope that it might make more stringent moves unnecessary. To this officio, an advisor of the crown attached a note stating that Norvões had been sent orders instructing him not to spare punishment to any person disobeying the king, though recommending a measure of prudence in the dispensation of justice.⁷⁶

The representative of the Relação of Bahia who ultimately conducted the investigation of the war and who sought a definitive solution to the problems left by it was Desembargador Antonio Marques Cardozo. His report of April 20, 1738, from Ceará, pointed to some of the difficulties involved in a resolution of the conflict. The desembargador, noting that many members of the Monte and Feitosa

75. Referred to in Secretary of State to Conselho Ultramarino, July 5, 1730, "Inéditos," pp. 199-200.

76. Ibid., pp. 200-201.

families and their allies continued to hold posts in the militia, recommended that he be ordered to relieve them of such positions. This action, he said, would strip them of some of their power and leave them less equipped to plunge the area into another war, for, he added, they were certain to resume their wayward conduct after his departure. Cardozo informed his superiors that he had also ordered the arrest of the leaders of the uprising, but, he emphasized, the execution of the order would entail great difficulties in regard to the Feitosas. They were in their homes, located many leagues from the fort, and it would be impossible to send a contingent of troops to arrest them, he said, without their being informed of its approach, since almost all of the residents of the area were connected with that family. To skirt this problem, he ordered the colonel of the militia in the Inhamuns to perform the task, and the colonel in his reply agreed that, indeed, the problem was a difficult one. Having his home in the area, he did not think that it would be wise to execute the order himself, but, having been ordered to do so, he would attempt to comply "achando ocasião oportuna." Should the Feitosas be arrested, the desembargador concluded, they would be sent to Pernambuco, since the jail at the fort could not be made secure without considerable effort.⁷⁷

Desembargador Cardozo presented the results of his investigation to the officials in Lisbon on March 26, 1745. The desembargador noted that, as a result of an eye ailment from which he suffered, the investigation had been much delayed. By the time he recovered from his illness, he stated in apology, José Mendes Machado had died; and, consequently, no information from him was included in the report. De-

77. "Documentário," RIC (1964), p. 167.

parting with the controversial magistrate, presumably, was his side of the story. In the covering letter to the report, Cardozo stated that 147 persons had been killed during the years of hostilities--a figure considerably smaller than that given earlier by the capitão-mor--deaths, he said, for which the Montes and Feitosas, along with their partisans, were responsible.⁷⁸

It does not appear that the leaders of the warring sides suffered greatly at the hands of the officials, if Francisco Alves Feitosa was representative. While he did lose six leagues of property in the Riacho Truçu, sequestered from him to pay the costs of the investigation,⁷⁹ Capitão-mor Francisco da Costa in 1747 granted him three leagues near the Serra Timbaúba in the Inhamuns.⁸⁰ From this action, it appears that the Feitosa chieftain not only recuperated a portion of his losses but returned to the good graces of the officials as well.

Theberge again supplements the official documents with some interesting details, and indicates that recriminatory acts continued for many years after the sounds of the major battles had died. According to him, Lourenço Alves Feitosa retired to Pernambuco during the height of official efforts to repress the conflict, while, somewhat later, Francisco moved over into Piauí, from which he continued to terrorize the Montes and their allies, being yet responsible for the deaths of nine of that faction. Theberge also wrote that the records of the câmara at Icô indicated that several killings related to the struggle occurred after that body was inaugurated in 1738. One of them was the murder of

78. "Inéditos," pp. 207-208. Only the covering letter is included in the Studart documents.

79. Bezerra, "Algumas Origens do Ceará," p. 269.

80. Sesmarias, VIII, 193-194.

Captain Manoel de Montes Pereira in the Rio Salgado area, a crime in which Lourenço and Francisco Alves Feitosa, a slave of the former named André, and Captain Alvaro de Lima Oliveira were implicated. This act was followed by the assassination of Captain Oliveira by Colonel Francisco de Monte.⁸¹

The story of the war between the Montes and Feitosas serves as a valuable commentary on the society of the Inhamuns as well as of the entire captaincy during the first half century following the arrival of Portuguese settlers to the area. The principal element of social control during this period was private power as contrasted to governmental power. The crown, attempting to people the sertão and erase the Indian menace at a minimum of expense and official effort, relied on the promise of generous land grants to attract fazendeiros sufficiently powerful to accomplish the task. The might of these potentates was officially blessed by conferring commissions in the militia on them, and, in some cases, the patent as local capitão-mor.

The crown-fazendeiro relationship lacked the necessary element of reciprocity. While the crown needed the potentates and demanded much of them, they, in turn, had little cause to respect or place reliance on the crown. They presided over miniature kingdoms, their vaqueiros, artisans, and agriculturists filling the ranks of their private armies. If these non-landed elements were also members of the militia, as many of them were, this was only an incidental factor, for to them the chief lines of authority emanated from the fazendeiro not because he was an officer in the militia but because he

81. Arquivo Histórico, pp. 136-138.

was their patrão. Highly important, the patrão relationship involved elements of respect for one's social superiors, economic ties, affection or fear or both, and, not infrequently, kinship links. These small kingdoms of one given area, when interlocked by blood relations of the owners--as was the case in the Inhamuns--constituted clans in possession of concentrations of power of no small import. Adding to their strength was the power they were able to exert over Indian tribes, this in part given to them by the crown and in part assumed by them as a means of social control in the vacuum left by the weaknesses of civil and ecclesiastical power. In contrast to the power of the potentates, the authority of the crown was weak. Represented by the capitão-mor, whose base was the fortress on the coast manned by a small detachment of regular troops, and the ouvidor, royal authority could do little but plead or threaten. The militia as an element of royal power was of questionable reliability, as events proved.

The system broke down in Ceará when a conflict originated which involved or came to involve a complex of family rivalries, alleged insults, unpopular actions by a government official, and old enmities among the Indians. A stronger more efficient government, in all likelihood, could have prevented the outbreak of violence, finding a solution through a combination of the use of official force and the machinery of justice, two elements which did not exist to significant degrees in early to mid-18th century Ceará. In their absence, a resolution of the problems was sought utilizing the channels which were available. The ouvidor, alone possessing insufficient strength, attempted to take advantage of the power of one of the family groupings in an attempt to assert his authority. The two original family groupings resorted to

war, seeking to fulfill their ends by the extermination of the persons and power of the opposing camp. Additional fazendeiros and family groupings were drawn into the war, adhering to one side or the other, for reasons, it would seem, of sympathy, blood ties, protection, and, quite likely, private ends of their own.

The war and its aftermath of continued violence were brought to a conclusion, it appears, by a greater number of factors than the threats and limited actions of the officials. A possible contributing factor was the sêca (drought) which assaulted Ceará during the mid-1720's.⁸² This natural calamity may have hastened the lessening of the war by destroying the resources with which it could be waged, as well as by adding to the decision of some of the leading participants to flee from the captaincy. It also seems likely that the opposing sides satisfied their thirst for revenge and in time arrived at what they considered to be an accommodation which no longer demanded further reprisals. Contributing to such an accommodation may have been the attrition exacted by the passing of the years, as old warriors disappeared from the scene and once-intense passions lost some of their urgency.

Tradition records that the Montes were so impoverished and decimated by the conflict that they never recovered; and, indeed, by the virtual disappearance of the family's name from the history of Ceará, it appears that such may well have been the case. As for Francisco Alves Feitosa and his numerous and hardy descendants, the last had not been heard from them, as so many of these following pages attest.

82. Ibid., p. 141.

The Formal Structure of Local Government

During the century or so between the War of the Montes and Feitosas and the end of the colonial period, Ceará assumed many of the characteristics of the more advanced units in Portugal's colonial empire. The culminating event was Ceará's elevation to a captaincy of the first order in 1799, at which time it acquired a governor (replacing the capitão-mor), its subjugation to Pernambuco coming to an end. The Inhamuns kept pace, as evinced by its promotion to a vila three years later in 1802.⁸³ The steps toward this latter event included, among other factors, developments in the three areas of the formal structure of local government: the military, civil, and religious.

The first permanent Portuguese authority in the Inhamuns appears to have been of a military nature. That, in any case, a military unit was in existence in the area by 1719 is indicated by the nomination of Francisco Alves Feitosa, as mentioned before, as colonel of the cavalry of Quixelô and the Inhamuns in that year. The cavalry of the Inhamuns was a unit in the ordenanças, a militia composed of men aged 18 to 40 years who had visible means of economic support.⁸⁴ Organized by vilas, or by special districts in the absence of a vila (as was the case in the Inhamuns in the 18th century), the ordenanças were under the local command of a colonel or capitão-mor,⁸⁵ who, in turn, was subordinated to the ranking royal officer--governor or capitão-mor, as the case

83. The vila was the basic local unit in Portuguese government. It included the population center which served as the seat and the surrounding territory assigned to it.

84. In general, the description of the militia presented here is based on Araripe, História do Ceará, pp. 83-86. Also see: Caio Prado Junior, Formação do Brasil Contemporâneo (7th ed.; São Paulo, 1963), pp. 310-311. Additional data are drawn from the sources noted.

85. The commanding officer often was referred to as both colonel and capitão-mor.

might be--of the captaincy. Second in command was either a lieutenant-colonel or a sargento-mor. The militia of the vila or special district was further organized into sub-areas, also called districts, each one under the command of a captain who was responsible to the local capitão-mor. As examples, in 1752 the Vila of Icô, then comprising all of the south of Ceará, was organized into nine special districts, each having its own militia under the command of a capitão-mor.⁸⁶ The Inhamuns was one such district, Quixelô forming a separate one by that year. To provide an example of the sub-areas, in 1813 the Inhamuns, by then a vila, was divided into the eight districts of Cococy, Flores, Arneirós, Umbuzeiro, Puiú, Carrapateira, Maria Pereira, and the Riacho das Favelas, each commanded by a captain.⁸⁷

The colonel was named by the governor, the nomination being subject to royal approval. To fill his staff, down to and including captains, the colonel, in consultation with the câmara of the vila, proposed three names for each vacancy to the governor, who made the final choice.⁸⁸ The captains, in theory, named their inferior officers, subject to the approval of the colonel, but, in practice, the governor could direct the entire process by his control of royal patents. Governor Manoel Ignácio de Sampaio in 1812 complained to the capitães-mores that many captains were neglecting to secure royal patents for their nominations;⁸⁹ and later in the year when he wrote the commanding

86. Theberge, *Esboço Histórico*, p. 173.

87. Entry of Sept. 16, 1813, Register of ofícios of the Governor of Ceará to the capitães-mores, Vol. 31, Arquivo Público, Fortaleza. This register and others of the kind are cited hereinafter as: ROGC. Following this designation is the volume number used by the archive.

88. Entry of Oct. 7, 1812, ROGC, Vol. 433.

89. Entry of Apr. 30, 1812, *ibid.*

officers of the Inhamuns requesting nominations for the posts of alferes and other inferior officers, he stated that he would order patents issued only in the event that he approved of the names submitted.⁹⁰

Uniforms and hair styles for the officers and soldiers of the *ordenanças* were minutely specified. The former, down to and including *alferes*, were to dress in white coats and trousers made of high-quality cloth, with yellow buttons, and in a hat adorned with silver lace and silk bands. The uniforms of the lesser officers and soldiers were of the same general appearance, though of less elegant cloth and with hat bands of wool, while both groups were required to wear spurs on both feet. The only hair style permitted was the pigtail, one for the officers and two for the soldiers.⁹¹ Inspections were conducted by the governor (or *capitão-mor*), as in 1775 when Antonio José Victoriano Borges de Fonseca directed Colonel Manoel Ferreira Ferro, son of Francisco Alves Feitosa, to assemble his regiment for that purpose on Sunday, October 22 at 7:00 A.M. at Cococy.⁹²

The principal function of the militia, once conquest of the *sertão* was accomplished, was to serve as the police force. The *capitão-mor* was, in effect, a liberally endowed chief of police, the captains of the district acting as his chief lieutenants. Among his duties were keeping the governor informed of happenings in the area, arresting criminals as well as expelling all those whom he considered undesirable, prohibiting public gatherings when he deemed such action necessary, and

90. Entry of Oct. 7, 1812, *ibid.*

91. Entry of Aug. 3, 1768, *ROGC*, Vol. 537.

92. Entry of July 22, 1775, *ROGC*, Vol. 534.

taking any measures the situation demanded to prevent strife and to settle quarrels.⁹³ The officios of the governors of Ceará to the capitães-mores of the Inhamuns provide proof that the latter, in concert with the governor, did possess broad discretionary powers. While on occasion the governor would order him to free a criminal who had been arrested or specify the term of imprisonment, on other occasions he would direct that the criminal in question be held until the capitão-mor considered him sufficiently punished. Although the capitão-mor was to keep the governor minutely informed on all happenings and consult with him on all important moves, in practice he, of necessity, operated with a great deal of independence because of the slowness of communications and the distance from the coast.

The post of capitão-mor, filled for three-year terms until 1749 and afterwards for life,⁹⁴ was much sought. The crown usually awarded it to the most powerful figure of the area, and not without reason. Though a juiz de fora could be placed in any vila where the crown considered this official necessary,⁹⁵ it was the capitão-mor who was expected to care for the crown's interests in the vast majority of the vilas. Naming the already established chief of the area to the office made the task easier, at least in theory. It was an attempt of the crown to utilize the power of the existing leaders to its own end, which, in fact, was about

93. Diogo de Vasconcelos, "Linhas Geraes da Administração Colonial," Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, Special Volume, Pt. III (Primeiro Congresso de História Nacional, 1914), 296.

94. Araripe, História do Ceará, p. 85.

95. On the juiz de fora, see Ch. I, pp. 40-41.

the only accommodation the crown could make to private power in the absence of a large regular army or any other agency of effective social control.⁹⁶

Civil authority on the local level was exercised by the câmara and judicial officials.⁹⁷ The Inhamuns, as was all of Ceará, was originally included in the Vila of Aquiraz, founded in 1700. With the inauguration of the Vila of Icó in 1738, the Inhamuns passed into its jurisdiction, where it remained until 1802.

The câmara was composed of two or three vereadores and two juizes ordinários, all of whom were elected by the homens bons, the vereadores for three-year terms, the juizes ordinários for terms of one year. No satisfactory all-inclusive definition of an homen bom exists, though it is clear that he was a person who was regarded as belonging to the upper strata of the community in which he lived. The system of election was indirect, the voters choosing six electors who then made the selection of the officials.

The câmara, presided over by one of the juizes ordinários, included among its functions: levying taxes on some items and professions, others being reserved to the crown; responsibility for the construction and upkeep of roads and bridges; legislating for the vila by adopting local laws, called posturas; judging some infractions of laws of limited consequence; providing for the routine administering and policing of the vila; naming some of the minor officials. Among the minor officials were

96. Victor Nunes Leal, Coronelismo, Enxada e Voto, (Rio de Janeiro, 1948), pp. 153-154. The most famous of the capitães-mores of the Inhamuns, José Alves Feitosa, rates a section of his own later in this chapter. See pp. 44-55.

97. The following description of civil government is based chiefly on the following: Araripe, História do Ceará, pp. 81-93; Max Fleiuss, História Administrativa do Brasil (2nd ed.; São Paulo, 1925), pp. 32-38; Leal, Coronelismo, pp. 38-45, 74-76, 137-140.

a procurador, whose function was to insure that the posturas were obeyed, a treasurer, a clerk, a jailer, and the quadrilheiros, who served as local guards.

The judicial structure reached from minor local magistrates to the crown, by route of the juizes ordinários, ouvidores, the relações, and the Conselho Ultramarino. Ceará was included within the jurisdiction of the Relação of Bahia, the highest court of appeals in the colony until the crown itself moved to Brazil in the early 19th century. With the creation of the Relação of Recife in 1821, Ceará passed into its jurisdiction. Below the relação was the ouvidor, whose jurisdiction was a comarca, this unit subdivided into termos, each termo usually consisting of a vila. Only one comarca existed in the captaincy until 1816, when the Comarca of Crato was created, including the Inhamuns within the territory.

The functions of the ouvidor were many. Having original jurisdiction over crimes involving homicide or large sums of money, he also was required to visit each termo annually to inspect the work of the judges inferior to him and to correct any errors he located, including ordering the inferior judges to proceed against any criminals they may have neglected. In addition, he was to: inspect jails; police the election of the câmaras; insure that roads, bridges, and other public works were kept in good repair; examine posturas, annulling any which were illegal and asking the king to annul those considered prejudicial to the crown's interest, even though they might be legal; insure that unlicensed physicians did not practice medicine; and police the collection and handling of royal revenues.

The chief resident magistrates in a vila were the juizes ordinários, endowed with both criminal and civil jurisdiction. They were officials of the câmara, rather than of the termo. In the case of grave crimes, they ordered the arrests and held inquiries before passing the case on to the ouvidor. The juizes ordinários also policed the work of the almotaces, minor judicial posts rotated monthly among 24 persons chosen from the juizes ordinários themselves, vereadores, and persons named by the câmara. Almotaces had both magisterial and police duties, including original jurisdiction in crimes involving minor sums and the policing of posturas in regard to weights and measures, public sanitation, and the like. More populous vilas might also have a juiz de orfãos, whose function was to inventory the property of orphans and, in general, to look after their interests.

In the outlying villages having population sufficient to need a judicial official were the juizes de vintenas, their jurisdiction limited to civil crimes of a pecuniary nature. In addition, evidence exists that provisions were made to place magistrates with higher jurisdiction than these juizes de vintenas in populous areas far from the seat of the vila. The Inhamuns had a juiz ordinário presiding over a judicial unit known as a julgado from 1795 until the inauguration of the vila in 1802.⁹⁸ The seat of the julgado was the village of Tauá, located near the confluence of the Trici and the Carrapateira.

A special judicial official was the juiz de fora, nominated by the crown to serve in populous vilas or in any other area where the prolonged presence of a representative of the crown was considered necessary.

⁹⁸. The proceedings of the juizes ordinários of the Julgado of Tauá are found in Cartório No. 1, Tauá.

Chosen only from among graduates of schools of law, he assumed the duties of the *juizes ordinários* and, in addition, possessed some functions not exercised by those officials. A *juiz de fora* was never sent to the *Inhamuns*, though a former governor of Ceará, Luiz Barba Alardo de Menezes, recommended to the crown in 1814 that such a move be made, for the purpose, he wrote, of bringing peace and civilization to that termo.⁹⁹

In spite of its elaborate formal organization, local government was poorly supported. That portion of taxes collected in the *vila* which was destined for its support was small, the major portion going to the crown. Belonging to the *vila* was revenue from: taxes levied on cattle killed in the public slaughterhouse, where all cattle destined for sale were required to be slaughtered; taxes on the sale of meat in the public market; fines collected from infractions of the *posturas*; and taxes on the sale of some processed or manufactured items, such as alcoholic beverages. The royal taxes were chiefly on cattle, the definition of cattle also including sheep, goats, and horses. The *dízimo* or tenth was the original and largest tax on cattle, but, as additional funds were needed, lesser taxes were also levied on that item. Among them were the military subsidy and the literary subsidy, the latter established in 1772 and designed for public instruction. Collection of the minor taxes was entrusted to the officials of the *vila*, while the *dízimo* was farmed out by contract to one of the local potentates or, in some cases, to one from outside the area.¹⁰⁰

99. "Memória sobre a Capitania do Ceará," Revista do Instituto Histórico, Geográfico e Ethnográfico do Brasil, XXIV, Pt. 1 (1871), 256.

100. Araripe, História do Ceará, pp. 78-81.

That the tax collector was an unwelcome caller in that era was attested by a complaint, dated April 7, 1747, of the "vereadores, nobreza, clero, homens bons, povo e filhos da folha" of the Vila of Icó. Pointing to the unfertile soil, the constant threat of droughts, and the general poverty of the country, they stated that the newest tribute on cattle, to be exacted at the rate of one head for each 100, was clearly exorbitant.¹⁰¹

The basic unit of ecclesiastical organization was the freguesia, presided over by a priest known as the vigário who resided at the igreja matriz, the head church of the jurisdiction. Usually included in a rural freguesia were smaller churches, called capelas, located on fazendas or in small villages. A capela might also have a resident priest, if it had sufficient resources, in which case it was known as a curato. The boundaries of the freguesia did not always coincide with those of civil and military government.

The Inhamuns was initially included in the Freguesia of Aquiraz, but with the creation of the Freguesia of Icó in the 1720's¹⁰² the area passed into the new jurisdiction, where it remained until 1755. The first organized religious effort in the Inhamuns was the mission for Indians at Arneirós, located near the meeting of the Rio Jucá with the Jaguaribe and founded at least by 1731. By 1763 Eufrásio Alves Feitosa, a grandson of Francisco Alves Feitosa, had constructed a substantial building for the mission, which was served by a resident priest.¹⁰³ The second oldest outpost of the faithful in the Inhamuns was the capela

101. Theberge, "Extractos," p. 226.

102. Couto, História do Icó, p. 68.

103. Francisco Carlos de Moraes, "Apontamentos sobre as Freguezias de Arneirós e de Saboeiro," RIC, XVI, Nos. 1 and 2 (1902), 72.

on the Fazenda Cococy, located on the upper Jucá. Its construction, completed by 1748, was ordered in 1740 by Francisco Alves Feitosa, who had come to live on that fazenda following the deaths of his brother, Lourenço, and his nephew, Lourenço Penedo, the original owners of the Fazenda Cococy.¹⁰⁴ The capela at Cruz, later called Saboeiro and located on the Jaguaribe in the southern portion of the Inhamuns, was in existence by 1755.¹⁰⁵

In 1755 the Inhamuns, together with the valleys of the Curiú and Bastiões, was dismembered from the Freguesia of Icô to form the new Freguesia of Nossa Senhora do Carmo dos Inhamuns, with the matriz at São Matheus.¹⁰⁶ In the following decade a capela, named Nossa Senhora do Rosário, was constructed by Sargento-mor José Rodrigues de Matos on the Fazenda Tauá, situated near the confluence of the Trici and Carrapa-teira.¹⁰⁷ The capela at Flores, on the upper Trici, was founded during the same decade. Ecclesiastical boundaries in the Inhamuns were further altered in 1784 with the creation of the Freguesia of Nossa Senhora da Paz, the former curato at Arneirós serving as the matriz. The dividing line with São Matheus, from which it was dismembered, was set between the Fazendas Cangalhas and Poço Verde on the Jaguaribe, the territory of the upper portion of the river being awarded to the new freguesia.¹⁰⁸ Completing the changes in ecclesiastical organization in the Inhamuns during the century and a quarter following 1707 was the dismemberment

104. Feitosa, "Para a História do Ceará," Ch. III.

105. Couto, Origens de São Mateus, pp. 27-28.

106. Ibid., and Theberge, Esboço Histórico, p. 174.

107. Feitosa, "Para a História do Ceará," Ch. XXIV.

108. Copy of the act of erection of the freguesia, furnished to the writer by Carlos Feitosa from his private archive.

of the upper Inhamuns from Arneirós in 1832 to form the Freguesia of Nossa Senhora do Rosário, the former curato at Tauá serving as the matriz.¹⁰⁹

Capitão-mor José Alves Feitosa

The most distinguished and durable of the capitães-mores of the Inhamuns was José Alves Feitosa, who assumed the post in 1791, holding it until his death 32 years later in 1823. His long public career provides a central theme around which to trace many of the developments in the Inhamuns during the last decades of the colonial period.

A great-grandson of Francisco Alves Feitosa, the colonizer, and a grandson of Sargento-mor Francisco Ferreira Pedrosa, one of the earliest and largest sesmeiros of the Inhamuns, the capitão-mor was a son of Captain José Alves Feitosa of the Fazenda Varzea da Onça, as well as nephew and son-in-law of Pedro Alves Feitosa of Papagaio, one-time capitão-mor of the Vila of Crato. The elder José Alves, in addition to serving as commander of one of the companies of the cavalry, was, at various times, juiz ordinário of the Vila of Icó and, after the creation of the Julgado of Tauá, served there as juiz ordinário and juiz de orfãos. The younger José Alves was well fortified with the solid lineage and the landed wealth necessary to place him among the potentates of the Inhamuns. When he was married in 1781 in the capela at Cococy, only 11 years after the death of Francisco Alves Feitosa, it was to a granddaughter of that venerable colonizer.¹¹⁰

^{109.} Thomaz Pompeu, Ensaio Estatístico da Província do Ceará, Vol. II (Fortaleza, 1864), 140.

^{110.} Petition of José Alves Feitosa, Sept. 15, 1807, SC; Feitosa, Tratado Genealógico, *passim*.

Prior to being named capitão-mor, José Alves Feitosa served as a lieutenant in the cavalry, and in 1790 was awarded the post of collector of the royal tenths for the Vila of Sobral.¹¹¹ The letter naming him capitão-mor of the Inhamuns praised his previous services to that area and noted his substantial wealth and social position, adding that, while the post paid no salary, he would enjoy the privileges and respect accompanying it.¹¹²

The first half of his regime appears to have been peaceful, the second portion being the occasion for opposition from within the Inhamuns as well as from outside the area. After assuming the post, he served as a juiz ordinário of Icó and of the Julgado of Tauá,¹¹³ but the most noteworthy event of his early years as capitão-mor was the elevation of the Inhamuns to the status of vila in 1802. Authority for the creation of the vila was a general order¹¹⁴ of 1766 directing that the vagrants, vagabonds, and criminals who inhabited the sertão be grouped into vilas of not less than 50 hearths for the purpose of instructing them in the ways of civilization. Any persons unwilling to accept such regimentation were to be considered thieves and declared enemies of the state. The inhabitants of Arneirós were apparently the first in the Inhamuns to attempt to secure a vila for the area. Their efforts met strong opposition from Icó, the câmara of that vila arguing in 1767 that although Arneirós was appropriately populated by thieving Indians and

111. Offício, Aug. 16, 1790, SC.

112. Carta patente, July 7, 1791, SC.

113. Petition of José Alves Feitosa, Sept. 15, 1807, SC.

114. Text found in Guilherme Studart, "600 Datas para a Crônica do Ceará na Segunda Metade do Século XVIII," RIC, V, Nos. 2 and 3 (1891), 156.

other vagabonds it lacked personnel capable of staffing a local government.¹¹⁵

When orders were given to erect a vila in the Inhamuns, the place selected for its seat was not Arneirões, the head of the freguesia, but Tauá, where there existed a capela, the julgado, and the home of the capitão-mor. Governor Bernardo Manoel de Vasconcelos later explained the reasons for the decision to erect the vila and for the selection of Tauá as its seat.¹¹⁶ A principal factor was the distance from Icô, the people of the Inhamuns telling him that an inheritance was virtually all consumed by the juizes ordinários and juizes de orfãos, together with their clerks and lesser officials, who were required to journey to Icô to legally settle the estate. A second consideration was the administration of justice. The governor noted that the Inhamuns lay only a day's ride from sparsely settled regions outside of Ceará, to which criminals could easily flee, returning another day to perpetrate additional crimes. It was his hope that with the erection of a vila the area would be better prepared to handle this troublesome problem. Tauá was selected as the seat of the vila, he said, by virtue of already possessing a part of the structure of government and because the people of that village, aided by some of its wealthiest residents, had offered to construct a house for the câmara, a jail, and the pelourinho, the last named being the stocks in which criminals were placed.

The first official step toward the creation of the vila was taken

¹¹⁵. Theberge, "Extractos," p. 233.

¹¹⁶. "Bernardo Manoel de Vasconcelos, Documentos para a História do Governo (Collecção Studart)," RIC, XXVIII (1914), 363-364.

by Governor Vasconcelos on December 14, 1801. He directed Ouvidor Gregório José de Silva Coutinho to create the vila, in the event that he found conditions in the Inhamuns suitable for such action.¹¹⁷ Apparently finding conditions satisfactory, Coutinho published an edital on April 20, 1802, instructing the people of the Inhamuns to appear in Tauá on the following May 3 in order to participate in the erection of the vila, the fine for non-attendance set at 6\$000 reis. On May 3, the greater part of the inhabitants being present, according to the official account, the church bells were rung to signal the commencement of the event. The edital was read, and the pelourinho, the symbol of a vila, was raised, after which the bailiff first and then the people shouted three times: "Real, Real, Real, Viva o Príncipe Regente, Nosso Senhor."

There was also an address by the ouvidor, who provided philosophical justification for the occasion. God had ordained, he said, that men should be congregated in groups, for only in this manner could they be happy and prosperous. History demonstrated, he continued, that men living independently of other men in conditions of anarchy were as brutes; but once transplanted to organized society, they lost their ferocity and acquired virtue.

The new vila was christened São João do Príncipe, the name chosen by the governor. Its boundaries were the same as those for the Freguesias of São Matheus and Arneiros, except that, in addition, an area to the east of the Inhamuns, in the vicinity of the village of Maria Pereira, was included.¹¹⁸ Ninety-five years had passed since

¹¹⁷. J. B. Perdigão de Oliveira, "O Resumo Chronológico, Ligeira Apreciação," RIC, II, No. 1 (1888), 45.

¹¹⁸. The preceding account of the creation of the vila is based on the documents found in "Tauá, Anno de 1802," RIC, XXI, Nos. 1 and 2 (1907), 189-201.

the arrival of the first sesmeiros.

Friends as well as enemies of Capitão-mor José Alves Feitosa were later to claim that he was responsible for the creation of the vila. His friends in 1807 attested under oath that he secured the creation of the vila, this over the strong opposition of many of the inhabitants of the area, and that he bore all of the expenses of its elevation.¹¹⁹ One of his major enemies, João Antonio Rodrigues de Carvalho, Ouvidor of Ceará from 1815 to 1817, charged that the capitão-mor worked for the creation of the vila to serve his own private ends, and that Tauá was selected as its seat only because it was his home. Carvalho ventured the opinion that Arneirões would have made a better seat, in view of its more central location.¹²⁰

Having been at least partially responsible for its creation, José Alves Feitosa occupied a prominent position in the affairs of the vila, as well as in the region. He was the administrator of the vila's literary and military subsidies and was the overseer of the property of deceased persons and those absent from the vila. He again served on several occasions as the collector of the royal tenth, not only in various areas of Ceará but as far afield as the valley of the São Francisco. In addition, in 1805 he was appointed general commander of the boundary between Ceará and Piauí.¹²¹

Following this period of apparently peaceful exercise of his many duties, the capitão-mor, near the end of the first decade of the century,

119. Petition of José Alves Feitosa, Sept. 15, 1807, SC.

120. Antonio José da Silva Paulet, "Descrição Geográfica Abreviada da Capitania do Ceará," RIC, XII, No. 1 (1898), 24. The author of this document is believed to have been Ouvidor João Antonio Rodrigues de Carvalho. See statement by Guilherme Studart, pp. 31-33, in the above.

121. Petition of José Alves Feitosa, Sept. 15, 1807, SC.

began to confront a series of difficulties which lasted for several years. First, there were problems from within the Inhamuns. Sometime between 1809 and 1812, according to José Alves, his enemies attempted to steal a portion of his holdings. In 1819, he successfully appealed to the governor to restore land to him which he said had been taken in that manner during the aforementioned years. Employing lies and deceit, he charged, his enemies had been granted a sesmaria in lands legally held by him and family for many years.¹²²

The most serious difficulties of his career appear to have commenced in 1810. The capitão-mor was ordered arrested by the Relação of Bahia, and was subsequently imprisoned in late 1810 or in the first days of 1811 in the jail at Tauá. This action came shortly after his receipt of the Hábito da Ordem de Christo, bestowed on him by the crown on the recommendation of the governor in acknowledgment of a large gift he had promised to make toward the construction of a new military installation at Fortaleza.¹²³ The reasons for the arrest appear to have been of a financial nature. In answer to an appeal made by the capitão-mor's son, Captain José do Vale Pedrosa, to Governor Manoel Ignácio de Sampaio for aid in absolving his father, the governor requested information concerning the handling of property left by the deceased Antonio de Sousa Carvalheda, particularly in regard to cattle and "outros objectos" which were apparently lost. He also spoke of the need to "legalisar" the debts owed to the estate. Whether or not the capitão-mor may have been charged with mismanagement or a crime of

122. Sesmarias, IX, 129-139.

123. Ofícios, Dec. 18, 1810 and Jan. 6, 1811, in "Correspondência Oficial Administrativa Barba Alardo (Collecção Studart)," RIC, XXIX (1915), 299.

a more serious nature in connection with his duties as administrator of estates is a matter for conjecture, for the governor's letter fails to state the charges against him. The governor assured José do Vale that he would do all he could to aid the capitão-mor in recognition of the services he had long performed in the captaincy.¹²⁴ Prior to this, outgoing Governor Menezes in January, 1811, had appealed to the crown in Rio de Janeiro to aid the capitão-mor, stating in his ofício that the arrest was the result of intrigue by enemies of that loyal vassal.¹²⁵

That the capitão-mor did, indeed, have enemies in the Inhamuns was indicated by a formal complaint which he had recorded in 1811. Stating that he was imprisoned on order of the relação, he charged that his enemies were using the opportunity occasioned by his confinement to destroy his property. They had reduced the houses and corrals on the Fazenda Retiro to ashes, he lamented, by their actions rendering virtually impossible the caring for that year's calves. Moreover, he charged that the officials of justice of the vila had made no attempt to punish the guilty or protect his property.¹²⁶

As a result of his troubles, José Alves was suspended from the post of capitão-mor from May 24, 1812, until February 7 of the following year.¹²⁷ By this latter date he had been absolved, for Governor Sampaio on January 20, 1813, congratulated him on proving his innocence to the relação and granted him permission to journey to Fortaleza,

¹²⁴. Entry of Nov. 6, 1812, ROGC, Vol. 434.

¹²⁵. "Correspondência Oficial Administrativa Barba Alardo," p. 299.

¹²⁶. Petition of José Alves Feitosa, 1811, day and month illegible, Cartório No. 1, Tauá.

¹²⁷. Entries of May 24, 1812, and Feb. 7, 1813, ROGC, Vols. 433 and 434, respectively.

adding that he was anxious to become personally acquainted with him.¹²⁸

The acting commander of the ordenanças during the imprisonment of the capitão-mor was Sargento-mor Leandro Custódio de Oliveira Castro, José Alves' brother-in-law.¹²⁹

The circumstances surrounding the difficulties of José Alves Feitosa suggest that changes had occurred in the Inhamuns since his great-grandfather confronted the authorities some ninety years earlier. First, it appears that the virtually absolute power which the Feitosas enjoyed during the earlier era had eroded to a significant degree. Not only was José Alves imprisoned on his home ground, but elements in the community used his troubles for attacks on his property, with the apparent tolerance of the local officials. Such would seem to indicate that the power structure in the area had come to be somewhat more broadly based. Second, the events point to the conclusion that the power of government had become more effective in the curtailment of the private power of the potentates of the Inhamuns, perhaps as a result of a greater balance of power among the potentates themselves.¹³⁰

During the years following 1813, Governor Sampaio, who headed the captaincy until 1820, came to have considerable admiration for his capitão-mor in the Inhamuns. The governor congratulated José Alves in January, 1817, for the order and tranquility which he had reestablished in his district, this action following a recommendation by the governor

128. ROGC, Vol. 434.

129. Entry of May 24, 1812, ROGC, Vol. 433.

130. The capitão-mor, it appears, may have had less than solid backing from his family in the dispute, this being a probable contributing factor to his difficulties. At the time, he appears to have been involved in bitter intrigue with his brother-in-law (each was married to a sister of the other), the influential Lieutenant Colonel Eufrásio Alves Feitosa of the Casa de Estreito. Feitosa, Tratado Genealógico, pp. 22-23.

in October of the preceding year that he spend a few weeks in the seat of the vila to curb disturbances there.¹³¹ But the principal cause of Sampaio's affection for the capitão-mor was the support that the latter gave the royalist cause in the short-lived republican revolution in Ceará in 1817.

The republican efforts of that year were centered in Pernambuco, from which they spread to Ceará, partly as a result of the work of a priest, José Martiniano de Alencar of Crato. Having a duration of somewhat over two months in Pernambuco, the republic in Ceará lasted only eight days, from May 3 to 11, and even then was confined to the areas of Crato and Jardim.¹³² Though Alencar in later years received much of the credit for instigating the revolution in Ceará, the ground for his work was assiduously prepared by Ouvidor João Antonio Rodrigues de Carvalho. Carvalho, a native of Bahia and a former juiz de fora, was installed as Ouvidor of Ceará in May, 1815. In the course of his travels throughout the captaincy in exercise of his duties, he spread republican ideas and enlisted support for the planned revolution.¹³³

According to the ouvidor's enemies, Carvalho attempted to destroy the power of José Alves Feitosa, after failing to obtain his support for the planned revolution. It was charged that the ouvidor initiated legal action against him, in the course of which he ordered property of José Alves' son, José do Vale, sold at public auction. But in spite of it all,

131. Entries of Oct. 16, 1816, and Jan. 16, 1817, ROGC, Vol. 465.

132. The general information presented here on the Revolution of 1817 is from Cruz Filho, História do Ceará, pp. 109-117.

133. The contributions of Carvalho to the revolution are emphasized in Carlos Studart Filho, A Revolução de 1817 no Ceará e Outros Estudos (Fortaleza, 1961).

the capitão-mor remained loyal to the crown.¹³⁴

Carvalho gave a different version of his relations with José Alves. Arriving in São João do Príncipe, he related, he found the people suffering under the tyranny of the capitão-mor, who used his position and the arms of the militia to dominate and terrorize the area. Protecting murderers and thieves in return for their support, he arrested innocent persons who opposed his rule or who incurred his displeasure for any other reason, always providing witnesses against them from among his own partisans. The ouvidor told the story of Leonor Pereira do Canto, charged by the capitão-mor with the slaying of her husband. The woman was sent to jail at Icó, he said, where she was forced to live from alms and where she gave birth to a child of her late husband, her other children, in the meanwhile, left homeless. All this was persecution, the ouvidor charged, for a debt of 30\$000 reis the couple owed to a vaqueiro of the capitão-mor. Leonor's husband, he concluded, died a natural death as a result of sickness he suffered during the last month of his life. Moreover, Carvalho asserted, José Alves had disregarded his order to release the woman.

Other aspects of the potentate's behavior were equally unsavory, Carvalho continued. He appointed a man to the post of captain of the district of the seat of the vila who was not only an alcoholic but a criminal as well. His mistreatment of the clerks of the vila, which included charging them with false crimes and threatened beatings, had resulted in eight different persons being successively appointed to fill that position. Finally, the ouvidor related, José Alves had even

¹³⁴. Manoel Ignácio de Sampaio to the Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Jan. 21, 1818, in "Documentos para a História do Ceará (Coleção Tristão Araripe)," RIC, XXVI (1912), 99-101.

offered him a bribe, using the vigário of Crato as an intermediary, to decide a case in his favor. Such was the basis of the rule of the capitão-mor, according to Carvalho, who concluded that the choice of José Alves Feitosa for the post had been a greater calamity than a sêca. His investigations into the capitão-mor's activities and the legal proceedings resulting from them, he asserted, were all justified and in accordance with the law.¹³⁵

After the republican menace of 1817 had been bloodlessly eliminated, Governor Sampaio thanked José Alves for his loyalty and for an offer he had made to march against the rebels, adding that his services to the crown would not go unnoticed in the royal family.¹³⁶ The governor, in contrast to his praise for the capitão-mor, was not certain that all residents of the Inhamuns had been unaffected by the subversive propaganda of the republicans. He was convinced that the vigário of Arneirós, Antonio José de Lima, was one of the conspirators.¹³⁷ Sampaio was particularly anxious to learn why the vigário, in a journey to Fortaleza, had stopped at Campo Maior, a minor center of the plotters, on both his trip from Arneirós and on his return.¹³⁸ He was also persuaded that two of the district commanders, Francisco Fernandes Vieira and Gonçalo Batista Vieira, had been sympathetic toward the rebellion,¹³⁹ these two brothers being members of an increasingly powerful family located in the area of Saboeiro.

¹³⁵. Statement by Carvalho, May 31, 1817, in: Biblioteca Nacional, *Documentos Históricos*, Vol. 101 (Rio de Janeiro, 1953), 242-243; Paulet, "Descrição Geográfica," p. 24.

¹³⁶. Entry of June 2, 1817, ROGC, Vol. 465.

¹³⁷. Entry of Oct. 31, 1817, *ibid.*

¹³⁸. Entry of Sept. 30, 1817, *ibid.*

¹³⁹. Entry of June 30, 1817, *ibid.*

Capitão-mor José Alves Feitosa died November 9, 1823,¹⁴⁰ living over a year after the Prince Regent declared Brazil independent of Portugal and assumed the title of Pedro I. His immediate reaction to the events of 1822 is not known, but early in the following year, he offered to send troops to Piauí to aid Pedro's supporters in their efforts to free that area from the pro-Portuguese element.¹⁴¹ The offer being accepted, Colonel João de Araujo Chaves and Captain José do Vale Pedrosa, the capitão-mor's only offspring, took 300 cavalrymen to Piauí, remaining there until the Portuguese departed some few months later.¹⁴²

The death of José Alves Feitosa serves as an appropriate symbol of the end of a period in the history of the Inhamuns, for the event coincided with the formal termination of Feitosa domination over the entire area. In 1823 the Vila of São Matheus was created, the Saboeiro portion of its territory being dismembered from São João do Príncipe. In the area of Saboeiro the influence which the Feitosas once exercised had been supplanted by that of Francisco Fernandes Vieira and his numerous relatives.¹⁴³

During the years immediately following the death of José Alves Feitosa, several persons from the Inhamuns achieved prominence in local and provincial affairs. Francisco Fernandes Vieira was one of six members of the temporary junta established in Ceará in January, 1823, to

¹⁴⁰. Feitosa, Tratado Genealógico, p. 189.

¹⁴¹. Governor of Piauí to José do Vale Pedrosa, Apr. 2, 1823, SC; F. A. Pereira da Costa, Chronologia Histórica do Estado do Piauí (Recife, 1909), pp. 172, 180.

¹⁴². Ofício of the President of Piauí, July 22, 1825, SC.

¹⁴³. The vila was created by Imperial Alvará of Oct. 17, 1823. The laws, resolutions, alvarás, and decrees of Ceará and Brazil are found in the official collections, Leis do Ceará and Leis do Brasil, the first commencing with 1835, the latter with 1808. Laws in these collections generally are identified by number, although in some cases only the date of promulgation is employed. On the Fernandes Vieira family, see Ch. II, pp. 77-81 and passim.

replace the pro-Portuguese government.¹⁴⁴ José do Vale's assault on the Portuguese in Piauí later in the year has been noted. The most prominent of the sons of the Inhamuns during the 1820's was Colonel João de Araujo Chaves of the Fazenda Estreito, the commanding officer of the troops sent to Piauí. The great-grandson of João de Araujo Chaves, a sesmeiro of the Rio Carrapateira, Colonel Chaves of Estreito was married to Josefa Alves Feitosa, a great-granddaughter of Francisco Alves Feitosa, the colonizer. Indeed, his major fazenda, Estreito, was inherited by him from his father who, in turn, had received it from his Feitosa connections.¹⁴⁵

When in 1824 Ceará again experimented with republicanism, adhering to the Confederation of the Equator which for a few months exercised control of Northeastern Brazil, it was Colonel Chaves who represented the Inhamuns in the new government.¹⁴⁶ But when the shaky creation of the republicans began to fall, Chaves turned against the government to which he had sworn loyalty and, joined by José do Vale, raised the royalist banner in the Inhamuns.¹⁴⁷ He not only escaped the fate of the principal leaders of republicanism in Ceará, most of whom were killed or executed,¹⁴⁸ but assumed an even more important role in the succeeding royalist government. He was made military commander of the Vila of Icó during the last days of republican resistance and, before the end of the decade, was appointed commander of the military forces of Ceará.¹⁴⁹

His younger brother, Antonio Martins Chaves of the Fazenda São Bento,

¹⁴⁴. Guilherme Studart, "Datas e Factos para a História do Ceará," RIC, XXXV (1921), 218.

¹⁴⁵. Feitosa, Tratado Genealógico, pp. 33, 139-140, 154.

¹⁴⁶. "Confederação do Equador, Documentos," RIC, XXVI (1912), 296.

¹⁴⁷. Guilherme Studart, "A Confederação do Equador no Ceará," RIC, Special Volume (1924), p. 158.

¹⁴⁸. Cruz Filho, História do Ceará, pp. 136-139.

¹⁴⁹. Theberge, "Extractos," p. 269; entry of Apr. 25, 1829, and passim, ROGC, Vol. 103.

was the Inhamuns' last capitão-mor. Though the last holder of the post was inappropriately not a Feitosa, he was married to a first cousin, who did bear that name.¹⁵⁰

The marital connections of these two potentatos point to a significant observation: that while political leadership in São João do Príncipe, following the death of José Alves Feitosa, passed, in considerable measure, to the Araujos, the portion of that family which lived in the Inhamuns was being absorbed by the much more numerous Feitosas. Seen from this viewpoint, the change was not as deep-seated as a simple relation of names would indicate.

Aspects of Social and Economic Life

During the first century and a quarter following 1707, the main lines of social and economic development in the Inhamuns established their directions. The principal families assumed leadership or began their ascent toward influence, and kinship links among some of them were made. Centers of population were founded, and the industry of cattle raising assumed a secure place in the fabric of the society.

The outstanding family during the period unquestionably was the Feitosas.¹⁵¹ Lourenço and Francisco Alves Feitosa, according to the family genealogist, were the sons of José Alves Feitosa, a Portuguese who established himself as a sesmeiro in the valley of the São Francisco during the 17th century. Within the Inhamuns, it was Francisco who founded the family, for both Lourenço and his son, Lourenço Penedo, are believed to have left no descendents, bequeathing their property

¹⁵⁰. Feitosa, Tratado Genealógico, pp. 140, 154.

¹⁵¹. The following account of the history of the family is based on ibid., pp. 7-30.

and influence to Francisco. He resided in the Inhamuns somewhat over 60 years, contracting three marriages, all with widows, from which issued four daughters and two sons. By these marriages, he gained at least five additional offspring, children of his wives by former marriages. From him, his three wives, and their combined offspring, with their spouses, the Feitosas of the Inhamuns were descended.

A study of the genealogy of the family leads to the conclusion that, for reasons of convenience, preference, lack of other contacts, or other reasons, many of the descendants of Francisco and his wives chose persons from within the family group as their mates, family group being defined as the descendants of Francisco and his wives. This becomes particularly evident in the third generation born in the Inhamuns, considering the children of Francisco and his wives as the first. Of the 32 persons contracting marriages in that generation, eight chose spouses outside the family group while the remaining 24 married within the group.

Though the majority of the members of the Inhamuns' most numerous family chose spouses from among their own group, a significant number married outsiders. Not only was new blood brought into the family in this manner, valuable alliances were formed with other families, such as the Araujos. The Araujos in Ceará descended from two brothers and a sister, one of them being Capitão-mor José de Araujo Chaves. In their area of Vila Nova d'El Rey, they were as powerful, if not more so, as the Feitosas in the Inhamuns. They extended their influence into the Inhamuns during the early years of settlement, receiving sesmarias in 1717 and 1720.¹⁵² The union of the families had its beginning with the

¹⁵². Sesmarias, V, 202; VI, 165.

second generation of Feitosas in the Inhamuns, two granddaughters of Francisco marrying a son and a nephew of Capitão-mor Chaves. It was extended in the fourth generation with three marriages, one of them between José do Vale Pedrosa and a daughter of Manoel Martins Chaves, the late 18th century chief of the Araujos, while another was between Colonel João de Araujo Chaves and a daughter of Lieutenant Colonel Eufrásio Alves Feitosa. With these alliances as a base, the union deepened in succeeding generations, as the result of marriages between members of the two families resident in the Inhamuns, as well as between Feitosas of that area with Araujos of Vila Nova d'El Rey.¹⁵³

In some cases, the Feitosa ranks were increased by the addition of persons who came to the Inhamuns as strangers, a notable example being Leandro Custódio de Oliveira Castro, who bequeathed his name and numerous progeny to the clan. Leandro, according to tradition, left his native Rio Grande do Norte because of difficulties surrounding a love affair. A young lady, whom he had promised to marry, consented to his wishes and, as a result, became pregnant. Having changed his mind as to the promised marriage, Leandro was imprisoned, and in spite of the appeals of his

153. Feitosa, Tratado Genealógico, pp. 139-155. In numerous historical works, the two families--the Feitosas of the Inhamuns and the Araujos of Ipu--have been confused, chiefly, it seems, because of an error made by Henry Koster in his frequently cited Travels in Brazil, Vol. I (2nd ed.; London, 1817), 195-199. The incident dealt with by Koster, concerning the arrest and imprisonment of a potentate whom Koster simply calls "Feitosa"--an event which took place in either 1805 or 1806--involved Manoel Martins Chaves, rather than any Feitosa. Although the Araujos of Ipu, of whom Martins Chaves was the chief, had kinship links with the Feitosas, they remained a separate family. Only those Araujos who moved to the Inhamuns merged with the Feitosas. On the Martins Chaves case, see Guilherme Studart, "João Carlos Augusto de Ceynhausen e Manoel Martins Chaves," RIC, XXXIII (1919), 3-21.

former lover, remained adamant as to wedlock. But, the imprisonment continuing, he consented to wed Ana Tereza, who, by then, had decided she did not want an unwilling husband, whereupon Leandro was released. He left Rio Grande do Norte and found his way to the Inhamuns, where in 1789 he married a 14-year-old sister of José Alves Feitosa, who was soon to become capitão-mor. Later visiting his native captaincy, he claimed the product of his earlier indiscretion and returned to the Inhamuns with him.¹⁵⁴ This son, Leandro Custódio Bezerril, also married into the Feitosa family, and was selected as one of the vereadores of the first câmara of São João do Príncipe.¹⁵⁵ The elder Leandro, living along the Rio Jucá, became one of the potentates of the Inhamuns, serving as temporary commander of the militia during the period of his brother-in-law's incapacity.

Although the Feitosas augmented their influence by marital alliances with other families, these were not numerous enough to perpetuate the near-absolute domination of the Inhamuns which they enjoyed during the early years. By the opening decades of the 19th century, other family groupings had assumed control of some areas of the Inhamuns or were laying the foundation for future domination, this, sometimes, in spite of limited kinship relations with the Feitosas. Already referred to was the rise of the Fernandes Vieiras in the area of Saboeiro. Among other family groupings which were ending or diluting the power of the Feitosas in given areas were: the descendents of sesmeiro Theodozio Gomes de Freitas of the Rio Trici; the Rodrigues Pereiras, also of the Trici; the families of Custódio André dos Santos and Manoel Gonçalves dos Santos in

¹⁵⁴. Feitosa, *Tratado Genealógico*, pp. 48-49.

¹⁵⁵. "Tauá, Anno de 1802," p. 198.

the valley of the Puiú; and the Campo Preto group, composed of Cavalcantes, Teixeiras, Motas, and Ferreira de Sousas, along the Rio Favolas.¹⁵⁶ This is not to say that these families, in all cases, were opponents of the Feitosas; but they were numerous and influential enough to achieve a measure of independence in their areas. In the valley of the Carrapateira, the Araujos exercised their greatest influence, and, while the Feitosas could be found in most areas of the Inhamuns, their bastion was the Rio Jucá.

The lack of information precludes a detailed description of society in the Inhamuns during the 18th and early 19th centuries. In general lines, it appears that a small number of fazendeiros, who made their living from cattle raising, owned the land and dominated the society, while, beneath this numerically insignificant but privileged group, there lived the remaining inhabitants, vast classes of slaves and landless agriculturists. The fazenda serving as the main economic and social unit, towns and villages were small. Ouvidor Carvalho wrote that Tauá, the seat of the vila, possessed 55 houses, which were rapidly going to ruin, and that it had no house for the câmara or jail. Carvalho added that the vila, in addition, had four other places improperly called villages: Arneirós with 23 houses; Cruz with 16; and Flores and Maria Pereira, each with six.¹⁵⁷ Formal education of the young does not seem to have been especially fostered, for no school existed in the area in 1798.¹⁵⁸ In the early decades of the 19th century, attempts were made to establish schools, but they did not enjoy great success. The school in Tauá had five pupils in 1829, while the one in Arneirós reported an

156. Antonio Gomes de Freitas, "Inhamuns, Sua Origem e Seu Desenvolvimento Inicial," *O Povo* (Fortaleza), Sept. 19, 1964.

157. "Descrição Geográfica," p. 24.

158. Plácido Aderaldo Castelo, "História da Instrução e da Educação do Ceará," *RIC*, LII (1943), 56-58.

attendance of one.¹⁵⁹ In spite of its distance from major population centers, the Inhamuns was not a totally isolated region, for both Tauá and Arneirões lay on the highway linking Piauí with Bahia and Pernambuco, this being in that era one of the chief cattle trails in Northeast Brazil.¹⁶⁰ And after 1821 Tauá had bimonthly mail service with Fortaleza.¹⁶¹

One traveler whose observations would have been especially valuable never reached the Inhamuns, although his arrival must have been eagerly awaited. A missive was sent from Portugal to the Governor of Ceará in 1800 informing him that one Alexander von Humboldt was journeying in the Americas under the pretext of making geographical observations, although his true intent, Lisbon warned, was to undermine the crown's control by the dissemination of subversive ideas. The governor relayed the message to the vilas, adding that 200\$000 reis--the value of approximately 40 cows--would be awarded for the capture of that "viajante perigoso."¹⁶²

159. Ofícios of São João do Príncipe, São João dos Inhamuns, and Tauá, 1829-1920, ofício dated Oct. 3, 1829. This is an unbound collection of correspondence from the câmara to the provincial (or state) authorities. It is found in the Arquivo Público, Fortaleza. Also found there are similar collections from Saboeiro (1851-1920) and Arneirões (1874-1920). Hereinafter, items from these collections are cited in the following general manner: Ofícios, Saboeiro, Jan. 1, 1860.

160. Carlos Studart Filho, "Vias de Comunicação do Ceará Colonial," *RIC*, II (1937), 31-34, 40-41, 44-46.

161. Studart, "Datas e Factos," p. 186. A fuller discussion of society in the Inhamuns is given in Ch. V, pp. 189-218.

162. Quoted in Theberge, *Esboço Histórico*, p. 205.

II. GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS DURING THE EMPIRE

During the quarter of a century or so following the end of Portuguese rule in Brazil, local government underwent considerable change. As it finally emerged in a stable form during the early years of the reign of Pedro II, it contained elements of two movements: the first tending in the direction of centralization, while the second veered toward representative democracy. Both of these movements faced heavy odds in their confrontation with the Inhamuns. In the first place, the chieftains of the area prized their independence and resisted the encroachment of whatever agencies of outside authority they could not dominate. As a result of the nature of the society, in the second case, democracy in the 19th century Inhamuns was stillborn.

The functioning of local government in the Empire can be understood only within the context of the provincial and central government. The element of prime importance was the emperor, who formed ministries, dissolved legislatures, sanctioned laws, and named provincial presidents, in addition to numerous lesser officials. Representative elements included a senate, a house of deputies, and, after the Additional Act of 1834,¹ provincial assemblies. These last named were limited to largely routine functions. While they could alter administrative, legislative, judicial, and ecclesiastical boundaries and legislate in regard to municipal and provincial budgets and education, determining basic policy

1. Law 16 of Aug. 12, 1834.

was excluded from them. The chief element in the provincial government was the president, working in conjunction with the imperial ministry.

The Formal Structure

Of the three branches of local government, the police was controlled by the central government or its representatives, the judiciary was of a mixed nature, while civil administration lay within the province of locally selected officials. Elections, as a part of the representative element in the governmental structure, were, at least in theory, also locally determined.

By law of August 18, 1831, the militia, which had remained essentially unaltered during the reign of Pedro I, was replaced by the National Guard (Guarda Nacional). On the local level, the guard was subdivided into legions, battalions, and companies, each município² having at least one company, while large ones might have a battalion or even a legion. A company, usually consisting of from 60 to 140 men, was commanded by a captain, assisted by a lieutenant, alferes, first sergeant, and other inferior officers. A battalion, composed of four to eight companies, was commanded by a colonel, while the ruling head of a legion was a supreme commander. Eligible to serve as officers were the electors of the município, while any citizen could be enlisted in ordinary service.

As formed by the law of 1831, the guard reflected the early decentralizing tendencies of the Regency under Diogo Antonio Feijó:³ officers were elected by their fellow officers; enlistment for ordinary service was performed by a conselho de qualificação, composed of

2. Leal, Coronelismo, pp. 8-10.

3. With the end of the colonial period, the unit which had been called a vila became known as a município, the seat of which was either a vila or a city, depending on official designation.

electors; and the guard was declared to be subordinate to the local officials of justice, as well as to provincial presidents and higher authorities. Law 602 of September 19, 1850, placed the guard under more centralized control. It was subordinated only to the provincial presidents and the Ministry of Justice, officers were appointed by higher officers or by provincial or imperial civil authorities, and the conselho de qualificação was composed of officers of the guard itself.

The National Guard had as its purpose, as defined in the 1831 legislation, the maintenance of internal order and aid to the regular army, should circumstances demand this latter function. But, in practice, apart from service in the war with Paraguay in the 1860's, it was soon reduced to a largely honorific position.⁴ As a local police force, it was replaced for the most part by other agencies, although it was sometimes called upon to furnish troops for local police duties.

In the Inhamuns, the câmara of São João do Príncipe reported in 1833 that four companies had been organized in the município, one each in the vila, Flores, Arneirós, and Cococy.⁵ General references by the provincial presidents to the guard in Ceará indicate that it lacked the training, equipment, and discipline necessary to constitute an effective police and military force. A typical view of the guard was that expressed by President João Silveira de Sousa, who in 1856 reported to the legislature that the force was not yet organized in all the province, and that where it had been organized, it was "completamente desarmada, sem disciplina, e sem habitos militares...."⁶ Yet, commissions in the

4. Teal, Coronelismo, p. 157.

5. Ofícios, São João do Príncipe (hereinafter cited as: Ofícios, SJP), Oct. 23, 1833.

6. Relatório do Presidente da Província do Ceará, 1856, p. 6.

National Guard were greatly prized by those occupying, or aspiring to positions of influence in the community.⁷ Whatever fazendeiro, provincial deputy, local politician, or other person of the upper stratum of the community who lacked the title "doutor"--conferred on those completing a university course and in the 19th century Inhamuns limited to a few people--usually could produce a title in the National Guard.

The National Guard being a largely ineffective force, local police power during the Empire was usually exercised by other officials, the most important of whom was the delegado. Created by Imperial Law 261 of December 3, 1841, that official possessed broad police and judicial powers. He could make arrests, confine persons suspected of crime and those suspected of having the intention to commit crime, levy fines, and mete out other punishment for minor offenses. In the case of serious crime, he interrogated the accused, held hearings on the alleged act, and made the decision as to whether or not evidence warranted bringing the accused to trial. The delegado was named by the imperial authorities and he worked under the supervision of a provincial police chief. His territorial jurisdiction consisted of a termo, a police and judicial district whose boundaries were usually, but not always, the same as those of a município. Serving under him were the subdelegados, one for each distrito, a subdivision of a termo. They too were appointed by imperial authorities. As examples of organization, in 1860 São João do Príncipe, a termo, had a delegado, with subdelegados in the vila, Marrecas, Arneirões, Cococy, and Flores. Saboeiro (a município since 1851) also had a delegado, with

7. Leal, Coronelismo, p. 157.

subdelegados in the vila, Bebedouro, Brejo Seco, and Poço da Pedra.⁸

The delegados were, on occasions, persons from outside the area and, on others, residents of it. Which it was depended largely on whether the nominating authorities wished to cooperate with, or thwart the dominant local powers.

Working closely with the delegados was the police corps, a provincial force created in Ceará by Provincial Law 44 of September 14, 1836. Under the supervision of the provincial president, who had the authority to station and move the detachments at will, it aided other officials in the maintenance of order and public security. Enlistment in the corps was voluntary, with the result that the force was usually undermanned. Recruits were given little training, and discipline was poorly maintained.⁹ The number of soldiers of the corps stationed in the Inhamuns depended upon how much influence the provincial president wished to exercise there. São João do Príncipe in 1875 had 15 soldiers and one officer, while Saboeiro had seven soldiers and one officer. In 1885 the detachment at São João do Príncipe consisted of only four soldiers, Saboeiro and Arneirós (the latter a município since 1873) possessing none.¹⁰

Troops from the regular army could be stationed in the municípios, if the imperial authorities deemed this necessary. Such detachments

8. Pompeu, Ensaio Estatístico da Província do Ceará, Vol. II, 93, chart following 243.

9. See: Relatório do Presidente da Província do Ceará, Apr. 26, 1871, p. 8; Relatório do Presidente da Província do Ceará, Apr. 9, 1881, p. 8.

10. Falla do Presidente da Província do Ceará, July 2, 1875, Anexo No. 7, p. 2; Relatório do Presidente da Província do Ceará, Feb. 19, 1885, p. 52A.

were reported in 1872 to be located in four interior municípios, including São João do Príncipe.¹¹

The judicial structure was a reliable arm of the central government only in part, for it possessed a measure of independence, as well as a partial base in the community, which the police authorities did not have.¹² The highest court of appeals was the *relação*, Ceará remaining under Recife until 1874, when a *relação* was created in Fortaleza.¹³ Nearer the local level, the province was divided into *comarcas* and *termos*, the *comarca* consisting of one or more *termos*. A juiz de direito presided over the *comarca*, assisted by a prosecuting attorney, called the promotor público. Both of these officials were named by the emperor, the judges from among graduates of law schools, although, if no lawyers were available, a layman could be appointed promotor. The *juiz de direito* held his post for life, the promotor being named for terms of four years, subject to reappointment to the same or another *comarca*. To the *juiz de direito* belonged original jurisdiction in all criminal cases, as well as in civil cases of a serious nature.

The Inhamuns remained within the jurisdiction of the *Comarca* of Crato until 1832, in which year the province was divided into six *comarcas*, the Inhamuns falling within the *Comarca* of Quixeramobim. Four years later, in 1836, the *Comarca* of São João do Príncipe dos Inhamuns was created.¹⁴ The only other major alteration during the Empire was

11. Relatório do Presidente da Província do Ceará, Jan. 8, 1872, p. 12.

12. The judicial system of the Empire was provided for in the criminal code, promulgated by Law of Nov. 29, 1832 and altered by Law 261 of Dec. 3, 1841. The version presented here is post-1841.

13. Created by Decree of Aug. 6, 1873. See: Eusébio de Sousa, Tribunal de Apelação do Ceará (Rio de Janeiro, 1945), pp. 16-21.

14. Provincial Law 52 of Sept. 25, 1836.

the creation of the Comarca of Saboeiro in 1856, it being dismembered from Icó.¹⁵

The termo, the same unit mentioned in regard to the delegados, was presided over by a juiz municipal, whose jurisdiction was confined to civil cases. He was appointed by the emperor from among graduate lawyers for a term of four years. The Comarca of the Inhamuns varied in the number of termos it embraced. Sometimes having only the Termo of São João do Príncipe, at times it included the Termo of Maria Pereira, lying across the serras on the east of São João do Príncipe; and after 1873 it included the Termo of Arneirós, which was dismembered from the Termo of São João do Príncipe when Arneirós was made a município.

The most radical innovation of the Empire in the realm of the judicial system was the jury, a body which, unlike the judges, was based in the community. It was provided for in the Constitution of 1824,¹⁶ and was retained in spite of the fact that it did not accord with the centralizing tendencies of the reign of Pedro II. Bearing the name of the conselho dos jurados, it was implemented only in regard to criminal cases. Eligible to serve as jurors were those citizens qualified to be electors, with the additional requirement that they be literate and of good reputation. A list of such persons was drawn up annually by the delegado and reviewed by the juiz de direito and the president of the câmara. Before a jury session, these two officials selected 70 persons by chance from those on the list and summoned them to appear for duty. On the appointed day, a boy drew out 48 names by chance of those appearing, from which the 12 to serve on the jury were

15. Provincial Law 757 of Aug. 5, 1856.

16. Article 152.

selected. If only 36 appeared, the formation of the jury could proceed, the accused and his accuser each having 12 challenges. The 12 jurors judged the guilt of the accused, the sentence resting with the juiz de direito.

The jury aside, the chief element in the judicial system was the juiz de direito, who could not be ejected from the system except as a result of conviction for crime. On the other hand, he could be removed from one comarca to another at the pleasure of the royal authorities. This fact had a potential compromising effect on the independence of the system, not only because the will of the judge might be bent by the threat of remaining in, or being sent to an undesirable location, but also because the appointing authorities might heed the wishes of local political chiefs in regard to removals and appointments. In practice, the posts of juiz de direito and juiz municipal, both of which required graduate lawyers, were difficult to fill in isolated areas of the sertão. Resulting from these difficulties was the liberal use of substitutes, the juiz de direito being replaced by the juiz municipal, who in turn was substituted by six local citizens designated by the provincial president. Thus, in the Inhamuns, it was not uncommon for the acting juiz de direito to be a substitute juiz municipal who was a local political figure with no special qualifications for the post.

The branch of government reserved to local control was civil administration, the basic unit of organization being the município and the machinery being the câmara, composed of vereadores. Imperial Law of October 1, 1827, set the basic structure for municipal government during the Empire. In those municípios having a vila for a seat, as distinguished from those whose seat was a city, the câmara consisted

of seven vereadores, elected by the qualified voters for four-year terms, the member receiving the most votes serving as president. Substituting for any of the seven vereadores who did not appear for a meeting was the unsuccessful candidate receiving the highest number of votes, and, in his absence or in the need for other substitutes, the one receiving the next highest, etc. The câmaras were declared to be purely administrative, possessing no judicial functions. Regular sessions were held at intervals of three months, the president being empowered to call special meetings.

The chief functions of the câmara included: legislating for the município, establishing the posturas, although they were not effective until approved by the provincial assembly; policing the município to ensure compliance with the posturas, the câmara having the power to hire officials for this purpose; setting penalties for infractions of posturas of up to 30\$000 reis and eight days in jail; construction and upkeep of public buildings, such as jails, slaughterhouses, and markets, and roads, bridges, and cemeteries; and, as charged by law, encouraging the introduction of improved seeds and new races of animals.

The oldest município in the Inhamuns was São João do Príncipe. The second oldest was São Matheus, created in 1823, which included the portion of the Inhamuns in the area of Saboeiro. In 1851 the seat of São Matheus was moved to Saboeiro, and the name of the município changed to accord with the alteration,¹⁷ the name of a município and its seat always being the same. Eight years later, in 1859, São Matheus was dismembered from Saboeiro and was reelevated to a município in its own right.¹⁸ The area's newest município was Arneirós, inaugurated in 1873

17. Provincial Law of Nov. 27, 1851.

18. Provincial Law 889 of July 22, 1859.

as a result of Provincial Resolution 1128 of November 21, 1864. As created, Arneirões included Bebedouro and Cococó, in addition to the vila. In practice, both Arneirões and Saboeiro claimed Bebedouro, as São João do Príncipe had earlier done.

Meetings of the municipal câmaras were not always held at the appointed times, nor were special meetings always promptly called to care for matters arising in the interim. The câmara of São João do Príncipe reported on January 7, 1861, that all of the vereadores had not been sworn in, a result of travel difficulties caused by heavy rains.¹⁹ In a reply to an inquiry as to why they had not acted on a matter, the vereadores of the same município in 1842 somewhat indignantly informed the provincial president that they could not always conveniently appear to take care of a special matter, since some of the members lived 12 to 16 leagues from the vila.²⁰ During the major sêcas, business was suspended completely, as a result of the absence from the area of many of the vereadores and their substitutes.

Posturas were adopted by the câmara to cover most of the major concerns which lay within the jurisdiction of municipal government. Reflecting the economic interests of the inhabitants were numerous and detailed regulations in regard to agriculture and cattle breeding, while others dealt with commerce, the physical appearance of the community, public tranquility, slaves, sanitation, and morals. Cattle were required to be slaughtered in places designated by the câmara, this in order to insure the collection of taxes, and fines were imposed on merchants misrepresenting the weight or quality of their products. Permits were required for construction, and in the vila the

19. Offícios, SJP.

20. Ibid., Nov. 14, 1842.

fiscal, an officer who enforced the posturas, insured that each building was well aligned in reference to others on the same street. Property owners were to keep their houses in good repair, though special provision was made to grant the poor additional time in which to bring their property up to required standards. Clothing or hides could not be washed in places from which the inhabitants customarily drew their drinking water.

One could not ride his horse at excessive speeds through the vilas, and in São João do Príncipe a tavern keeper was to be fined if he allowed a slave to loiter in his establishment after he had made his purchase, the fine to be six times as great if the slave was gambling, singing, or dancing. In Saboeiro, located on the Jaguaribe, a person was forbidden to bathe in a place where public morality might be offended.²¹

The portion of taxes collected in the município which was destined for its support remained little changed from the colonial era. Belonging to it was income from taxes on cattle slaughtered for consumption, licenses required for commercial activities, and fines resulting from infractions of the posturas.²² Municipal expenditures reflected the scarcity of revenues. In 1866, a fairly typical year, the budget for São João do Príncipe was as follows: salaries for the secretary of the câmara, janitor, fiscal, and custodian of the municipal corral, 850\$000 reis; light and water for the jail, 40\$000; rented house for the câmara, 120\$000; expenditures to provide water for the vila, 100\$000; and costs

21. The posturas referred to are found in *Ofícios*, SJP, Apr. 19, 1834; Provincial Laws 667 of Oct. 4, 1854 and 807 of Aug. 25, 1857; and *Ofícios*, Arneirões, Jan. 12, 1857.

22. Each session of the provincial assembly passed an act regulating municipal income. Typical is Law 701 of Dec. 15, 1854.

of jury and elections, 200\$000.²³ The provincial president in 1880 told the legislature that the backwardness of the municípios was due in large part to the financial poverty under which they operated, adding that income was insufficient for minimum expenses of salaries, upkeep, and administration. After these necessary expenditures, he concluded, the câmara was left with nothing to devote to improvements.²⁴

Although election regulations dated from the early 1820's, the electoral system which in its essentials lasted throughout most of the Empire was outlined by Imperial Law 387 of August 19, 1846. The basic electoral unit was the freguesia, with elections to be conducted only at the matriz. Eligible to be qualified as voters were males aged 25 and over (reduced to age 21 in the case of married men, military officers, university graduates, and clergy) who had an annual income of not less than 100\$000 reis, excepting, in whatever case, ordinary servants, members of monasteries, sailors on ships of war, and a few other special classifications. Electors, who participated in elections of the second grade, were chosen from among the qualified voters who possessed incomes of at least 200\$000 reis.

The two most important steps in the electoral process were the formation of the junta de qualificação and the mesa eleitoral. The junta de qualificação was composed of the most-voted juiz de paz²⁵ from the distrito de paz in which the matriz was located and four other

23. Provincial Resolution 2134 of Nov. 22, 1886.

24. Falla do Presidente da Província do Ceará, July 1, 1880, pp. 69-70.

25. The juizes de paz, created by Imperial Law of Oct. 15, 1827, were originally endowed with the broad police and judicial powers which were exercised by the delegados after 1841. After 1841, the juizes de paz remained important by reason of their roles in elections. Four such officials were elected every four years in each distrito de paz of the município, the one receiving the most number of votes being known as the juiz de paz mais votado, partially translated here as the most-voted juiz de paz.

members chosen from among the electors and their substitutes who appeared for the organizing meeting. To choose the four members, the juiz de paz, who automatically served as president, divided the electors in two equal groups: one composed of those receiving the most votes for their posts as electors and the other of those receiving the least votes, arranged within each group according to the number of votes each elector had received. The ones chosen to serve were the last of the most-voted group and the first of the least-voted group. The process was then repeated to select two members from among the substitutes. The mesa eleitoral was formed in the same manner and was presided over by the same juiz de paz, except when he did not appear, in which case the next most-voted juiz de paz presided. The four other members were the same only if the identical electors and substitutes reappeared for the organizing meeting.

Following its formation on the third Sunday of January of each year, the junta held sessions to revise the list of qualified voters, including the enlistment of new ones, meeting again 30 days after the last session to consider complaints. Appeal by a citizen who believed he had been wronged was made to the conselho municipal de recurso, composed of the juiz municipal, the president of the câmara, and the elector who had received the most votes in the freguesia in which the vila was located. Further appeal could be carried to the relação.

Elections for vereadores and juizes de paz were held every fourth year, these posts being filled by direct voting. Elections for electors, who then met in electoral colleges to choose provincial deputies, general deputies, and senators, were normally held in the year preceding the expiration of the current legislative body. In addition, special elections were called when circumstances made them necessary.

On the appointed day, mass was said at 9:00 A.M., after which the mesa eleitoral was organized and the election held, all of the events taking place in the church. Following completion of the voting, the mesa eleitoral counted the results. In the event of complaints concerning the counting, the decision rested with the câmara in regard to vereadores and juizes de paz. Further recourse was available by appeal to the emperor for nullification of the election. The legislative bodies judged the validity of the selection of their members, having the power to order new elections for electors in any freguesia.

Candidates for provincial and general legislative bodies were not required to be residents of the district or province they sought to represent. The power to redraw boundaries of districts and assign electoral votes rested with the provincial assembly.

Royal Decree 3,029 of January 9, 1881, altered some of the practices of the electoral system. The juiz municipal was entrusted with forming the list of qualified voters, while appeals from his decisions were made to the juiz de direito, further recourse still being permitted to the relação. The four places on the mesa eleitoral which had been filled by electors and their substitutes were delegated to the juizes de paz and those receiving votes for those offices, a change made necessary by the abolition of eleitoral colleges and, hence, electors. After 1881, all elections were direct. Among other changes, the pre-election mass was abolished.

Families and Parties

Politics, in the sense of elections involving a significant portion of the population, was an innovation of the Empire. It was a serious matter in the Inhamuns, for at stake in the game of politics was the privilege of exercising considerable authority in the community. Selecting vereadores and juizes de paz was not the only aim of the local political chiefs; had they been able to maintain their domination of the community through possession of these offices, their task would have been simple. But, with the introduction of agencies of police linked to outside authorities, the traditional prerogatives of the local chiefs were threatened. As a result of this threat, they had to arrive at some accommodation with provincial and imperial authorities. Because of the introduction of representative forms of government, the principal channels for arriving at such an accommodation were the political parties.

While the political parties of the Empire bore the names of liberal and conservative, they possessed little identification with the then current European use of those terms. In reference to the Inhamuns, there is no basis for believing that ideology played any role whatsoever in party conflicts. The comment by Heitor Lira in his study of Pedro II can be most appropriately applied to that area: "o que havia, no mundo partidário, era sobretudo uma luta de paixões, de sentimentos antagonicos ou interesses contrariados."²⁶ In the Inhamuns, the party divisions broke along family lines, the Feitosas carrying the liberal banner, while the Fernandes Vieiras commanded the conservative forces. As a result of the preeminence of these families, the intensity of the struggle between them, and the fact that only two parties existed, the

26. História de Dom Pedro II, Vol. II (São Paulo, 1938), 333.

other inhabitants of the area were forced to fall in behind one or the other of these leading families.

The Fernandes Vieiras, in comparison with the Feitosas, arrived late to a position of influence in the Inhamuns. According to tradition, the founders of the family were six sisters and one brother, at least some of whom settled on lands once owned by Lourenço Alves Feitosa in the area of Saboeiro. The descendents of these first Fernandes Vieiras came to be called Carcarás, a name which was passed on to them from their Fazenda Carcará, located near the village.²⁷ The family began to assume a prominent position in the Inhamuns in the early years of the 19th century, this as a result of the growing wealth and prestige of Francisco Fernandes Vieira. In 1810, at the age of 27, he was a juiz ordinário of São João do Príncipe and an alferes in the militia.²⁸ Two years later, the governor, on the recommendation of Capitão-mor José Alves Feitosa, appointed him captain of one of the militia companies.²⁹ Already mentioned were the roles he played in the revolts and changes associated with the coming of independence to Brazil. His older brother, Gonçalves Batista Vieira, was also a public figure in the area, serving as vereador³⁰ of São João do Príncipe and as captain in the militia,³¹ holding these posts by 1812. Later, he became the capitão-mor of the Vila of São Matheus.³²

27. Carlos Feitosa, "Origens de Saboeiro," A Verdade (Baturité), Jan. 8, 1961.

28. Proceedings of the juizes ordinários of São João do Príncipe, 1802-1822, Cartório No. 1, Tauá.

29. Entry of Oct. 7, 1812, ROGC, Vol. 433.

30. Petition of José Alves Feitosa, Sept. 15, 1807, SC.

31. Entry of Oct. 7, 1812, ROGC, Vol. 433.

32. Cruz Abreu, "Presidentes do Ceará, Ignácio Francisco Silveira da Mota," RIC, XXXVIII (1924), 155.

After his family began its ascent toward power in Ceará, Francisco Fernandes Vieira served one term in the provincial assembly and, during most of the 1840's, was supreme commander of the legion of the National Guard of the south of the province. Though he was said to have been a mule driver in his youth, when he died in 1862 he left what was probably the largest fortune in the province and he brought his life to a close with the title of Viscount of Ic6.³³ He owed the title less to his own prestige than to that of his sons, five of the 17 whom he fathered completing university courses.³⁴ Without them, in all likelihood he would have died a plebeian.

It was Miguel Fernandes Vieira, born in Saboeiro in 1816 and graduated in law at Olinda in 1837, who was the most influential politician of the family, and it was he, in fact, who acquired the title for his father. The conservative party in Ceará, of which Miguel became the chief, had its origin in the middle 1830's, rising in opposition to the regime of José Martiniano de Alencar, who as provincial president represented the liberal faction of Feijó. Formed by a group of intellectuals, the conservative element in Ceará at first attracted little popular support, but with the recruitment of new members, among them Francisco Fernandes Vieira and his sons, and the fall of Feijó the party took on new life. Favored by the imperial government during most of the time between 1838 and 1845, the conservatives established themselves as one of the two major political factions in Ceará. During this

33. A biographical sketch of Francisco Fernandes Vieira is found in Hugo Victor Guimarães, Deputados Provinciais e Estaduais do Ceará 1835-1947 (Fortaleza, 1952), pp. 258-260.

34. Pedro II, July 19, 1862.

period, in 1838, Miguel and an associate founded the newspaper, Pedro II, in Fortaleza, which until the end of the Empire championed the conservative cause.³⁵

Miguel directed the fortunes of his party in Ceará for over 20 years, although his tight control and liberal favors to his family resulted in constant bickering and more than one schism, including the exodus of many of the founders of the party. When he died at the age of 46 in 1862, the same year in which he was elected senator, leadership of the party passed to his first cousin, Gonçalo Batista Vieira, a son of the capitão-mor with the same name. Gonçalo, who took two of the senator's sisters as well as his widow for his wives, served as general deputy and in 1871 was made the Baron of Aquiraz.³⁶ Also outstanding in the family was Miguel's brother, Manoel, who served as a general deputy.³⁷ In addition, many lesser offices were filled by the family, not fewer than 12 Fernandes Vieiras occupying seats in the provincial assembly during the Empire.³⁸

Saboeiro, as the home ground of Ceará's leading conservative family, began to flower in mid-century. In 1851 the seat of the município was moved to Saboeiro, an act followed two years later by the creation of the freguesia. Shortly thereafter, in 1856, the Carcarás were granted a comarca, thus completing their acquisition of all the chief units of

35. On Miguel Fernandes Vieira, see Guimarães, Deputados, pp. 454-455. On the history of the conservative party, see: João Brígido, "A Queda da Facção Boticaria," O Araripe, Feb. 21, 1857, and Abelardo F. Montenegro, História dos Partidos Políticos Cearenses (Fortaleza, 1965), p. 8 ff.

36. Guimarães, Deputados, pp. 275-277.

37. Ibid., p. 421.

38. Ibid., passim.

local government. The last named move, the liberals claimed, was done to give a Carcará lawyer a post as judge, there being no vacancies in other areas. Though the liberals conceded that Icó, the judicial unit to which Saboeiro had belonged, was a long distance away, they thought that a better solution would have been annexation to the Comarca of the Inhamuns.³⁹

While liberal reasoning as to the exact cause of the creation of the Comarca of Saboeiro may not have been correct, the Fernandes Vieiras did staff the município with their own. In 1858 the juiz de direito was Gonçalo Batista Vieira, son-in-law and nephew of the viscount, the juiz municipal was a cousin of the viscount and an uncle of the juiz de direito, the delegado was José Fernandes Vieira, son of the viscount, the subdelegado was Francisco Fernandes Vieira, also son of the viscount, while the promotor was Francisco Rodrigues Lima Bastos, nephew of the viscount and cousin of the juiz de direito, the delegado, and the subdelegado.⁴⁰

Commissions in the National Guard were also liberally bestowed upon the family. Already noted was the post of supreme commander held by the viscount. In addition, Inácio Bastos de Oliveira, local party chief and nephew as well as son-in-law of the viscount, held the same post,⁴¹ as did Francisco de Paula Fernandes Vieira, son of the viscount and twice brother-in-law of the Baron of Aquiraz.⁴² Serving under the latter in the early 1870's were José Gomes Fernandes Vieira Leal, as lieutenant colonel on the supreme commander's staff, and Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Fernandes Vieira Bastos, as commander of the battalion in Saboeiro.⁴³

39. O Araripe, Mar. 28, 1857.

40. Cearense, Dec. 17, 1858.

41. Guimarães, Deputados, p. 292.

42. Cearense, Sept. 11, 1868.

43. Almanak do Ceará 1873 (Fortaleza, 1873), pp. 169-170.

In spite of the power and prestige of the Carcarás, an opposition existed in Saboeiro. A correspondent from Saboeiro in 1860, stating that he himself was a Carcará, complained in a letter to the Fortaleza liberal journal, Cearense, that Saboeiro was an "infeliz Siberia, esquecida do governo, e parece que de Deos!" The police, he continued, was used to persecute the people and guarantee conservative victories, while criminals went unpunished. Saboeiro, he wanted the readers to know, was a land in which the laws governing the remainder of Brazil had not yet entered.⁴⁴ Six years later, another resident of the land of the Fernandes Vieiras informed his liberal friends that being in the opposition in that area was not a comfortable position. When their party was in power, he charged, the Carcarás robbed, arrested, and assassinated, and, for this, they were proclaimed to be strong men and faithful bearers of the conservative tradition. But when their party did not enjoy official favor, he continued, they cried and shouted that the government was not obeying the law and was letting criminals go unpunished, and, for this, their friends declared them to be rich men who were interested in the maintenance of law and order.⁴⁵

Opposition within the município was furnished by dissident Carcarás, such as the correspondent mentioned above and Francisco Rodrigues Lima Bastos, ex-conservative stalwart who in 1872 was a member of the liberal party directorate of Saboeiro,⁴⁶ as well as by families which never entered the conservative fold.

These latter were concentrated in the western portion of the

⁴⁴. July 6.

⁴⁵. Cearense, Mar. 18, 1866.

⁴⁶. Ibid., July 4, 1872.

município in the district of Bebedouro, created in 1860 within the termo of Saboeiro.⁴⁷ The inclusion of Bebedouro in the município of the Carcarás resulted in conflicts which lasted for a century. Bebedouro, which came to be a village with a capela only in the 19th century, was settled principally by Feitosas, Arrais, Andrades, and Goes. Animosity between the two areas dated from before the creation of the Município of São Matheus in 1823, being initially based on a rivalry between Francisco Fernandes Vieira and Captain Domingos Alves de Goes over a land question. Goes, a friend and relative of the Feitosas, resorted to legal action to thwart the efforts of the Carcará chief to acquire a sesmaria along the Rio Umbuzeiro.⁴⁸

The leader of the Bebedouro Feitosas in the last decades of the Empire was Pedro Alves Feitosa Timbaúba, his second marriage being to an Arrais, while his children married into the Arrais and Andrade families, among others. The Arrais chief was Colonel Nicolau d'Albuquerque Arrais, a major political figure in the município from the 1860's until well into the Republic. All in all, the liberal elements in Bebedouro constituted a rather closely-knit group.

Before the provincial legislature, in August, 1860, declared Bebedouro to be within the Município of Saboeiro, jurisdiction of the area was in dispute. The câmara of São João do Príncipe in April, 1860, complained to the president that the village--forming a part of the district of Cococy, the vereadores said--had been invaded by the delegado of Saboeiro, who had named as a local police officer a person who was illiterate and only 15 years old. Since São João do Príncipe

47. Provincial Law 929 of Aug. 6, 1860.

48. Cearense, May 22, 1860.

already had police officers there, the câmara reported, the residents were in doubt as to whom to obey.⁴⁹ The câmara of São João do Príncipe later recognized the jurisdiction of Saboeiro in the area, although under protest. The vereadores in 1861 warned the president that placing a large number of Feitosas under the Fernandes Vieira family--which, they said, ruled "como qualquer sultan no Oriente"--could lead only to serious consequences.⁵⁰

During the following years, the district remained in almost constant turmoil and uncertainty, a situation aided by the fact that while the area passed back and forth between the two municípios it remained within the Freguesia of Arneirões. Thus, in local elections, the Carcarã element elected juizes de paz in the voting at Saboeiro, while the liberal faction took similar action in Arneirões. The Feitosas and their allies won a temporary victory in 1864, when the law which authorized the creation of the Município of Arneirões declared the disputed district to be within the boundaries of the new município. But as a result of the long delay in effecting the provisions of the act, Bebedouro continued under the rule of Saboeiro. Even with the elevation of Arneirões to a município in 1873, Saboeiro tarried somewhat in relinquishing control of the district. The câmara at Arneirões in 1874 was forced to ask the president to forbid Saboeiro to collect taxes in the area, a request repeated in 1875.⁵¹ Apparently, the Arneirões officials did gain control, for after the passing of the district back to Sabociro in 1876, the Carcarãs complained that they were being prevented from establishing

49. Ofícios, SJP, Apr. 24, 1860.

50. *Ibid.*, Jan. 11, 1861.

51. Ofícios, Arneirões, Feb. 24, 1874, and Jan. 7, 1875.

jurisdiction and they requested the suspension of Juiz de Paz Pedro Alves Feitosa Timbaúba.⁵² Previously, the Arneirós câmara, stating that it had never been properly informed of the change, had told the president that it would exercise jurisdiction in the area until so notified.⁵³ The Arneirós vereadores conceded in April, 1877; in submitting their budget they asked the president to carefully note that they had lost over half of their revenue as a result of the alteration.⁵⁴

But just before conceding, the opponents of the Carcarás enjoyed one last moment of triumph on March 18, 1877. It was the Sunday on which the priest came to say mass at the capela, this event, as was the custom in the sertão, also being the occasion for a market day and general festivities: merchants from Saboeiro came to sell their goods; people came in from the fazendas to trade and enjoy the fellowship of others; and the vila sent soldiers to maintain order. According to the vereadores of Saboeiro, the celebration was orderly until a group of some 70 armed men arrived, among them the "celebre criminozo," Luiz de Goes. Various members of the band, "com toda audacia e ostentação," provoked arguments with the soldiers and the subdelegado, whereupon the 70, with "vivas ao partido liberal," began an uproar which drove home the more peaceful of those in attendance and brought the business transactions to a close. The vereadores charged that the disorder was planned and directed by Juiz de Paz Pedro Alves Feitosa Timbaúba.⁵⁵

52. Ofícios, Saboeiro, Apr. 9, 1877.

53. Ofícios, Arneirós, Jan. 13, 1877.

54. Ibid., Apr. 3, 1877.

55. Ofícios, Saboeiro, Mar. 20, 1877. The Bebedouro question continued to arouse passions for yet many years, subsiding only in 1956 when the assembly, by Law 3,338, raised the district to a município under the name of Aiuaíba, the name the district had borne since 1943. The political chief largely responsible for securing the move was, appropriately, Armando Arrais Feitosa, a grandson of Timbaúba.

By the time of the Bebedouro incident in March, 1877, the Carcarás has passed the peak of their influence. The years of their greatest prestige lay in the three to four decades immediately following 1838, a period which coincided with the height of the conservative party's influence in the province. Contributing to the decline of the family after that period was the deepening of conservative dissension in Ceará which followed the death of Senator Miguel. In 1863 a group of conservatives founded in Fortaleza the newspaper, Constituição, in opposition to the Carcará element, and in 1871 a split ensued which was never healed, one faction following the Baron of Aquiraz while the other was led by Joaquim da Cunha Freire, the Baron of Ibiapaba.⁵⁶ The conflict between the two conservative factions was, on occasion, as bitter as the fight with the liberals. Adding to the discord were alliances which one or the other of the conservative factions made with its former enemies. After one defeat at the hands of a liberal-Ibiapaba coalition in 1872, a Saboeiro correspondent, writing in Cearense, reported that the Fernandes Vieiras, rather than submit to Ibiapaba's rule, were talking of becoming republicans or even communists.⁵⁷

As a matter of fact, a group of the former persuasion was formed in Saboeiro on election night in 1872, an event reported in Cearense on August 18 of that year. But the chairman of the organizing meeting was Captain Salústio Tertuliano Bandeira Ferrêr, a bitter enemy of the Carcarás. In a keen observation on coming things, the reporter called the republicans "verdadeiros operarios do futuro." Though this early movement was short lived--Captain Ferrêr soon rejoined the liberals,

⁵⁶. Guimarães, Deputados, p. 276; Montenegro, História dos Partidos, p. 19.

⁵⁷. Mar. 10, 1872.

and news of the party ceased to reach the press--it did exist long enough to order a mass said, also in 1872, on the death of one enemy of royalty, Benito Juarez of Mexico.⁵⁸

With such a powerful family on their doorstep, the Feitosas were hard pressed to maintain their dominance over the center of the Inhamuns. The exact reasons why the Feitosas became liberals, and hence opponents of the Fernandes Vieiras, are somewhat obscure. In 1868 a conservative correspondent writing in Pedro II, Francisco Barbosa Cordeiro, stated that the Feitosas' conversion to liberalism dated only from the early 1850's. Previous to this, he wrote, they dealt with the Fernandes Vieiras, giving them their votes when such a move appeared to be advantageous. But because of the vigorous efforts of a conservative government to prosecute criminals in the Inhamuns in the early 1850's, among them many Feitosas, they became liberals.⁵⁹ Contributing to their change of heart, he continued, was the aid given them during this difficult period by Thomaz Pompeu, who in 1848 succeeded the Alencar family as leader of the liberal party.⁶⁰

Various bits of evidence appear to lend support to Cordeiro's version of the reasons for the Feitosas' late entry into the liberal ranks. They had little cause to support that party during the 1830's, for President Alencar denounced crime in the Inhamuns,⁶¹ while a liberal juiz de direito, José Antonio de Maria Ibiapina, resigned from his post at least in part as a result of the Feitosas' obstruction of

58. Cearense, Sept. 13, 1872.

59. See Ch. III, pp. 119-135.

60. Pedro II, July 12, 1868.

61. Paulino Nogueira, "Senador José Martiniano de Alencar," RIC, XIII, Nos. 3 and 4 (1899), 161.

his efforts.⁶² With the creation of the Comarca of the Inhamuns in 1836, Antonio Leopoldino de Araujo Chaves, whose mother was Josefa Alves Feitosa, was appointed to preside over the new jurisdiction, remaining there until 1851.⁶³ His many years as judge in his home territory would indicate that the Feitosas were able to make a satisfactory accommodation to whatever government happened to be in power. Thus, the most likely answer to the question as to the political stance of the family prior to 1850 is that they dealt with both parties in an attempt to preserve their dominant position in São João do Príncipe. Only as a result of the bitterness engendered by the events of the early 1850's, it appears, did they definitively enter the liberal camp.

In gaining the Feitosas to their side, the liberals acquired a family of remarkable qualities, one of which was a high degree of internal cohesiveness. Although the writer in the course of research on 19th century politics in the Inhamuns frequently encountered Carcarás who left their family to become liberals, not one Feitosa or Araujo was found making the move from the liberal party to the conservative party. Being in the opposition in the 19th century Inhamuns was not a desirable position, for the aim of the winning element was not to distribute justice but to exact revenge. A family with less solidarity would have had at least occasional deserters to the winning side, but not the Feitosas. Aiding the maintenance of cohesion was the strength to be found in numbers, for, though they might be in opposition, the Feitosas were not totally defenseless. Also, somewhat in contrast to the Fernandes Vieiras who had a greater interest in educating their sons, and conse-

⁶². Paulino Nogueira, "O Padre Ibiapina," RIC, II, No. 1 (1888), 182.

⁶³. Guimarães, Deputados, p. 184.

quently, in seeking desirable positions for them, the Feitosas and, to a lesser extent, the Araujos generally remained on the fazenda, impervious to the lure of public employment which the winning side could grant. Although, as will be seen, political solidarity in the family was broken in the 1880's, it came more in the nature of an intra-family quarrel than a desertion to the enemy.

All of the most prominent liberal chiefs of São João do Príncipe were either Feitosas or Araujos, this as a result of the preeminence which the family held. As noted earlier, leadership within São João do Príncipe passed to the Araujos following the death of Capitão-mor José Alves Feitosa, the most noted of his successors being Colonel João de Araujo Chaves, who was married to a Feitosa. The colonel's brother, Antonio Martins Chaves, was the last capitão-mor of the ordenanças and in 1847 was appointed supreme commander of the guard of São João do Príncipe.⁶⁴ Two sons of Colonel João occupied leading positions among the chiefs of the Inhamuns, the first being the long time juiz de direito, Antonio Leopoldino de Araujo Chaves. A graduate of the law school in Olinda, he served two terms in the provincial assembly, in 1838-1839 and 1842-1843.⁶⁵ His brother, Joaquim Leopoldino de Araujo Chaves, was for many years the local chief of the liberal party. This position was complemented by the post of supreme commander of the National Guard, which he held from the late 1850's into the 1870's. A correspondent from Taubá,⁶⁶ writing in Pedro II in 1868, said that the

⁶⁴. Entry of Aug. 14, 1847, Register of nominations for officers of the National Guard, 1836-1852, Arquivo Público, Fortaleza.

⁶⁵. Guimaraes, Deputados, p. 184.

⁶⁶. Although the name of the município was São João do Príncipe, its seat continued to be referred to popularly as Taubá, originally the name of the fazenda from which the village grew.

colonel distributed justice at his pleasure, giving orders which the local authorities obeyed.⁶⁷

Although the Araujos held the upper hand during these years, the Feitosas were not unrepresented in the councils of power. Succeeding Antonio Martins Chaves as supreme commander in 1849 was Pedro Alves Feitosa e Vale, who held the post for only a short while as a result of the widespread dismissal of members of the family from military offices in the early 1850's.

Commencing during the decade of the 1860's, a closely related group of Feitosas began to reclaim leadership from the Araujos. All were descendents of the marriage of Sargento-mor Leandro Custódio de Oliveira Castro of Rio Grande do Norte with a sister of José Alves Feitosa. Colonel Pedro Alves Feitosa e Vale, mentioned above, was married to a daughter of the sargento-mor. Leandro Custódio de Oliveira Castro Jucá, a grandson of the elder Leandro, served as acting promotor and in 1864-1865 as provincial deputy, during which time he introduced the legislation elevating Arneirões to a município. His career was cut short by his death in Fortaleza in the last year of his term as deputy.⁶⁸ Succeeding Colonel Joaquim Leopoldino as chiefs of the family after the early 1870's were two grandsons of the elder Leandro, both sons of a marriage of his daughter to Pedro Alves Feitosa of the Fazenda Cococá. These twin brothers were Major Francisco Alves Feitosa and Colonel Joaquim Alves Feitosa, the latter having served one term in the provincial assembly in 1868-1869.⁶⁹ In the closing years of the Empire, another grandson of the elder Leandro began a political career which was

⁶⁷. Oct. 31.

⁶⁸. Feitosa, Genealogia, p. 110; Guimarães, Deputados, pp. 401-402.

⁶⁹. Guimarães, Deputados, p. 322; Cearense, June 16, 1881.

to be the most distinguished of that of any Feitosa since the time of the capitão-mor. This was Colonel Lourenço Alves Feitosa e Castro, offspring of the marriage of Colonel Lourenço Alves e Castro, son of the elder Leandro, and a daughter of Major José do Vale Pedrosa. While he served two terms in the provincial assembly, in addition to filling local posts, before the fall of the Empire--an event which occurred when he was aged 45--his career belonged principally to the Republic.

The strongest concentration of opposition to the Feitosas within São João do Príncipe came from the district of Marrecas, located on the Puiú. Inhabited almost entirely by relatives and allies of the Carcarás, it furnished the base for conservative power in the município. To a liberal correspondent in 1853, it was "o foco do crime, o terror dos homens pacíficos."⁷⁰

"By the People"

Elections in the Inhamuns were hotly contested. Given the context in which they were conducted, fairness to the opposition or obedience to either the letter or the spirit of the law was not the primary aim. The objective was victory. The years of the most intense political activity in the Inhamuns lay between 1850 and the 1870's, the period in which the Carcarás reached the height of their influence and one which preceded the confusion brought about in later years by the splintering of the parties.

The 1852 election for vereadores and juizes de paz in São João do Príncipe opened the period. Occurring during a conservative ministry, it came just after the waging of the most concentrated campaign against

70. Cearense, May 18.

the power and prestige of the Feitosas to take place since the colonial era. With some of the Feitosa leaders in jail and others in hiding, their local opponents enjoyed unusual advantages.⁷¹

The account of the election of August 7, 1852, presented here is based almost wholly on the complaint sent by the câmara to the provincial president. While no Feitosa signed the protest, it did originate from that family's liberal allies, the Rodrigues-Mota-Pereira grouping in the Rio Trici area. It was a characteristic of political reporting in that era that the losers gave the fullest account of the events of election day; the victors seldom explained how they won.

Preparations for the contest were well planned. The commanding officer of the National Guard, Lieutenant Colonel José André dos Santos of the Marrecas Carcarás, ordered his troops mobilized, a move made, according to the opposition, for the purpose of intimidating voters. Concurring in the mobilization was the delegado of the termo, Pedro José Castelo Branco. The câmara charged that the book containing the names of the qualified voters disappeared, later turning up in the home of the promotor, where various alterations in it were made. On the day preceding the election, the delegado, accompanied by several armed men, appeared at the building which served as the seat of the câmara to ask that it be turned over to him for the purpose of housing troops. His request refused, that night 13 men, including known criminals called from Piauí to assist in the election, forced open the rear door and took possession. All through the day and night of the 6th, the vereadores reported, men were arriving with firearms, so that by election day it

⁷¹. See Ch. III, pp. 119-135.

appeared that the vila was prepared for the beginning of a major battle instead of an election.

When, on election morning at 9:00 A.M., the juiz de paz, accompanied by a large number of voters, arrived at the church to begin the election, he found it filled and surrounded by the conservative faction, which had been there since 7:00 A.M. Protecting them were the police, their number augmented by 20 additional troops from Piranhas, Piauí. Repelled by bayonets, the liberals retired to a private home and held their own election in the midst of rumors that the troops had been ordered to set fire to the building. In the meantime, the conservatives conducted their plebiscite in the church, casting more than 400 votes, when, the câmara reported, they could not have mustered more than 40 in a legal election. Duplicate returns were also reported from Arneirós, although in that freguesia the conservatives were forced to retire to a private home, where, with the aid of a juiz de paz imported from Saboeiro to provide an atmosphere of legality, they soundly trounced their liberal opponents.⁷²

The liberal version of the election was, in part, corroborated by Delegado Castelo Branco. In a defense of his conduct, he admitted that criminals had been brought from Piauí, but argued that such action was taken without his knowledge. In addition, he stated that the most-voted juiz de paz was refused entrance to the church because he arrived there somewhat after the appointed hour of 9:00 A.M.⁷³

In this case, the appeal of the câmara to the central government for nullification of the election was not in vain. Even with a con-

72. Cfícios, SJP, Sept. 2, 1852.

73. Ibid., Oct. 22, 1852.

servative ministry in power, the imperial government invalidated the election.⁷⁴

Throughout the 1850's, the Carcarás retained the upper hand in São João do Príncipe. The juiz municipal in 1856, who was also the acting juiz de direito, was José Fernandes Vieira Bastos, while João Fernandes Vieira filled the post of promotor.⁷⁵ The lead editorial in Cearense on December 27, 1858, complained that the new provincial president, João Silveira de Sousa, had completely turned over the Inhamuns to the Carcarás, a situation, the readers were informed, which could lead only to fatal consequences. The redistricting carried out in 1856 for elections of deputies to the provincial assembly grouped São João do Príncipe and Maria Pereira with Saboeiro and Assaré. O Araripe, Crato's liberal journal, claimed that the move was made to insure a conservative victory, since the most logical districting, it said, would have placed the two liberal constituencies with Quixeramobim. And, as predicted, when the district electoral college met on December 3 of that year to choose the provincial deputy, the Carcará candidate won handily. But, even so, O Araripe stated, he won only because Miguel Fernandes Vieira had controlled the college by fraudulent means. In the first place, the liberal journal charged, the conservative chief had purchased the votes of various electors and, secondly, had secured the election to the body of 13 members of his family, who by law were ineligible to vote by reason of being either brothers or uncles of the candidate.⁷⁶ The liberals occasionally demonstrated that they had not lost spirit, as on December 27, 1853, when they defaced the new home of Vigário João

⁷⁴. Ibid., Apr. 11, 1853 and Dec. 20, 1854.

⁷⁵. Pedro II, Nov. 29, 1856.

⁷⁶. Feb. 21, 1857.

Felipe Pereira,⁷⁷ the priest who ministered to the souls of the vila's inhabitants while serving several terms in the provincial assembly as a supporter of the Carcarás.⁷⁸

The 1860 elections for vereadores and juizes de paz brought on a revival of liberal activity. Among the candidates for the former posts were Lieutenant Colonel Leandro Custódio de Oliveira Castro Jucá, Lieutenant Joaquim Alves Feitosa, and Dr. Manoel Marrocos Teles. Dr. Marrocos, a graduate of the medical school in Rio de Janeiro and a native of Crato, had recently moved to the Inhamuns as a result of his marriage to the sister-in-law of Lieutenant Joaquim.⁷⁹ He was not particularly popular, at least initially, with the area's conservatives, who charged that he not only demanded high fees for his services but murdered "sem o maior escrupulo aos infelizes que cahem nas suas mãos."⁸⁰

The junta was formed, on January 15, to revise the list of voters. Three conservatives and two liberals were selected as members, the former being the most-voted juiz de paz, Antonio José dos Santos, along with Captains Domingos Alves Ferreira and João Gonçalves dos Santos, while the liberal representatives were Colonel Joaquim Leopoldino de Araujo Chaves and José Rodrigues do Nascimento. Reviewing the list of qualified voters presented by the conservative members, Colonel Joaquim Leopoldino charged that it was grossly incomplete, whereupon he produced a list of his own. But, seeing that he was outnumbered, the colonel took possession of the book in which the names of the voters were to be inscribed and, followed by José Rodrigues, departed from the meeting, "deixando a junta estupefacta." The two then proceeded to the

77. Pedro II, Jan. 14, 1854.

78. Guimarães, Deputados, pp. 306-307.

79. Ibid., p. 431.

80. Pedro II, Feb. 8, 1860.

church, where, protected by a band of ruffians from Flores and the vila, the conservatives claimed, they filled the book with the names of their supporters. Apparently quickly recovering from their astonishment, the majority of the junta, furnished a new book by the juiz municipal, selected replacements for the missing liberals and completed their work, enrolling some 1,100 voters.⁸¹ The president of the province, informed of the proceedings in São João do Príncipe, annulled the work of the junta and ordered that the enrolling of voters be repeated in April, also directing Colonel Joaquim Leopoldino to return the official book to the authorities.⁸² The junta finally met in June, when, according to the conservatives, its work resulted in a solid majority for their side.⁸³ The liberals, for their part, complained that they had been excluded.⁸⁴

In the months before the election, there were charges that the police forces were threatening liberal voters,⁸⁵ the election taking place during a conservative ministry; but, in an unexplained abrupt change before the September election, a new delegado, Captain Henriques Frederico Benjamin Ettur, arrived on August 23 among liberal rejoicing. The conservatives reported to Pedro II that his home was filled with wine, gin, cachaça, and cigars, all at no cost to him. In addition, they said that he placed the 20 to 30 soldiers in the detachment at the disposal of Colonel Joaquim Leopoldino, while the National Guard took over duties at the jail and criminals freely roamed the município.⁸⁶

The election began on September 7 with the formation of the mesa.

81. Pedro II, Feb. 8, 1860.

82. Ibid., Mar. 7, 1860.

83. Ibid., June 16, 1860.

84. Cearense, June 26, 1860.

85. Pedro II, Apr. 18, 1860.

86. Ibid., Oct. 3 and 12, 1860.

The conservatives later reported that, having a majority of 530 enrolled voters as opposed to 270 for the liberals, they had thought they were certain to win the election. But when they arrived at the church, they found some 800 to 1,000 ardent liberals gathered there. Led by the former commander of the National Guard, Pedro Alves Feitosa e Vale, the liberal congregation was composed of inhabitants from the home freguesia as well as from Arneir6s, Maria Pereira, and Piauf. The liberals permitted their opponents to enter the church, in spite of rumors which had been circulating predicting bloodshed, and the work of the election got underway. The mesa was formed, the conservatives placing Lieutenant Colonel Jos6 Andr6 dos Santos and Padre Francisco Bastos d'Oliveira on it, in addition to Juiz de Paz Santos, while the liberals seated Lieutenant Jos6 da Mota Sousa Lima and Dr. Marrocos. With the formation of the mesa completed, voting was postponed until the following day.

On the 8th, the church filled with potential voters and interested spectators, the first name called was Antonio Ferreira Lima. The person answering the summons was not, Lieutenant Colonel Santos objected, Antonio Ferreira Lima, and he produced a witness to testify to that effect. Colonel Joaquim Leopoldino, on the other hand, maintained that the person appearing was the one called, and his witness stated that it was, indeed, Antonio Ferreira Lima. To settle the dispute, Captain Ettur, the delegado, ordered the mesa to vote the person before it, whoever he was. Shortly thereafter, in the midst of another identification dispute, Dr. Marrocos grabbed the list of voters and stuck it in his pocket. Adding to the confusion which resulted from the physician's action were the arrivals of Pedro Alves Feitosa e Vale and his son, Manoel Martins Chaves e Vale, the father intoxicated and the son "furioso como um tigre."

The conservatives, backed to the wall by the aroused liberals, requested help from the delegado, whose only answer was a threat to arrest all those present. Juiz de Paz Santos, the conservatives reported, seeing that an election could not be carried on in such an atmosphere, suspended the proceedings and he and his followers retreated. The liberals, left to their own devices, called the second most-voted juiz de paz and completed the election.⁸⁷

Elected vereadores were Dr. Marrocos, José Rodrigues do Nascimento, Leandro Custódio de Oliveira Castro Jucá, Joaquim Alves Feitosa, José Ferreira de Castro, Marcelino Alves Cavalcante, and Pedro de Sousa Mota, the first five with 1772 votes each, the last two with 1771, these figures including results from the entire município.⁸⁸

The liberal organ, Cearense, carried only brief notices on the election in its September 18 and October 12 editions. The Tauá correspondent, in the October 12 issue, reported that on election day the chief of the Feitosas, Pedro Alves Feitosa e Vale, arrived in the vila with 1500 of his family and dedicated followers, while the Carcará chief, João Vieira, could gather only 300, including recruits drawn from Saboeiro and Piauí. Although the mesa was his, the conservative chief, seeing that he was outmanned, "covardemente com os seus espoletas abandonaram a urna...." Following the conservative retreat, the election proceeded peacefully and legally. The September 18 report stated that the Carcarás had retired to the house of João Vieira to hold a duplicate election.

⁸⁷. Pedro II, Oct. 3, 1860; a preliminary report was carried in the Sept. 18th edition.

⁸⁸. Session of Sept. 15, 1860, minutes of the câmara of São João do Príncipe, 1860-1876, Prefeitura, Tauá.

Captain Ettur was ordered removed to Telha on October 8.⁸⁹ While the Carcarás charged that he favored the liberals, the fact remains that he was sent to São João do Príncipe by a conservative government.⁹⁰

The liberals in São João do Príncipe, aided by liberal ministries from 1862 to 1868, held the upper hand until near the end of the decade. Apart from the post of juiz municipal, all of the police and judiciary offices in 1862 were held by sympathizers of that party. The conservatives claimed that their opposition, led by the acting promotor, Leandro Custódio de Oliveira Castro Jucá, had imposed a reign of terror on the area.⁹¹ The Tauá reporter of Pedro II wrote that on October 14, 1863, the peace of the vila was disturbed by a group of liberals, led by Jucá and including among its members a criminal, Vicente Macaco, and the local padre, Francisco da Mota Sousa Angelim. Proclaiming imminent death to various conservatives, Jucá's band also threatened the juiz municipal, José Fernandes Vieira Bastos. After Bastos had ordered the commander of the military detachment to arrest Macaco, the liberals went to the home of the Carcará magistrate, where, brandishing knives--the padre and promotor included, the correspondent emphasized--they threatened to expel him from the vila.⁹²

The liberals suffered at least one loss during the decade with the desertion of Dr. Marrocos to the enemy camp. Having earlier found

89. Pedro II, Nov. 5, 1860.

90. The election occurred during a period of conservative ministries lasting from Dec. 12, 1858, to May 24, 1862. Nelson Werneck Sodré, Panorama do Segundo Império (São Paulo, 1939), p. 379.

91. Pedro II, May 5, 1862.

92. Ibid., Dec. 5, 1863. The liberal priest participating in the uproar was a son of Arneirós. After his service in São João do Príncipe, during which time he served one term on the câmara, in 1868 he moved to Ipueiras, remaining there until his death in 1884. In his new post, he enjoyed a long career as priest and politician, serving one term in the provincial assembly. Once suspended from orders for disobedience, he was said to have involved himself in difficulties wherever he went. Guimarães, Deputados, p. 251.

himself in disagreement with Colonel Joaquim Leopoldino, he broke with the liberals in the first part of his term as vereador and lent his services to the opposition. In a special election to fill a vacancy in the senate in December, 1861, he turned over the lists of qualified voters to the second most-voted juiz de paz, his reason being, he stated, that the most-voted judge did not arrive at the church by the appointed hour. The liberals, on the other hand, charged that his action was taken to insure a conservative victory, since the most-voted juiz de paz was a liberal, while the second in line was a conservative.⁹³ In October, 1862, he was elected to complete the term in the provincial assembly of José Fernandes Vieira,⁹⁴ a victim of the cholera epidemic of that year. Finally, late in 1863, it was reported that Jucá had forced him to flee from the area in the interest of personal safety.⁹⁵

Near the end of the decade, in 1868, a conservative ministry assumed control of the government, and, according to the liberals, widespread persecution ensued. Cearense reported that a military detachment was sent to São João do Príncipe for the purpose of producing a conservative victory in the September local elections.⁹⁶ If that was the purpose of the detachment, the move was fruitless, for the liberals won the elections for vereadores and juizes de paz. With the expedition of more troops to São João do Príncipe in October, to bring the total to 52, the paper stated that the conservatives could not forgive the liberals for winning the elections and expressed fear that the scenes of the early 1850's were to be repeated. It added, in a veiled warning,

93. Several statements on the dispute were published in Pedro II, May 2, 1862.

94. Ibid., Oct. 5, 1862.

95. Ibid., Dec. 5, 1863.

96. Sept. 11, 1868.

that the Feitosas knew how to preserve their honor.⁹⁷ The fears of the liberals notwithstanding, the worst that seems to have happened in São João do Príncipe was the usual dismissal of officeholders, a minor attack on a police official, and the recruitment of a number of opposition supporters for the army. The home of the liberal subdelegado of Arneirós, Manoel Leonardo de Araujo, was attacked by a group of ruffians, according to Cearense,⁹⁸ but, with the adamant attitude of the Arneirós official, the conservative band retreated. Soon thereafter, Araujo was dismissed from his post, the reason given being illegal recruiting practices. To this charge, the liberal journal replied that his major crime, in addition to being a liberal, was apprehending deserters from military service, such as Francisco Alves Cavalcante, uncle of the vila's subdelegado.

Liberal claims that recruitment for the regular army was being used as a weapon of conservative oppression were probably well founded. Soldiers were in demand, 1868 falling within the war with Paraguay; and the selection of recruits, a task in which police officials possessed broad discretionary powers, had long been employed as a means of controlling the opposition. Cearense reported on December 13 that 45 recruits, mostly fathers and liberals, were held in the jail at São João do Príncipe. One of them, the liberal organ stated, was apprehended only because he had testified against a local Carcará, who was accused of rustling cattle.

In Saboeiro, in the heart of conservative strength, the victors appear to have tormented the opposition to a somewhat greater extent. According to Cearense's Saboeiro correspondent, who called himself "Samuel," word of the conservative return to power reached the vila on

97. Cearense, Oct. 24, 1868.

98. Oct. 1, 1868.

Wednesday, August 13. The Carcarás, upon hearing the news of their good fortune, began three days of festivities, including torchlight parades in the evenings. All went well until Friday, when, near noon, Francisco de Paula Fernandes Vieira and his nephew, Delegado Francisco Fernandes Vieira Bastos, arrived on the scene, leading a large group of capangas armed with rifles, revolvers, blunderbusses, knives, and clubs. What followed, Samuel wrote, was an "ato de maior selvageria, escandalo, e canibalismo que poderia praticar o tribu mais feroz de bugres antropofagos!"

First, Francisco de Paula inquired if anyone had yet exacted any revenge, and, someone answering in the negative, he replied that such had to be done. This surprised the people, the liberal reporter wrote, for generally the Carcará chief was a prudent man, but, if such a distinguished citizen thought revenge was necessary, the celebrating conservatives were inclined to agree. To create the proper spirit, Francisco de Paula ordered wine and cachaga distributed to the revelers. At 10:00 o'clock in the evening, the conservative leader and the delegado called the merry-makers together and led them to the home of Major Salústio Tertuliano Bandeira Ferrêr, the liberal chief whose family was linked to the Feitosas by marriage. Greeted by a bolted door, the conservatives called out insults and threatened to murder the major and, on receiving no answer from inside, they attempted to enter by force. Although Ferrêr had departed earlier, those inside the house defended the door. With greater violence in the offing, Samuel wrote, João Ricardo de Melo and Captain Joaquim Pinto Penna, both of whom were conservatives while the latter was a cousin of Francisco de Paula, arrived just in time to prevent bloodshed. Their counsel persuaded the Carcará

leaders to disband the mob, but not before Francisco de Paula had insulted his cousin by calling him a caboclo.⁹⁹

In the month following the celebration in Sabociro, Cearense charged that a full scale political persecution of the Arrais and their fellow liberals had begun. The event which set off the affair was the murder in Assaré of Bento Alves Pedralino by Ignácio Ricardo Arrais, the latter claiming that the act was the result of an insult. According to the Fortaleza paper, the conservative officials began a wave of arrests and criminal proceedings against liberals, including, among others, 12 members of the Arrais family, the vigário of Assaré, Major Ferrêr, and Lieutenant Pedro Alves Feitosa Timbaúba. Cearense reported that Delegado Bastos not only arrested Captain Luiz Antonio de Matos Arrais and Marcos Arrais, both of whom were not in Assaré when the killing took place, but, in addition, ordered a search of the house of the latter to apprehend his 17-year-old son. Being met with resistance by the boy's mother, the police broke her arm and beat her to the point that she aborted the child she was bearing, an act in the description of which the liberal reporter added "Horror, horror!!!" and asked his readers if the war in Paraguay could possibly be resulting in greater atrocities than those practiced in Ceará by the conservatives.¹⁰⁰ Subsequently, a dispute arose over whether or not the woman had been pregnant, the provincial chief of police claiming that she was 53 years old and had borne her last child 12 years earlier. In defence of the truthfulness of its reporting, the liberal journal produced a baptismal certificate demonstrating that the woman in question had given birth to a child on

⁹⁹. Cearense, Sept. 11, 1868.

¹⁰⁰. Id., Oct. 22, 1868. Also see the Oct. 23 issue.

May 19, 1867, and, presumably, was capable of doing so again.¹⁰¹

The case dragged on for several months, and perhaps even years, as was common in Ceará in that era. On April 15, 1869, Cearense stated that the number accused in the murder had been reduced to 11 in the previous month, and to seven in April, four of them being Arrais. With that notice, news of the affair ended. Whatever the ultimate disposition of the case may have been, the accused appear not to have been permanently handicapped; in 1872 Captain Luiz Arrais was the president of the liberal directorate in Saboeiro,¹⁰² while in 1881 Marcos Arrais and Ignácio Ricardo Arrais, the latter being the admitted killer, were sworn in as juizes de paz.¹⁰³

Although the conservatives remained in control of the ministry, the liberals again won the local elections in São João do Príncipe in 1870. The reporting of the election events varied somewhat between Pedro II and Cearense. The conservatives wrote that a Carcará leader, Major Francisco Alves Cavalcante, and 150 armed voters were met on their way to the vila by Colonel Joaquim Leopoldino and Major Joaquim Alves Feitosa, accompanied by 200 "desordeiros." The superior liberal forces took possession of some of the arms of their opponents, bloodshed being averted only by the prudence of the conservative chieftain.¹⁰⁴

Cearense, in contrast, reported that the Carcarás sent their armed capangas to all parts of the freguesia with warnings that any liberals appearing in the vila on election day would be assassinated. Two days before the election, when Colonel Joaquim Leopoldino and 800 liberals

101. Ibid., Apr. 14, 1869.

102. Cearense, July 4, 1872.

103. Ibid., Feb. 13, 1881.

104. Reprinted in Cearense, Feb. 20, 1870.

were entering the vila, they were met by Francisco Alves Cavalcante and 60 national guardsmen. Supreme Commander Joaquim Leopoldino asked the major on whose authority the guard had been mobilized, and, upon receiving the answer that the action was taken by the subordinate officer, ordered the arms confiscated and the troops disbanded. Following this incident, the frantic conservatives ran through the vila, calling on their followers and the police to seize the church, but the commander of the detachment wisely refused to heed the appeal. Election day in the vila, Cearense reported, was peaceful.¹⁰⁵

In Flores, which was a freguesia in 1870, action was somewhat more animated. The liberals stated that the church was surrounded by the subdelegado and his Carcarã followers, the most-voted juiz de paz being refused entry. The magistrate then formed the mesa in his home and proceeded with the voting, while the subdelegado held the conservative election in the church.¹⁰⁶

Although political events in the Inhamuns were of a less spectacular nature during the last years of the Empire, they, nonetheless, indicated that the inhabitants of the area had not lost their traditional interest. Newsworthy happenings, in large part, shifted to Saboeiro, where the decline of the Carcarãs, combined with a liberal ministry from 1878 to 1885, tended to result in greater equality between the opposing sides. In São João do Príncipe, these same forces--conservative decline and liberal rule--left the Foitosas facing no strong opposition, with the result that they began to quarrel among themselves. The creation of the new município at Arneirós in 1873 added little of

105. Feb. 22, 1870.

106. Ibid.

interest to the political scene, for in that area of the Inhamuns the domination of the Feitosas was so complete that not even a conservative government could produce a significant local opposition. In what must have appeared to the municipal fathers to be an equitable distribution of votes--discounting the probability of a statistical miracle--the election for the first vereadores produced results only in round numbers: Manoel Leonardo de Araujo Feitosa, 1750 votes; Manoel Martins Chaves e Vale, 1700; Lourenço Alves Feitosa e Castro, 1600; Eufrásio Alves Feitosa e Vale, 1560; Leandro Custódio Bezerril, 1540; Fructuoso de Araujo Pereira, 1400; and José Francisco da Rocha, 1350.¹⁰⁷

In Saboeiro, the liberals faced an uphill climb. In 1876 Cearense reported that in the district of Pogo da Pedra Vicente Conceição was in critical condition as a result of a blow given him by one "Gil de tal," administered because the former had shouted a "viva" to the liberal party.¹⁰⁸ The same journal carried a protest later in 1876 stating that the conservative officials refused to qualify Nicolau d'Albuquerque Arrais as an elector, even though he was a wealthy commercial figure who conducted business in the capital. The liberals charged that the treatment of Nicolau was a part of the usual Carcarás lies, which always pictured the Arrais as "miseráveis e proletários."¹⁰⁹

With the fall of the conservative ministry in 1876, the Carcarás faced stronger opposition in Saboeiro. The high point of the liberal attack came in the 1880 local elections, in which the opponents of the Carcarás emerged with five of the seven vereadores and the juizes do paz.¹¹⁰

107. Session of Apr. 8, 1873, minutes of the Câmara of São João do Príncipe.

108. Cearense, Feb. 10, 1876.

109. June 20, 1876.

110. Cearense, Feb. 13, 1881.

Though the victory must have been satisfying to the liberals, it threatened to bring anarchy to local government, for the Carcará minority found it difficult to sit at the foot of the table. On April 11, following the swearing in of the new officials in January, Nicolau d'Albuquerque Arrais, as president of the câmara, and his liberal majority sent a report to the provincial president, stating that in the session of that day the conservatives had resorted to disruptive tactics. Not only had they used disrespectful and even obscene language, so the complainants said, in addressing President Nicolau, their capangas caused such disorder that the meeting had to be suspended.¹¹¹

Following this incident, the seven regular members of the câmara did not meet together until January of the next year. The Carcará minority, acting alone, held a meeting on May 10, in which they mustered a quorum by calling on conservative substitutes. In their report of the meeting to the provincial president, they attacked the liberal majority. First, they charged that the câmara president had refused to call a meeting, even though urgent business was awaiting attention; and, second, referring to the urgent business, they informed the president that two liberal members of the câmara and four liberal substitutes, together with the liberal juizes de paz, were all serving illegally in their posts, since they had not been properly enrolled as voters in the previous qualification.¹¹²

The liberals, in addition to producing a notarized document stating that all those attacked by the conservatives were qualified voters,¹¹³ informed Clarence that the May 10 Carcará session was a

111. Ofícios, Saboeiro, Apr. 11, 1801.

112. Ibid., May 10, 1801.

113. Ibid., Apr. 11, 1801.

clandestine affair, to which the liberal members had not been invited.¹¹⁴ The June 1 edition of the liberal journal added that the conservative faction had been attempting to annul the results of the Saboeiro election ever since it was held, and charged that at the secret meeting the Carcarás had ordered taxes restituted to some of their followers and had exempted others of them. Cearense returned to the matter on June 8, printing a statement by João Braga da Costa, one of the liberal vereadores, denying what he called the "asserção calumniosa" which was circulating to the effect that he had deserted his liberal friends and united with his conservative relatives.

It was early in the following year before partisan spirits subsided enough to permit the two factions to sit around the same table. But, in a statement dated January 15, 1882, the conservative group claimed that the câmara president, without consulting the other members, dissolved the session every time it appeared that he might be defeated.¹¹⁵ Included in the members signing the complaint was João Braga da Costa. At least a partial explanation for his change of heart was probably the liberal accusation in November of the previous year that he sold his vote to his relatives in the provincial elections of that month.¹¹⁶

In the midst of the câmara dispute, the new election law of 1881, which raised the annual income required for voter qualification to 200\$000 reis, resulted in complaints by Saboeiro's liberals that their opponents were employing illegal means to insure that their adherents could meet the requirement. The Baron of Aquiraz, they charged, had ordered his local relatives to make contracts with all potential

114. Cearense, May 31, 1881.

115. Ofícios, Saboeiro, Jan. 16, 1882.

116. Gazeta do Norte, Nov. 29, 1881.

conservative voters, leasing whatever land they owned for 200,000 reis per year. In this manner, the indignant liberals claimed, just any "serrote de pedra," on which not one goat could live and nothing was planted, was serving to qualify a voter. And, to top it all, they said, the Carcarás freely admitted that they intended to pay not one reis of the amount stipulated in the contracts.¹¹⁷

The dissension in the Feitosa camp during the 1880's was the local version of a provincial-wide split in the liberal party. With the death of the venerable Senator Pompeu in 1877, leadership of the party passed to his son-in-law, Antonio Pinto Mogueira Acioli. Shortly thereafter, difficulties developed between the new chief and a rival family in the party, the Paula Pessoas. The result was an open break in 1880, the Paula faction controlling Cearense, while the Pompeus founded Gazeta do Norte in that year.¹¹⁸

The split in the Inhamuns became evident during 1881 with complaints that Paula supporters were being excluded from the election rolls. Charges and counter charges indicated that the juiz municipal, Francisco Primeiro de Araujo Citô, and Lourenço Alves Feitosa e Castro, both of the Pompeu faction, were opposing Joaquim Alves Feitosa, Francisco Alves Feitosa e Sousa, and Pedro Alves Feitosa Timbaúba, representing the Paulas. Among 34 persons denied enlistment as voters, according to the Paula accusations, were several jurymen, juizes de paz, vereadores, and other public officials.¹¹⁹ In the June 18 edition of Cearense, Sousa, the delegado of Aracirô, attacked Citô, stating that it was he, aided by Lourenço, who was responsible for the exclusions.

117. Cearense, Oct. 11, 1881.

118. Montenegro, História dos Partidos, p. 22.

119. Cearense, May 26, 1881. Also see June 19 edition.

Not confining his attacks to official matters, he charged that Lourenço, the rising political chief who in his youth had failed the admission test to law school, scarcely knew how to sign his name, while Citó, who had completed the law course, was an "ignorante" who wore leather sandals and lived from hunting tatús and planting jerimum.

The juiz municipal, himself a member of the Araujo-Feitosa family, answered the accusations in a long letter to the provincial president.¹²⁰ Dealing with the exclusions one by one, he stated that some had submitted incomplete documentation, such as lack of proof of age, while the papers of others were dated before they were drawn up or sworn to by persons who were not residents of the comarca. In addition, he charged, Joaquim Alves Feitosa, who had been a leading political figure since the 1860's, had aided in the preparation of false documents in order to qualify his supporters. As to Timbaúba, the judge stated that he had submitted no proof of residence, and that, even though he was a vereador in Arneirós, his long record of holding public office both there and in Saboeiro left doubt as to where he was legally qualified to vote.

Although in 1862 Lourenço stated that the liberal quarrel in the Inhamuns had ended,¹²¹ it was reopened by 1884. Lourenço informed the Pompeu journal in that year that many liberals in the area had voted against its candidates.¹²² In February of the next year he attacked Joaquim Alves Feitosa, referring to him as the local Paula chief and charging that he was a "cêgo instrumento contra os interesses do verdadeiro partido liberal...."¹²³

^{120.} Text published in Gazeta do Norte, July 15, 1881.

^{121.} Ibid., June 10, 1882.

^{122.} Ibid., Dec. 23, 1884.

^{123.} Ibid., Feb. 25, 1885.

Later in 1835, a letter to the *Pompou* organ protested that the Paulas in São João do Príncipe were illegally enrolling voters. The provincial tax collector, according to the complaint, was furnishing tax receipts to Paula supporters showing annual sales of 200,000 reis of cachaga. Some 14 or 15 voters, the letter stated, had been qualified in that manner, even though it was common knowledge that their income was well below the required figure.¹²⁴

Conclusion

The foregoing account of political activities, even allowing for exaggerations in partisan reporting, indicates that the attempt to impose forms of representative government on the 19th century Inhamuns was unsuccessful. The effort failed for one general reason: the conditions necessary for its success did not exist. Representative government, to succeed, required a base of a significant number of independent voters, whose rights were not only written into law, but which, more importantly, were rooted in the conditions of the society. Such a prerequisite did not exist in the Inhamuns. The mentality and social and economic conditions, in their essentials, remained unchanged from the colonial era. The Foitosas in São João do Príncipe and the Fernandes Vieiras in Saboeiro regarded their respective areas as their personal dominions, the governmental institutions as agencies of their control. They did not concede that an opposition had the right to function.

Nonetheless, their power was threatened by the centralizing efforts of the Empire. Left to their own devices, the families could have dominated their areas without serious difficulties, utilizing the

¹²⁴. Ibid., Oct. 27, 1835.

channels of representative government and the power which they possessed. The innovation which most threatened their influence was the centrally controlled police. By an agreement with the political parties, the local chiefs could largely control the delegado and the police detachment, but only during those periods in which their party allies constituted the emperor's ministry. During the other periods, the local opposition, strengthened by its alliance with the ruling party, exercised considerable influence in the community. If the police agencies did not always dominate the local situation, they, at the least, acted as a restraining force. It was the power of the delegados and the police corps, combined with the strength which the party system gave to the opposition, which weakened the traditional prerogatives of the dominant families.

A consideration of political activities in the Inhamuns during the Empire points to a problem in regard to the overall interpretation of political life in the nation in that period. At least theoretically, the concentration of power in the hands of the emperor provided the means for control of the nation from Rio de Janeiro. Through a forceful employment of the delegados and the police corps, both centrally controlled, the ministry in power could guarantee election victories for its party.¹²⁵ In São João do Príncipe, as has been shown, this did not always occur. In spite of conservative ministries during the greater portion of the period, the Feitosas and their liberal allies generally controlled local elections. Only in 1852 was evidence found which indicated that the conservatives were willing to go to the lengths necessary to win an election. And, in that case, their victory was nullified by the emperor. Captain Ettur's apparent concordance with a liberal victory in 1860 also fails

¹²⁵. A forceful presentation of the view that such generally did occur is found in Leal's Coronelismo, pp. 160-163 and passim.

to fit within a pattern demonstrating central control. Similarly, in Saboeiro, the Fernandes Vieiras generally dominated their area, periods of liberal ministries notwithstanding. Only in the last decade of the Empire were they seriously challenged, and this was a situation not wholly attributable to liberal ministries, in view of the strength of the opposition, the split in the conservative party, and the declining influence of the family.

It may well be that the Inhamuns, being an isolated area in a relatively unimportant province, was an exception to the general rule, that in a more important area, such as Minas Gerais or Rio de Janeiro, the system functioned differently. But before valid conclusions can be drawn concerning the degree of control from the nation's capital, investigations need to be conducted to learn to what extent the situation in the Inhamuns was a general phenomenon.

III. CRIME AND JUSTICE, 1834-1916

Although a study of the political aspects of life in the Inhamuns reveals much about how the society functioned, it is insufficient to provide a complete picture. Political institutions were weak, with the result that other channels were often utilized to resolve matters which, according to law, lay within the realm of government. The following consideration of the dispensation of justice in both its private and public facets serves, in large measure, to complete the picture. Crime and justice, often involving the preservation or extinction of the life of the individual, bare a society as little else is capable of doing; interwoven with basic elements of human life and society, they reveal a community functioning in moments of extreme stress.

Land of the Lawless

The Inhamuns at an early date gained the reputation of being the most lawless area of Ceará. The Governor of Pernambuco was told in 1732 that there appeared to be as many legions of devils in Ceará as there were in Hell,¹ this in a reference to the recent uprisings in which the inhabitants of the Inhamuns had played leading roles. In large part, the Inhamuns acquired its reputation as a result of the war between the Fcitosas and the Montes, a war in which contemporaries appear to have affixed major blame to the former family. Neither Ioô nor the Montes

1. Duarte Sodré Pereira to Governor of Pernambuco, in "Documentos Históricos," RHC, LXXI (1957), 234.

were stigmatized historically for their participation in the conflict; while, in contrast, the Inhamuns and the Feitosas never lived down the infamy they acquired in that early era. To be sure, the almost constant flow of stories of lawlessness from the Inhamuns served to keep the tradition alive; but whether or not the Inhamuns was, in fact, more lawless than neighboring areas is a question to be settled by comparative studies falling outside the scope of this present effort.

Be that as it may, when government officials discussed crime in Ceará they often pinpointed the Inhamuns as the principal problem area. Ouvidor Carvalho's comments on crime and the workings of the machinery of justice during the time of Capitão-mor José Alves Feitosa have been mentioned. To cite another, Menezes, the former governor, wrote in 1814 that the Inhamuns needed much greater surveillance by police. In part because of its extensive territory but also because of the weakness of its police and officials of justice, he noted, the area served as a haven of immunity for criminals from Piauí. Several times, he added, the jail at Tauá had been broken open to free prisoners, acts committed by bands who feared neither residents of the area nor governmental officials. Menezes concluded that the past history of the Feitosas alone was sufficient justification for exerting greater efforts to bring law and order to the Inhamuns.²

From the time of José Alves Feitosa until the early 1830's the province was so rent by revolutions, revolts, and civil wars that lawlessness became commonplace. But with the suppression of the Joaquim Pinto Madeira Rebellion in 1832, marking an end to that turbulent period in the history of the province, government officials began to direct

2. "Memória," p. 269.

their attentions to the problem of law and order. The president who most concerned himself with establishing peace in the sertão during the 1830's was the politician-priest and ex-revolutionary, José Martiniano de Alencar, whose life had been spared during the executions of republicans only by intercession of Pedro I. Taking possession of the office of provincial president in October, 1834, Alencar represented the liberal views of Regent Feijó.

Alencar, in a speech to the assembly on April 7, 1835, dwelt at length on the problem of lawlessness in the province, singling out the Inhamuns as the area most in need of attention.³ There, he stated, even the judge appointed by royal action was terrorized by the assassins who ruled the area. To illustrate the might of the potentates, he related the story of a recent murder in Tauá. Pedro Vieira de Sousa Caldas had assassinated José Rodrigues do Nascimento, a member of a numerous and influential family of the Flores community. Arrested and held over for trial, the murderer was placed in the jail in Tauá. The father of the victim, João Rodrigues do Nascimento, led a group of his relatives and followers to the jail on the morning of December 2, 1834, to avenge the crime. After cutting off the foot of the accused killer in order to free him from the chain to which he was fastened, they murdered him in the middle of the main street of the vila. Subsequently, Alencar reported, the jury absolved the killers of all guilt and the voters elected the leader of the band the most-voted juiz de paz of his district.

The president lamented that the success of the innovations

3. Alencar's address is reprinted in: Nogueira, "Senador José Martiniano de Alencar," pp. 156-174.

introduced since independence in the legal structure had fallen short of expectations. The *juizes de paz* (endowed with broad criminal and police powers until 1841) had proved to be extremely timid and fearful in the exercise of their duties, and not without reason, he added. Various such officials in the *sertão* had been slain, one of them in *Pogo da Pedra* in the southern reaches of the *Inhamuns*. Many others, Alencar continued, corrupted their offices by the acceptance of bribes. The president also indicated that the introduction of the jury system had not resulted in a more equitable distribution of justice. The jurors, he said, showed complete indifference toward lawlessness, being disposed to exonerate the most reprehensible of criminals. The problem was basic, he continued, since the general society from which the jurymen were chosen was more inclined toward protecting criminals than bringing them to justice. In such an environment, Alencar concluded, the only punishment for crime was that based on hate and private vengeance, with the result that the law possessed no moral force.

President Alencar also blamed a part of the difficulties on the scarcity of adequately trained magistrates, pointing out that only two of the province's *comarcas* were headed by graduates of law schools. And in one of those, he stated, the appointment of a graduate lawyer as *juiz de direito* had only worsened the situation. This was a reference to José Antonio de Maria Ibiapina, in 1833 named head of the newly-created *Comarca* of Quixeramobim, which, until 1836, included São João do Príncipe. Ibiapina, who had studied at the seminary and law school in Olinda, was in his late twenties and an ardent liberal when he took possession of the post in the *sertão* on December 10, 1834, just after

the murder of Pedro Vieira.⁴ While the president charged that the young judge had been derelict in the performance of his duties, Ibiapina, in his letters to Alencar, argued that he had failed because conditions in the Inhamuns rendered the administration of justice impossible.

On December 30, 1834, he wrote to Alencar from Quixeramobim, stating he had quickly learned that conditions in the Inhamuns portion of the comarca were in a sad state. During the previous three months alone, he added, eight murders had been committed there. Convinced that it was his duty to remedy that deplorable state of affairs, he wrote, he had decided to journey first to Maria Pereira and soon thereafter to Tauá.⁵ Writing from the former location on January 30, he informed the president that it appeared most of the criminals in the province had fled to the Inhamuns. In that area, he continued, the most influential potentates considered it an act of heroism and honor to protect assassins and other criminals. In a thinly veiled reference to the Feitosas, the young magistrate wrote that:

O que tenta perpetrar o crime diz com todo o atrevimento:--Zombo das leis e das autoridades porque tenho em meu favor em tal parte o Capitão F.--Convencido disto mata a seu semelhante, procura a casa do Capitão F., que é em outro termo; este recebe o assassino em sua casa, e diz para todos o ouvirem:--Venhão cá tirai-o!!! O Capitão F. é um rei do lugar, ligado por parentesco com as pessoas mais ricas e de representação...E vão tirar o criminoso das mãos do Capitão F.! Os Juizes de Paz que são parentes, ou dependentes do Capitão F., ou se não querem comprometter, dormem profundo sono sobre as lagrimas da infeliz viuva, que pede a punição do que matou o seu esposo, o qual vive publicamente na casa do Capitão F.!⁶

After returning from the Inhamuns, where his moves to punish the killers of Pedro Vieira had been thwarted by the jury, Ibiapina wrote Alencar on March 8, 1835, explaining why he had failed. Even in his

4. A biography of Ibiapina and items of his correspondence are found in: Paulino Nogueira, "O Padre Ibiapina," pp. 155-220.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 175.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 179.

efforts to call the jury, he said, he had met resistance from the legal scribe to the last potentate of the area. The chiefs of the Inhamuns, he continued, did nothing they did not want to do; and since the enforcement of the laws would threaten their power they obstructed all such efforts. The only code of the Inhamuns was the law of strength, he said, and in the execution of that code punishment was awarded according to prejudices, not rules of justice. Ibiapina concluded that the ideas of the 19th century had not penetrated the first line of men in the Inhamuns and that their system of values and the principles of liberalism were completely at odds.⁷

Succeeding him as *juiz de direito* of the Comarca of Quixeramobim in 1836 was Antonio Leopoldino de Araujo Chaves, a son of the Inhamuns who had been graduated in law at Olinda in the previous year. Later in 1836 he was transferred to the newly created Comarca of the Inhamuns, where, with the exception of a few months in 1842 and 1843, he remained until 1851. His removal in that year came as a result of the most intensive campaign to occur against crime in the Inhamuns during the Empire, a campaign directed by the provincial president in cooperation with the imperial Ministry of Justice.

The president who launched the crusade was Ignacio Francisco Silveira da Mota, a conservative who served as the province's chief executive from November 16, 1850, to July 6, 1851.⁸ As a former president of Piauí, he was already acquainted with the reputation of the Feltosa family. Indeed, he charged that one of his major difficulties

7. *Ibid.*, p. 182. Following his short career as magistrate, the young liberal entered the priesthood.

8. On his administration in Ceará, see: Abreu, "Presidentes do Ceará," pp. 125-195.

in fighting crime in that province had been the ease with which criminals found protection in the Inhamuns. When he sent troops to the Inhamuns from Piauí to capture José de Barros Melo, a well known criminal, their efforts were obstructed at every turn, he said, by the leading citizens of the area.⁹

No sooner had the new president taken office in Ceará than his attentions were again called to the Inhamuns. On November 14, 1850, the juiz municipal of São João do Príncipe, Francisco Rodrigues de Lima Bastos, wrote to the president explaining the current situation in regard to crime in that area. His communication stated that the comarca was heavily populated by the Feitosas, and that they owned most of the land. On their immense fazendas, he said, they harbored large numbers of murderers and other assorted criminal and disorderly persons. Although the Feitosas referred to these persons as their agregados, in fact they served as instruments of the criminal power of that family, he said. The magistrate added that the people of the area lived in constant terror. Furnishing a specific example, Bastos related the story of a case quite similar to the death of Pedro Vieira. The murderer of a member of an important family was taken from the jail in Tauá and killed in the street before an audience of several of the townspeople. But at the trial no one would testify that he had witnessed the slaying or had any knowledge of it. In addition, Bastos stated that both he and the

9. Nota to the Minister of Justice, Jan. 4, 1851. This item is found in the ofícios of the presidents of Ceará to the Ministry of Justice, Arquivo Nacional, Rio de Janeiro. Although the bulk of the items in this collection is comprised of ofícios from the president to the ministry, correspondence from lesser officials to the president and other materials are occasionally included for the purpose of elucidating a matter more fully. Hereinafter, this collection is cited as: PCMJ.

promotor were threatened with whippings by chicote as a result of their attempts to bring the murderers to justice. The judge appended to the ofícios a list of criminals who had never been brought to trial. On the list were: José Alves Feitosa, accused of having killed and beaten several persons; Eufrásio Alves Feitosa, assassin and the owner of 25 firearms; Antonio de Tal, cangaceiro; Pedro Alves Feitosa e Vale, murderer and the suspected protector of José de Barros Melo; Francisco do Vale Pedrosa, protector of criminals; Manoel Ferreira Ferro e Vale, protector of criminals; Lourenço Alves e Castro, assassin and protector of criminals; Bernardo de Castro Freire Jucá, murderer; Joaquim de Sousa Rego, protector of assassins; João Alves Feitosa, protector of criminals; Pedro Alves Feitosa, murderer of a slave; Pedro Alves de Araujo Chaves, assassin and protector of criminals; Antonio Martins Chaves, assassin; and Manoel de Araujo Chaves, Antonio da Costa de Araujo Chaves, and Fortunato Alves Feitosa, accused of various crimes.¹⁰

The president received additional information on lawlessness in the Irhamuns in a report, written January 1, 1851, from Lieutenant Floriano Vieira Perdiggão of the military detachment in Tauf. The lieutenant wrote that there was no personal security in the area, the general population being subject to the domination and caprice of the potentates. He reported that the situation was worst in the Freguesia of Arneirós, the stronghold of the Feitosas. It was Perdiggão's opinion that all of the members of that family, excepting four, five, or six, were criminals; and he added that when they came into the vila from their fazendas the town populace was terrified.¹¹

10. Bastos' ofício is found in PCMJ.

11. Ofício in PCMJ.

Considering the handicaps under which he worked in regard to troops and other resources at his disposal, President Mota appears to have done about all that it was possible to do to prosecute those alleged to have committed crimes. First, he reported to the Minister of Justice on December 21, 1950, that he had removed from their posts all of the Feitosas who held commissions in the National Guard. He wrote that members of that family did not deserve confidence, in view of the fact that they not only gave asylum to criminals of all types but were themselves the directors as well as authors of much of the crime of the area. Among those dismissed were: Supreme Commander Pedro Alves Feitosa e Vale; Lieutenant Colonel Louronço Alves e Castro; Majors Eufrácio Alves Feitosa and Manoel Ferreira Ferro; Alferes Silvestre de Araujo Veras, Francisco Alves Cavalcante, Joaquim de Sousa Rego, José Alves Feitosa, Domingos Alves de Goes, and Francisco Alves de Goes; and Lieutenant Pedro de Sousa Rego.¹² One of those dismissed, Francisco Alves Cavalcante, appears to have been neither a Feitosa nor a close ally of that family. His dismissal came principally as a result of the fact that he was being charged with murder. All of the others were Feitosas, with the exception of the Goes of Bebedouro who were allies and, quite probably, relatives of that family.

Second, the president moved to strengthen the arm of the law. In early January, he transferred Alferes Antonio José Vidal de Negreiros from Quixeramobim to Tauá as commander of the military detachment. Negreiros, an officer of the regular army who had captured several criminals in Quixeramobim, was given 40 troops to man the Tauá post.¹³ Mota also dismissed many of the local police officers, including

¹². Ofício in PCMJ.

¹³. Abreu, "Presidentes do Ceará," pp. 141-142.

Francisco Rodrigues de Lima Bastos, the delegado, and Antonio Alves de Castro, Francisco Alves de Castro, Joaquim Leopoldino de Araujo Chaves, João Leopoldo de Araujo Chaves, José Custódio Bezerril, José de Sousa Rego, José Alves de Castro, Eufrásio Alves Feitosa, and João Vicente dos Santos, all of whom were the delegado's substitutes or subdelegados and their substitutes. Bastos excepted, the president charged that all of them were either criminals themselves or protectors of criminals.¹⁴ All of the officers dismissed were Feitosas, excepting the delegado and João Vicente dos Santos, the latter being one of the Marrecas Carcaris. Bastos, a Saboeiro Carcaré who was also the juiz municipal, lost his police post because the president considered him ineffective and believed that a person from outside the area could best serve there.

Third, the president attempted to bolster the judiciary in the area. Shortly after becoming president of the province, he indicated that he did not think Antonio Leopoldino de Araujo Chaves, the juiz de direito, was capable of effectively filling the post in his home territory. In addition to being a member of a family of "perversos regulos" and patrons of criminals, Mota said, he was neglectful of his duties.¹⁵ In one officio to the judge the chief executive asked him how many times he had presided over the jury and how many times he had left that task to subordinates, and in another the president ordered him to establish residence in the vila instead of following his customary practice of residing on his fazenda, located some five leagues away. Antonio Leopoldino ignored the questions but answered that the order was illegal, there being no regulation requiring a judge to live in any

14. Officio, Mar. 9, 1851, PCMJ.

15. Officio, Jan. 4, 1851, PCMJ.

particular portion of the comarca.¹⁶ As a solution to the problem, the magistrate was ordered removed to the Comarca of Alcântara in Maranhão on February 11, 1851, an action taken by the imperial government on the recommendation of President Mota.¹⁷ Domingos José Nogueira Jaguaribe, who was already becoming one of Ceará's leading conservatives, was appointed as his replacement and was reported as having taken possession of the office on May 28 of the same year.¹⁸ The president, on a note of pessimism, indicated that he was uncertain that his efforts would be successful. It was not the judge but the jury which made or broke the system, he said, and in the Inhamuns it was invariably composed of relatives of the criminals.¹⁹ In similar moves, the president directed Juiz Municipal Bastos and Juiz de Orfãos José Fernandes Vieira to reside in the vila. While Bastos complied, the juiz de orfãos, a son of Francisco Fernandes Vieira, requested dismissal from the position rather than move to Tauá.²⁰

Fourth, Mota moved to employ the weapon of recruitment for the army as a means of control. He named Lieutenant Floriano Vieira Perdigão as recruiter for the termo, and recommended that in the event criminals were freed by the jury they be inducted into the army, if they possessed the necessary qualifications. In such a manner, he hoped, the lenience of the jury might be partially overcome. He added that it might help clean up the Inhamuns to the degree that a person could travel through the area without being armed to the teeth.²¹

16. A report on the exchange is found in an officio of Feb. 7, 1851, in PCMJ.

17. Officio, Mar. 20, 1851, PCMJ.

18. Officio, June 16, 1851, PCMJ.

19. Officio, Jan. 4, 1851, PCMJ.

20. Abreu, "Presidentes do Ceará," p. 145.

21. Ibid., p. 143.

Fifth, Mota sent the provincial police chief, Francisco Domingues da Silva, to the Inhamuns to investigate the situation and to initiate proceedings against those accused of crimes. The police chief spent 18 days in the Inhamuns, returning to Fortaleza on April 10. In a report submitted several months later, he commented on the state of law enforcement in the município. During his visit to Tauá, he said, he was told of "factos horrosos" concerning crime in the area. Though homicide was the most common of the serious offenses, never was the murderer brought to trial, he charged. When the jury met, his report indicated, it was only for the purpose of trying one or two insignificant crimes. Adding his opinion to others who pointed to the same deficiency in the system, the police chief said that the jury, being composed of relatives of the criminals, was not qualified to impartially judge the accused.²² According to Cearense, the police chief directed the formulation of charges against 20 persons, almost all of them for homicide. Among those charged and taken into custody, Cearense reported, was Antonio Martins Chaves of São Bento, by 1861 over 60 years old and judged to be the richest man in the comarca. The liberal journal stated that the former capitão-mor, whose arrest had taken place in a violent encounter, warned that the conservatives would never win another election in São João do Príncipe while he was living.²³

The president's campaign in the Inhamuns achieved, at best, only very limited success. Recruiting for the army did free, temporarily at least, the area from a few of those whom the provincial authorities considered undesirable. On December 27, 1850, Perdigão informed the

22. Ofício, Mar. 28, 1852, PCMJ.

23. A portion of the Cearense article is reprinted in Abreu, "Presidentes do Ceará," pp. 145-146.

president that he was holding 11 recruits in the jail at Tauá while awaiting transportation for them to the capital. He stated that he was keeping two guards at the jail at all times, since he had been warned that the Feitosas were planning to free one of the recruits, Antonio da Costa d'Araujo Chaves, brother-in-law of Antonio Martins Chaves.²⁴ According to an annotated list sent by Mota to the Minister of Justice, the recruits from the Inhamuns were a varied and colorful group. Heading the list was Antonio da Costa d'Araujo Chaves, described as having no regular occupation and as a protector of criminals and patron of "mulheres livres." Others included were two thieves, two of the Feitosas' bodyguards, three persons of turbulent character, two dangerous persons who always went around armed with bacamartes, and one unfortunate whose father had turned him in. Number six on the list was Felix José dos Santos, originally of Bahia, who because of his conduct had acquired the name of Felix Perigo.²⁵

Negreiros, the commander of the detachment in Tauá, informed the president that recruitment was not always a satisfactory solution to the problem of what to do with disorderly persons. One suspected criminal, the alferes said, was arrested, but after being freed because of lack of evidence he could not be recruited by reason of being over 50 years old.²⁶ Pedro II reported that of 39 recruits sent from Quixeramobim and the Inhamuns only 15 were enlisted; five of the others were held for police investigation while the remaining 19 were released because they did not meet the army's qualifications. Finally, Mota instructed his recruiters to employ greater care in their task,

24. Pordigão's officio is found in PCMJ.

25. Officio, Apr. 5, 1851, PCMJ.

26. Officio, Mar. 11, 1851, PCMJ.

asking them to insure that their candidates were eligible for service before sending them to Fortaloza.²⁷

In regard to the arrests of those alleged to have committed crimes, the law officials encountered considerable difficulty, but met with some success. A part of the difficulty lay in the fact that the Feitosas did not await the arrival of the police. Lieutenant Perdigão reported in late December, 1850, that many of those who were to be recruited or arrested fled before his arrival. Many of them, he said, had hidden in the Serra Grande, a vast area of scant population, rough terrain, and thick scrub vegetation. Alferes Negreiros added that the people of the Inhamuns kept the criminals so well informed of the whereabouts of the police that apprehension was almost impossible.²⁸ According to the traditions of the Feitosas as well as contemporary accounts, many members of the family sought refuge with friends and relatives in Piauí. Nogueiros in March, 1851, stated that virtually the entire family had fled to that province, and President Mota on March 24, 1851, reported that he had asked the President of Piauí to aid in the capture of Lourenço Alves e Castro and other Feitosas who were hidden in the home of Elias de Sousa of Canabrava, some 12 leagues distant from Oeiras.²⁹

The lengths to which law officials had to go in order to catch a suspected criminal who did not submit peacefully to arrest is illustrated by the story of the search for José de Barros Melo, the most famous desperado netted by Mota's campaign against outlawry in the Inhamuns. Melo, who bore the nickname of "Cascavel," was wanted for

27. Pedro II article and Mota's officio are quoted in Abreu, "Presidentes do Ceará," pp. 162-163.

28. Officio, Dec. 27, 1850, PCMJ.

29. Both Negreiros' officio of Mar. 11, 1851, and Mota's report of Mar. 24, 1851, are found in PCMJ.

various crimes, being one of the better known criminals of the Ceará-Pernambuco-Piauí border region. It was not surprising that he sought shelter from the law in the Inhamuns, for both he and his wife, the latter from the Mourão family, were distant relatives of the Feitosas. Melo was first reported as having fled to the Inhamuns in middle November of 1850, and on the following January 11 Lieutenant Perdigão wrote the president that he had been informed the outlaw was hidden in the home of Pedro Alves Feitosa e Vale. He added that when he had verified the report he would attempt to arrest both of them. He was unsuccessful, for on February 17 Alferes Negreiros wrote Mota that Melo was working as a vaqueiro on São Gonçalo, the fazenda of Francisco do Vale Pedrosa. It was later reported that he had left São Gonçalo for Pernambuco.³⁰

The apparent reason for his departure from the Inhamuns was the fact that Negreiros had taken to the trail with his entire detachment of 40 men in an attempt to capture the wanted criminal. The soldiers left Tauá on February 20, after having heard that Melo, his brother, and their sequazes were in hiding at Exú in Pernambuco. Arriving at Exú on the 26th, Negreiros and his men conducted a house to house search, all to no avail. Finally, they took a slave into custody who informed them that Melo and his band had departed on the 23rd for Brejo Grande, nine leagues away in Ceará. Covering the almost 36 miles the following day without rest, the soldiers made a house to house search in Brejo Grande, but again without success. Negreiros reported that he placed all persons who could be found under arrest for questioning, but they told him

30. On Barros' whereabouts, see officios of Nov. 19, 1850; Jan. 11, 1851; Feb. 17, 1851; and Mar. 4, 1851--all in PCMJ.

nothing, even the promise of monetary rewards failing to loosen their tongues. Later, the alferes said, he learned that Melo and his men had left Brejo Grande for Cratêus, the area located many miles north in Piauí which often had been the scene of Melo's crimes. Intending to stop at Francisco do Vale's São Gonçalo for a change of horses, Melo planned to steal slaves and sell them to raise funds for his continued flight. The detachment, resigned to failure at least for the time being, returned to Tauá, informing the military police at Cratêus of the suspected whereabouts of the desperado.³¹ At least partially as a result of the efforts of the Tauá detachment, Melo was captured not far from Cratêus on April 7, he and his band being caught by surprise while they were resting.³² President José Antonio Saraiva of Piauí thanked Mota for his work, stating that except for his efforts Melo and others of his kind would still be free, living under the "sombra dos Feitosas."³³

On another successful note, President Mota reported on June 21, 1851, that José Ferreira da Silva Rabelo, also one of the most sought criminals, had been captured in Piauí, after having been driven out of the Inhamuns by the current campaign. Described as the assassin of two persons, it was said that he too had been under the protection of Pedro Alves Feitosa e Vale.³⁴

Residents of the Inhamuns--as distinguished from those who had sought refuge there--reported arrested by late March were: Francisco Alves Cavalcante, Francisco do Vale Pedrosa, João Alves Feitosa, Joaquim de Araujo Sül, and Venceslau Gomes da Silva, in addition to

31. Negreiros' report is contained in an ofício of Mar. 11, 1851, in PCMJ. Cratêus and the surrounding area was until 1880 a part of Piauí.

32. Abreu, "Presidentes do Ceará," p. 160.

33. Ofício, Apr. 25, 1851, PCMJ.

34. Ofício, June 21, 1851, PCMJ.

Antonio Martins Chaves and Antonio da Costa d'Araujo Chaves, both mentioned before. Some of them, including Francisco do Vale Pedrosa, were taken to Fortaleza for safekeeping.³⁵

President Mota, it will be recalled, had feared that apprehension of the criminals would not insure their punishment, because of the leniency of the jury. That his pessimism was not unfounded was borne out on August 25 when 19 persons accused of crimes were weighed on the scales of justice in Tauá. Among those brought to trial were: Joaquim de Araujo Sôl, Eufrásio Alves Feitosa, Antonio Martins Chaves, Pedro Alves de Araujo, Francisco Alves Cavalcante, José do Vale Pedrosa (Nô), and José de Araujo Lima, all charged with homicide; Francisco do Vale Pedrosa, for having protected Melo; Pedro Alves Feitosa e Vale, charged with murder and with being an accomplice of Melo; Bernardo de Castro Freire Jucá, murder of a slave and the beating of free persons; and Venceslau Gomes da Silva, "offensas physicas" against a woman named Maria. According to a report dated September 25 and written by the interim juiz de direito, the wheels of justice turned rapidly at the August session, all of the 19 accused being tried and exonerated in a single day! The judge charged that, among other irregularities, the jury was not chosen according to law and that various names on the list of proposed jurymen had been skipped over in the selection process. Moreover, Juiz Municipal Bastos, who in the absence of the juiz de direito was to preside over the jury, left town, leaving a local substitute, Joaquim Leopoldino de Araujo Chaves, as acting judge. Joaquim Leopoldino, who was soon to become the political chief of the comarca,

35. Ofício, Mar. 31, 1851, PCMJ; and Abreu, "Presidentes do Ceará," p. 160.

had more interest in absolving the accused than in seeing justice done, the magistrate said in his report.³⁶ The charge was probably true, since Joaquim Leopoldino, a brother of the juiz de direito who only recently had been removed from the comarca, was a relative of most of those tried. Among other kinship links with various of the accused which could be mentioned, he was the nephew and three times son-in-law (though he probably had not married the second or the third time by 1850) of Antonio Martins Chavos, on trial for murder. The whereabouts of the regular juiz de direito, Domingos José Nogueira Jaguaribe, was unexplained, though it seems quite probable that in line with common practice he was in Fortaleza watching after political and personal affairs while local substitutes discharged his judicial duties. Bastos, according to the September 25 report, was absent chiefly because he did not want to preside over a jury which he thought might possibly convict Francisco Alves Cavalcante, his friend and political associate.

Indeed, Bastos in a letter to a fellow conservative, João Rodrigues Pereira, warned that if the conservative government continued to prosecute its own partisans, such as Francisco Alves Cavalcante, a new day would dawn in the politics of the Irhamuns.³⁷ Not long after the August jury session, Bastos was removed as juiz municipal in São João do Príncipe, an action that Mota had recommended several months previously. President Joaquim Marcos de Almeida Rego, another conservative who replaced Mota in July, 1851, noted in October of that year that the post was vacant. Being located in the sertão where domination by potentates and disorder were the rule, Tauf, he said, was a difficult post to fill.

³⁶. The judge's report of Sept. 25, 1851, is in PCMJ. His name is not given.

³⁷. A copy of Bastos' letter, dated Aug. 11, 1851, is in PCMJ.

No graduate lawyer, he added, who was honest and intelligent wanted to serve in such an area.³⁸

Following the August jury session, the campaign against crime in the Inhamuns appears to have come to a close. In November of 1851 the number of soldiers in the detachment in Tauá had returned to a normal figure of 14.³⁹ A compilation of the results of the prosecutions showed meager results. Of 28 persons judged by the jury in 1851, including 18 accused of murder, only two were convicted, and one of those was a slave.⁴⁰ In what may have been a lingering, though surprising aftermath of the campaign, a conviction on a charge of having killed Pedro Ferreira in 1850 was obtained in 1852 against Lourenço Alves e Castro, and he was sentenced to a life of hard labor. At the same time, the criminal, who had been arrested when he returned from Piauí, was wanted in Paraíba for the beating of a student at a school in Cajazeiras; but he was not sent to the neighboring province for trial by reason of having appealed the Tauá verdict.⁴¹ Two years later in 1854, the jury at Tauá, returning to normal behavior, reversed by a nine to three vote the earlier verdict against Lourenço Alves e Castro in a session presided over by Joaquim Leopoldino de Araujo Chaves.⁴² Also indicating a return to normality was the action of the September, 1853, session of the jury which freed all six of those brought before it, including José Luiz Leite who was accused of having slain his wife in 1849.⁴³

The Feitosas attempted to defend their honor in the 1851 campaign

38. Ofício, Oct. 15, 1851, PCMJ.

39. Ofício, Nov. 17, 1851, PCMJ.

40. Ofício, Mar. 28, 1852, PCMJ.

41. Ofício, Feb. 1, 1852, PCMJ.

42. Pedro II, May 13, 1854.

43. Ibid., Feb. 22, 1854.

by charging that the prosecution of members of their family was politically inspired.⁴⁴ A Tauá correspondent to Pedro II wrote that the Feitosas hired a lawyer, Leandro Barreto da Silva Araújo, not only to defend the accused but to vilify the authorities as well. The lawyer, as a part of his campaign, wrote A Conquista dos Inhamuns, a pamphlet which referred to an attempted "conquest" of the Feitosas in the early 1850's by the conservative party.⁴⁵ On the other hand, a student of Mota's administration in Ceará presents the president as a fair official who carried on his work against crime without regard to the political affiliation of the criminals.⁴⁶ Although this view may be at least partially overdrawn, in view of the partisan nature of politics in 19th century Ceará, the Feitosa claim that politics was the sole basis of the campaign is not supported by reliable evidence. Most of the Feitosas' contemporaries, liberals and conservatives alike, appear to have believed many of the charges against them. A letter from Tauá appearing in Cearense in defense of the family asserted that the Feitosas were peaceful people--with the exception of one who had committed murder, the correspondent conceded--but then admitted the truthfulness of the charge that many of them protected criminals. Later in the letter, in a defense of Francisco do Vale Pedrosa on the charge that he had given refuge to José de Barros Melo, the correspondent wrote that it was widely known in the Inhamuns that it was Pedro Alves Feitosa e Vale who had done "alguns favores" for that criminal. But, the correspondent concluded, the Feitosas were

44. Feitosa, "Para a História do Ceará," Ch. XIV.

45. Pedro II, Nov. 15, 1854. Although the Instituto do Ceará has A Conquista dos Inhamuns catalogued, it could not be located; nor could a copy be located in any other place.

46. Abreu, "Presidentes do Ceará," pp. 131, 164, and passim.

not the only protectors in the Inhamuns of fugitives from justice, charging that he who gave refuge to the largest number was none other than Francisco Fernandes Vieira, the Baron of Icó (later viscount) and father of the chief of the province's conservative party.⁴⁷ An editorial also presented in the liberal journal, cast another shadow of doubt over the Feitosas' claim that members of their family were not guilty of the crimes with which they were charged. The liberal editor wrote:

O empenho que o Sr. Motta tem mostrado pela perseguição dos criminosos não podia deixar de obter nosso apoio e aplauso....Sabemos que a comarca do Inhamuns gosa de pessimo nome, já por crimes de barbara atrocidade que alli se tem praticado, já porque com effeito tem sido asilo seguro de muitos criminosos. Por vezes temos levantado nossa fraca voz contra o estado semi-selvatico a que aquella comarca ia tocando....⁴⁸

The editorial went on to note that Antonio Martins Chaves and Francisco do Vale Pedrosa were among those who had been arrested. The writer did not protest that they were innocent or that charges against them were politically inspired but limited himself to calling for a fair trial.

In an earlier chapter it was argued that the Feitosas did not establish a definitive affiliation with the liberal party until 1851, and then only as a reaction to the anti-crime campaign by the conservative government. Although they may have been nominal liberals before that year, it appeared that they had been able to enter into a satisfactory accommodation with whichever party was in power, lending support to that party in return for a free hand in São João do Príncipe. The additional data presented in this chapter lend weight to that contention. Many of the local police officials dismissed by Kotta in late 1850 and early 1851 were Feitosas, and this action came several months after the conservative ministry assumed guidance of the nation in late September of

⁴⁷. Letter reprinted in ibid., p. 146.

⁴⁸. Reprinted in ibid., pp. 147-148.

1848. The point is that, consistent with usual practice, the conservatives would not have waited so long to dismiss delegados and subdelegados who were strongly identified with the opposition party. Similarly, the editorial stance of Cearanense in regard to prosecution of the Feitocas was not in harmony with attitudes usually taken when a conservative government brought liberal party chieftains to trial. Thus, the conclusion stands that the Feitocas became ardent liberals only in 1851 and only as a consequence of their antagonism toward the conservative government and the support they received from Thomaz Pompeu, one of the leading liberals. Their claim that politics alone motivated the arrest and prosecution of members of their family was an effort at self-justification and defensive propaganda which appears to have had little basis in fact.

The View from Within

The preceding section of this chapter permits a view of crime in the Inhamuns as seen from outside the area through the eyes of the provincial authorities. The following incidents of crime from the middle 1850's until the early 20th century, in contrast, offer materials for an approach to an understanding of some of the factors involved in criminality, as seen from within the area. Also, the means by which justice or retribution was meted out in these cases aid in placing the role of the public institutions of justice in proper perspective in regard to their importance in the local society. The first of the cases or groups of cases presented here demonstrates the importance of political partisanship in the administration of justice, the second illustrates the role of the dominant family in determining the verdicts of the juries, while the third emphasizes the extent to which acts of private

retribution met general acceptance in a society in which publicly administered justice was of doubtful reliability. Although selected chiefly for their illustrative value in regard to these matters, the cases described here also point to various other facets which contribute to an understanding of society in the Inhamuns.

Politics

Although doubt was cast in the foregoing section on the validity of the Feitosas' claim that the campaign against crime in 1851 was based solely on political grounds, it is true that in the succeeding years political considerations were heavily intermingled with matters of justice. It could hardly have been otherwise, since the area's two leading families--the Feitosas and the Fernandes Vieiras--were in opposite political camps. Fortunately for the peace of the Inhamuns, conflict between the two families was usually held within reasonable bounds by a mutual recognition that each family possessed an area of influence, a recognition attributable not so much to civility as to a knowledge of the difficulties involved in challenging the opposition on its home ground. In the event that one of their partisans who lived in the other area encountered difficulties with the dominant element, protest was generally limited to vilification of the offending parties in the press. Neither Pedro II nor Cearense ever printed more impassioned words than those condemning the Feitosas, in the first instance, and the Fernandes Vieiras, in the second. Illustrative was the correspondent in the June 2, 1868, edition of Pedro II who, answering a Cearense claim that the Feitosas did not deserve the infamous reputation they had acquired, issued a call for an examination of the historical record. There, he argued, "não encontramos outros títulos

senão de sangue; lá não encontramos outras tradições senão de assassinos; lá encontramos só a selvageria que caracteriza essa raça...." A Taub correspondent in a no less scathing indictment of the Fernandes Vieiras in the May 1, 1860, issue of Cearense concluded his letter with the charge that the original seven members of that family in Ceará had inundated the province with "aves de rapina."

Illustrative of the political cross-currents in which justice could be ensnared were the cases of Manoel Alves Feitosa and Manoel Gonçalves, the first in 1863, the second in 1871. The former was arrested and charged with the knife slaying in 1862 of Thereza, described as a prostitute who was the daughter of a public official in Icó. Reasons given as to the motive for the killing varied. A contemporary account stated that it resulted from the refusal of the woman, a former lover of her slayer, to consent to a renewal of their relationship.⁴⁹ On the other hand, Leonardo Feitosa, historian and genealogist of the family, wrote that it was because Manoel was planning to end his affair with Thereza, by reason of having the intention to marry, and did not want to leave her for the desires of another man.⁵⁰ The person who brought charges against the accused was Bernardo José Pereira dos Santos, a Ceará police officer from Marrecas. While there was little doubt as to the truthfulness of the accusation, murder, when it involved affairs of the heart, was not generally considered by the Feitosas to lie within the realm of public justice, particularly in those cases in which charges were brought by a Ceará.

A change of the ministry in Rio de Janeiro in May, 1862, gave the Feitosas the opportunity to use their influence in the liberal party in

49. Pedro II, Dec. 5, 1863.

50. Tratado Genealógico, p. 52.

an attempt to secure dismissal of charges against the murderer of Thereza. After the liberals returned to power, Joaquim Alves Feitosa, brother of the accused and already an influential figure in the area, warned Lieutenant Colonel José André dos Santos, chief of the Marrecas Carcarás, that unless charges were dropped every Carcará who was guilty of crime would be brought before the liberal bar of justice. Subsequently, Pedro II reported, murder charges were brought against the arresting officer, and, in addition, Juiz Municipal José Fernandes Vieira Bastos was suspended, Antonio Pinto Barbosa Cordeiro, a medical doctor, was sentenced to three months in prison, and ex-Promotor Firmino Barbosa Cordeiro, originally a liberal who had displeased the Feitosas, was prosecuted on three counts. These actions, the conservative journal charged, were in retaliation to the initiation of criminal proceedings against Manoel Alves Feitosa by a Carcará. Pedro II concluded its reporting on the matter with a plea for the appointment of a military delegado to São João do Príncipe and the early arrival of the new promotor, who was said to be in Recife.⁵¹ Presumably, the liberal strategy was successful, since neither Pedro II nor the family historian recorded that the accused was convicted for his crime. Whatever the case, there was very little that the Marrecas Carcarás could do with a liberal government in office.

The slaying of Manoel Gonçalves da Silva Junior, a Carcará from Marrecas, occurred on January 11, 1871, this date falling within the long period of conservative ministries stretching from 1868 to 1878. On the day following the crime a correspondent from Tauá began a report to Pedro II with: "Sangue! Horror! O sangue corre pelas ballas e

⁵¹. Dec. 8, 1863.

punhaes dos Feitosas." With that said, he proceeded to give an account of the incident. Manoel Gonçalves and Captain João Gonçalves dos Santos Dino were returning in late afternoon to Marrecas from the vila when they were attacked in an ambush, led, the report charged, by José Alves Feitosa. Captain Dino managed to escape unharmed, thanks to the swiftness of his horse, but his companion was hit by two bullets and then stabbed no less than 14 times. Following the assassination, the correspondent continued, the band went to the home of Juiz Municipal José Fernandes Vieira Bastos who escaped a fate similar to that of Manoel Gonçalves only by reason of not being at home. It was well known, the report said, that José Alves Feitosa had threatened to assassinate Bastos and other conservative leaders. The correspondent asked for police protection for the conservatives in São João do Príncipe, adding that he feared the Inhamuns was returning to a state of barbarism. Although the juiz de direito had sent a small police detachment to arrest the assassins, he said, it was powerless against the might of the Feitosas.

The motives for the slaying, according to the report, emanated from pure perversity and political antagonism. Manoel Gonçalves, it was said, was not only a respected citizen of political importance in his district, he was the faithful husband of a devoted wife and the dutiful father of seven children. His only crimes, the report said, were his allegiance to the conservative party and his membership in the Fernandes Vieira family. The faux correspondent charged that, in contrast, José Alves Feitosa had committed "no decurso de sua vida desde a mais tenra idade todos os crimes contemplados na estatística criminal...."⁵² In a

52. Padro II, Jan. 20, 1871.

dissenting opinion, Leonardo Feitosa later wrote that the motive for the slaying was other than political. Manoel Gonçalves and José Alves were intimate friends, he said, until a dispute over a bottle of cachaga turned into bitter intrigue. Subsequently, Manoel charged that his former friend had murdered Raimundo Bombom, a cabra who had lived under the protection of José Alves. The accused, learning that the one whom he was said to have murdered was living in Piauí, asked him to return to the Inhamuns; and, upon the presentation of Raimundo to the authorities, charges were dropped. But the intrigue continued. When, somewhat later, Manoel again denounced José Alves for the murder of the same cabra, rumor had it that this time the accusation had not been fabricated. The result was the slaying of Manoel Gonçalves. Leonardo added that José Alves was forced to flee to avoid prosecution, once finding refuge among a band of gypsies.⁵³ Cearense also stated that the slaying was not politically motivated, claiming that among the assassins was Vicente Ferreira dos Santos, a Carcará and a relative of the Baron of Aquiraz.⁵⁴

No one was brought to trial for the murder of Manoel Gonçalves until 1875, and then it was not the alleged leader of the ambush who faced the jury. José Alves, a member of the influential Cococá branch of the Feitosa family and a brother of Joaquim and Francisco Alves Feitosa (the political chiefs), apparently managed to outwit his pursuers. The person brought to trial was an alleged accomplice in the act, one Joaquim Manoel. According to Pedro II, he was first scheduled for trial in February, 1875, but the Feitosas, distrusting the list of proposed jurymen, counseled the accused to pretend to be sick. He

53. Tratado Genealógico, pp. 55-56.

54. Mar. 12, 1871.

apparently followed the advice of his benefactors--assuming the charge was true--for the trial was reset for May. By that time, the conservative organ said, the Feitosas had the situation well in hand. Not only had the brothers of José Alves publicly threatened and bribed the jurors, it charged, they had attempted to make a political issue of the matter, calling for a closing of liberal ranks in the defense of Joaquim Manoel against conservative persecution. In the May trial, the accused, with Joaquim Alves Feitosa sitting beside him, was exonerated by his peers on a vote of eight to four. Pedro II stated that the trial created such a scandal in the Inhamuns that even some of the Feitosas hung their heads in shame. The reason for so much crime in the area, the conservative journal said, was precisely the impunity which criminals found in juries such as the one responsible for the acquittal of Joaquim Manoel.⁵⁵ A liberal correspondent, answering the charge in Cearnense, stated that the real reason for crime in the area was the perversity of the Carcarás in attempting to unseat legitimate power with a "meia duzia de farroupilhas e proletarios...."⁵⁶

Both of the cases presented demonstrate that the outcome of a criminal prosecution could be determined by political considerations. Moreover, they indicate that the entire process of law enforcement and justice had a partisan base. Except for the existence of political rivalries, criminal proceedings, in all likelihood, would not have been started. While vigilance against crime is to be commended, to have moral force it must apply to all alike, and in these cases public justice was appealed to only because the offenders were members of the

55. June 27, 1875.

56. Sept. 30, 1875.

opposition. And, in both cases, the innocence or guilt of the accused was incidental to the outcome of the trial. The Feitosa family could not allow the accused to be convicted, because to have done so, under these circumstances, would have been not only humiliating but politically inexpedient; for the influence and power of the family and its political chiefs rested, in part, on the immunity they could grant from conviction for crime in a court of justice.

The family

Although the power of the Feitosa family in the mid-19th century hardly needs to be demonstrated again, the following case illustrates, among many other things, the extent to which the jury was under the influence of that family. Also, in contrast to the preceding case which dealt with matters of interfamily conflict, this incident serves to show how a problem involving a potentially explosive situation within the family was resolved.

The crime occurred in the early morning hours before dawn in the village of Cococoy on September 21, 1855. José do Vale Pedrosa (also called "Nô") shot and killed Leandro Custódio de Oliveira Castro upon finding him in adultery with his wife, Maria (known as "Taia"). Having been told of the whereabouts of the pair by a slave named Anacleto, the enraged husband posted the informer at one door to the room in which his wife and her suitor were engaging in illicit love while he fired through the other exit, hitting Leandro Custódio in the chest. As soon as news of the slaying reached Tauá, Delegado José André dos Santos sent a force of 10 troops to arrest the murderer. The following day he sent eight more to assist the first party, because, Pedro II noted, Nô lived in the stronghold of the family and would be protected and

because, the report added, "O mesmo Nõ não é homen para graças."⁵⁷ But Nõ was not to be found in Cococy. It was reported the following January that he had left immediately after the killing for Maranhão, where he sought the protection of Diogo Sales. No one, Pedro II reported, believed the rumors that the murderer's brother, Pedro Alves Feitosa e Vale, would deliver him to the authorities. The January notice also stated that the slave, Anacleto, had been found dead in an area of Piauí not far from the Inhamuns, his body partially eaten by vultures. Prior to his disappearance, it was said, he had been suffering from mental disturbances, caused, in part, by the consumption of alcoholic beverages but also by the fear that Lourenço Alves e Castro, the victim's brother, was out to murder him.⁵⁸

The crime aroused an unusual amount of interest in the Inhamuns, not because killings over adultery were rare in that area but because the persons involved came from the most influential branch of the Feitosa family. Both Nõ and Leandro Custódio were descendents of Captain José Alves Feitosa of Varzea da Onça, the father of Capitão-mor José Alves Feitosa. The murderer was the grandson of the capitão-mor and the son of Major José do Vale Pedrosa, while the victim was an offspring of the marriage of Leandro Custódio de Oliveira Castro of Rio Grande do Norte to the capitão-mor's sister. In addition, the wives of Nõ and Leandro Custódio were first cousins and both were nieces of their husbands.⁵⁹

Under usual circumstances, murder committed by reason of adultery

57. Pedro II, Oct. 20, 1855. In addition to the notice in Pedro II, an account of the crime is found in: Feitosa, Tratado Genealógico, pp. 53-54.

58. Pedro II, Oct. 20, 1855.

59. All genealogical references in regard to this case are from: Feitosa, Tratado Genealógico, pp. 32, 53, and passim.

was judged to be justifiable and the murderer was seldom convicted by a jury. Illustrations abound in the history and traditions of the sertão of slayings of either an adulterous woman or the offending male or, in some cases, both of them. When João Bezerra do Vale, a son-in-law of the original Francisco Alves Feitosa, resolved to murder his wife around 1780, in order to facilitate his intended marriage to a young lady whom he had met in Recife, he simply spread the word that she was unfaithful to him. Although in this case complications developed when the slain woman's brothers discovered he had lied, the incident serves to illustrate the sertanejo's opinion of an unfaithful wife.⁶⁰ Leonardo Feitosa was not entirely correct, but probably not far from the truth, when he wrote that in the sertão, where justice was weak, a woman charged with adultery always paid with her life;⁶¹ although at least in some cases, as with Nô and his cousin, it was the offending male who was murdered instead of the wife. Sometimes, it was both partners in the act, as in 1878 when Pedro Alves de Araujo slew both his wife, Maria, and his brother, Eufrásio, when he found them engaging in sexual relations.⁶² In the event the murderer was brought to trial--for many times he was not--the code of the sertão appears to have taken precedence over laws against homicide. The promotor of the Inhamuns reported a case in Pedro II in 1870 in which José Antonio de Menezes killed one Raimundo de Tal, whom he had found in adultery with his wife. In the Inhamuns, the promotor wrote, a man who did not take such action was considered to be a coward. The defending lawyer argued, he continued, that the killing was

60. Feitosa, "Para a História do Ceará," Ch. V.

61. Ibid.

62. Feitosa, Tratado Genealógico, p. 85.

justifiable, and the jury by a unanimous vote agreed with him.⁶³

In contrast to the aforementioned incidents, Nô's slaying of Leandro Custódio was not written off as a case of justifiable homicide. The victim, for one reason, was no mere Raimundo de Tal, left defenseless before the power of a numerous and influential family. Not only was he a Feitosa, he was esteemed as an individual. Pedro II, in a report on the slaying, commented that in the period when virtually the entire Feitosa family had been prosecuted for crimes Leandro Custódio suffered no difficulties, for his record was clean. The premature death of the respected citizen, the conservative organ stated, had caused great sadness among the populace of the Inhamuns.⁶⁴ Also complicating the matter was the fact that while the code of the sertão questioned the courage of a man who did not avenge the crime of adultery, it also demanded an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. Locally, it was assumed that Lourenço Alves e Castro would avenge his brother's death.⁶⁵ Indeed, the close relatives of the murdered Leandro Custódio were not at all disposed toward letting the killer go unpunished.

It appears that the matter might have been less difficult if Nô had slain his wife instead of slaying Leandro Custódio; for the slaying of the adulterous woman was generally considered to be a matter of lesser consequence than the killing of the offending male--assuming they were of equal social status--this being a reflection of the generally low status of women and of sexual mores which branded the female partner as the chief offender in an adulterous relationship. But Nô did not murder his wife, even though there were some who thought that would have been

63. Pedro II, Feb. 15, 1870.

64. Ibid., Oct. 20, 1855.

65. Ibid.

the more desirable course, especially in view of the fact that others had died by Nõ's hand as a result of Iaia's previous amorous adventures. In one instance, the victim was a more distant relative whom Nõ had discovered in adultery with Iaia, and, in the other, it was a female slave who was the bearer of love notes between Nõ's wife and her illicit suitor. In addition, Nõ had been prevented from slaying his nephew, because of his relationship with Iaia, only by warnings from the young man's father that the death would be avenged. It was clear that the seduction of Iaia was not particularly difficult, and there were those who thought that Nõ had exacted too high a price from Leandro.⁶⁶

Nõ was not apprehended and brought to trial, it appears, until 1863.⁶⁷ The long delay may have been the deliberate strategy of the Feitosas, for, with the return of a liberal ministry to power in May, 1862, they were in the position to more effectively dictate the outcome of the trial. The approach to the day on which the jury was to meet found the family divided into opposing camps; and, with both armed, bloodshed was expected to follow the verdict, whatever it was. The faction supporting Nõ was headed by Pedro Alves Feitosa e Vale, one of the principal figures of the Feitosa family of that period. In addition to being a brother of the accused and the father of the wife of the accused, he was married to a sister of the victim. Lourenço Alves e Castro, also a powerful voice in the family, led the faction which demanded that Nõ pay for his crime. Lourenço's kinship links with both groups were no less complicated: he was a brother of the victim, he was married to the murderer's sister, and he was an uncle of the wives of both the victim

⁶⁶. Ibid.

⁶⁷. The following account of the resolution of the case is from Feitosa, Tratado Genealógico, pp. 53-54, except where noted.

and the murderer. Standing between the two camps, in an attempt to avert an armed encounter, were Joaquim Felício de Almeida Castro, a lawyer, and Joaquim Leopoldino de Araujo Chaves, political chief of the comarca. Although each of these mediators was related to both of the opposing factions, neither one was closely identified with either group.

A few days before the jury was scheduled to meet, Joaquim Felício and Joaquim Leopoldino persuaded the chiefs of the two factions to agree to a conference in which a peaceful solution to the conflict would be sought. For three days and three nights, it was said, the four men earnestly attempted to find a compromise satisfactory to both sides, but without success. At the end of the third 24-hour session, Francisco Alves Feitosa, who had been dispatched to bring news of the progress of the mediation, suggested that the problem be turned over to his mother-in-law, Ana de Castro. The mediators, weary and despairing of further effort, accepted the suggestion. Dona Ana was acceptable to both sides by virtue of being a respected matriarch in the family, not because of a lack of kinship relations with those concerned. She was the sister of the victim and the mother of his wife, in addition to being the aunt of Iaia, over whom the slaying had occurred. Dona Ana swiftly arrived at her decision. The jury was to be instructed to exonerate the accused by a unanimous vote, but he was to be perpetually exiled from the Inhamuns. Nõ's supporters readily accepted the decision, and, somewhat reluctantly, the members of the other group also concurred, but, for reasons not explained, they insisted that the trial be rescheduled for a later date. When the case was presented to the jury, Nõ was duly acquitted by a unanimous vote. The promotor, Firmino Barbosa Cordeiro,

moved to appeal the decision, but Juiz de Direito Francisco Bernardo de Carvalho nullified his efforts on the grounds--spurious ones, Pedro II said--that the petition had not been signed within the required time limit. The judge's decision, the conservative journal charged, was also dictated by the Feitosa family.⁶⁸ As for Nô, Leonardo Feitosa wrote that he resided outside the Inhamuns for the remainder of his life, but that, after many years had passed, he occasionally returned to the area for brief visits.

The case of José do Vale Pedrosa demonstrates once again the weakness of judicial institutions as contrasted to the power of the Feitosa family. In this instance, the officials of justice were of peripheral importance, as were the written codes of law; the officials functioned merely to bestow legal sanction on a decision which the family had made, while the innocence or guilt of the accused played no role in determining the verdict. The Feitosas dominated the society to such a degree that in regard to those cases which they deemed to be of importance the verdict was synonymous with their collective decision. The chief function of the jury was to grant the accused freedom from future molestation by the authorities, a factor of importance in the event a police official of the opposition party should want to bring up the case at a later date. Though the Feitosas in that era probably could have dominated almost any jury, there was always an element of risk involved in a criminal prosecution, and, at the least, it was a nuisance. Thus, an official exoneration, which only a jury could grant, was deemed to be necessary. Other than for this reason, the case could have been settled out of court--as, in effect, it was--just as easily.

⁶⁸. Dec. 5, 1863.

Private justice

The exercise of private justice is a recurring theme in the history of the Inhamuns. In many cases, it was nothing more than vengeance, although, in others, it served to fill the vacuum left by the weakness of public judicial institutions. The following crimes, each related to the other, stand as vivid and profound commentaries on the workings of justice in the Inhamuns in its many and varied aspects.⁶⁹

The slaying of José Bizarria by Antonio Preto occurred on May 30, 1912, on the Fazenda Poço Comprido of Vital de Sousa Feitosa, brother-in-law of the murdered man, in the district of Cocoy in Arneirões. According to testimony taken by police officials, Preto, described as a Negro morador on the fazenda, attacked Bizarria, who also lived on the fazenda, with a knife when the latter approached him around 7:00 A.M. asking that he pay a debt. Although Bizarria was armed with both revolver and knife, as was his custom, it was said that he was so taken by surprise that he could not adequately defend himself.

Further testimony revealed that the slaying was the result of alleged affronts and was enveloped in intrigue within the Feitosa family, all of the principal figures concerned being Feitosas with the exception of the morador and his sons. Antonio Preto had two sons, José Antonio and Paschoal, the first of whom deflowered a girl, named Maria, who lived and worked in the house of Vital de Sousa. The patrão insisted that the son of his morador marry the girl, and José Antonio agreed to do so. But, with the day for the wedding drawing near, the young man secretly left Poço Comprido and secured protection from Francisco das Chagas Cazé,

⁶⁹. The following account is based on the autos do processo criminal, records of criminal proceedings, in the cases of: Antonio Preto; Cypriano Alves Feitosa, et al.; Luiz Pereira de Sousa (also called Luiz de Tal and Luiz Umburana in the autos). Cartório No. 1, Tauf.

a Feitosa who lived on the Fazenda Riacho dos Cavalos, also located in the district of Cococy. Shortly thereafter, Chico Cazê, as he was commonly called, sent word to Poço Comprido stating that he guarded José Antonio on his fazenda, though not as an affront to Vital de Sousa but to José Bizarria, with whom he had long been on unfriendly terms. Subsequently, Paschoal went around saying that it was not really his brother who had violated Maria, and Vital, already angered by the flight of José Antonio, struck the boy. Conflicting accounts were given as to whether or not José Bizarria, who was present at the incident, participated in the attack on Paschoal. Contributing to a deepening of the intrigue was the boast of Chico Cazê that he would protect Antonio Preto, should he wish to avenge José Bizarria's alleged role in the incident. Thus, on the morning of the 30th José Bizarria went to collect his debt from the morador who was expected to leave the fazenda of his estranged patrão. After the slaying, Antonio Preto fled to Riacho dos Cavalos for protection, but, as a result of altered circumstances, he was arrested and in September of the same year was sentenced to a term in prison.

By September, Cazê was dead. The circumstances surrounding his slaying form one of the most dramatic chapters in the history of crime in the Inhamuns; more than half a century after the event, it was still a topic of conversation in the area. In the early evening hours of July 1, 1912, Cazê was seated in the alvendre of his home talking with his vaqueiro, Manoel Avelino, when three men on horses approached the fazenda. After riding up to the house and dismounting, they introduced themselves as romeiros from Joazeiro, the city in the Cariri region of Ceará where the politician-priest, Cícero Romão Batista, benevolently ruled an odd assortment of religious fanatics, ordinary citizens, and

fugitives from justice. When Cazé, widely known in the area as an admirer of Padre Cícero, offered his hand in greeting, one of the strangers attacked him with a knife. While Manoel Avelino either stood by or was held by the other two of the supposed romeiros--reports varied--the unarmed Cazé was either killed or so badly wounded that he soon died. Though the mission of the three at Riacho dos Cavalos was apparently accomplished, the violence of that night had not run its course. With Cazé dead or dying, a previously unrevealed armed band, numbering perhaps more than a score,⁷⁰ launched an attack on the trio of assassins. When the shooting ended shortly after midnight, one of the three was dead and another was so badly wounded that he died later in the day. Manoel Avelino, who had locked himself in the house, and one of the supposed romeiros survived the attack.

Testimony taken in the investigation of the case revealed that those murdered on the night of July 1 were the victims of a diabolical plot. Shortly after the May 30 slaying of José Bizarria, various members of the Feitosa family began to make plans to avenge his death, but not with the life of Antonio Preto, who, they judged, as a lowly morador and Negro could be left to a jury composed of relatives of the murdered man. He who had to pay with his life was the man who, they were convinced, had ordered the killing, namely, their relative and social equal, Chico Cazé. Cazé, by July of 1912, possessed many enemies among his family, including, as events demonstrated, some of his closest kin. In addition to his feud with Bizarria and his role in the slaying, he had rebelled against the political orientation of the family. In the elections of

⁷⁰. Leonardo Feitosa stated that the number exceeded 40. Tratado Genealógico, p. 122.

April, 1912, he lent his support to the successful candidacy for state president of Colonel Marcos Franco Rabelo against the remnants of the deposed Acioli machine with which the Feitosas had long been allied.

Vital de Sousa Feitosa, brother-in-law of the dead Bizarria, appears to have played a principal part in the events leading up to July 1. He first called a meeting of interested members of the family at Varzea de Estreito to discuss what ought to be done with Cazé. Following the meeting, he made a trip to the Fazenda Barra, near the village of Cococy, to consult with Colonel Leandro Custódio de Oliveira Castro, one of the wealthiest and most respected members of the family. Thus, the secret plan took form and the execution of it began. Three men, who were not members of the family, were promised 100\$000 reis to kill Cazé. They were persons whom the intended victim did not know; and, since the arrival of strangers to an isolated fazenda in the sertão usually aroused suspicion, they were instructed to impersonate followers of Padre Cícero, to whom, it was correctly supposed, Cazé would extend a warm welcome. Luiz Pereira de Sousa, José Balaio, and Luiz Gonçalves, agregados, respectively, of José de Deus of Timbaúba, Cypriano Alves Feitosa, and Cândido Alves Feitosa, were the three. To forever seal the lips of these hired assassins--and to save the 100\$000 reis, one informant testified--it was agreed that a group composed of members of the family and trusted subordinates would trail the assassins and murder them, once their deed was done. Except for the failure to kill Luiz Pereira do Sousa, the plan was carried out in its entirety.

Efforts were begun immediately to bring the murderers of Cazé to justice, a move aided by the fact that Marcos Franco Rabelo and his party, which the majority of the Feitosas opposed, ruled the state. The

rabelistas generally engaged in vigorous efforts to prosecute criminals in all parts of the state, particularly, it appears, when they were partisans of the opposition. Pretrial testimony was taken from 15 persons, most of whom were vaqueiros or moradores. All of them stated that their source of information was "por ouvir dizer," as was the general practice of so-called witnesses in that era, no one being asked to divulge how he had come to know the testimony he gave. In effect, it was generally the repetition of rumors and common knowledge. Except for a few conflicting points previously noted, most of the informants gave similar accounts, although some of them limited themselves to telling the story of the attack without naming any of those alleged to have participated in it or ordered it. Nonetheless, the information they gave appears to have been in harmony with the account generally accepted in the Inhamuns, the Feitosa family included. Quite probably, the fact that the rabelistas controlled the state made the informants somewhat more willing to tell their stories; for when the accused were brought to trial in late 1914, by which time Franco Rabelo had been deposed by insurrection and federal intervention and his enemies were in power, not one of the persons summoned to testify put in an appearance!

Two separate criminal proceedings were initiated: one against Luiz Pereira de Sousa for having given aid in the killing of Cazé and the other against members of the family and their associates. In the case of these latter, considerable time passed before they were arrested. Six of the leading figures in the conspiracy petitioned for a writ of preventive habeas corpus early in 1913, charging that they were being threatened with illegal imprisonment by the substitute delegado from Taubá, Francisco Aguiar. According to the petitioners, Aguiar had repeatedly sent police detachments to arrest them, even though, they

stated, Arneirós was outside of his jurisdiction and, moreover, they had committed no crimes. Although their petition was granted, it protected them only until September 23, 1913, when the juiz de direito ordered them arrested. The formal charges, as drawn up by the promotor in July, 1913, divided the accused into two groups. Charged with being the "autores psychicos intellectuaes" of the deaths of Cazé and two of his assassins were Cypriano Alves Feitosa, Cândido Alves Feitosa, João Baptista de Castro Jucá, Pedro Honório, and José Custódio Bizarria Filho, the last named being one of Cazé's brothers. The second group was composed of those charged with being the "autores physicos" of the slaying of the two assassins. Members of the Feitosa family included in this group were José de Deus, Vital de Sousa Feitosa, and José Pedroso Bizarria (a son of the above named brother of Cazé). Antonio Salviano, Antonio Francisco, and Antonio Pagheú, agregados of various ones of those named above, completed the second group. These 11 persons were the only ones against whom formal charges were brought, even though the number of persons directly involved in the events was said to have been much larger.

The case came before the jury in the Termo of Arneirós on September 23 and 24, 1914, by which time charges against four of the accused (Pedro Honório, José Custódio Bizarria Filho, José de Deus, and Antonio Pagheú) had been dropped for reasons not explained in the written records. The first order of business was the formation of the jury. The 12 members, the majority of whom were Feitosas, were soon selected, the defense challenging five proposed jurors while the prosecution excluded two. There being no one present to offer testimony, the proceedings were not lengthy. After Domingos Teixeira Leite, a local citizen serving

temporarily as promotor, had perfunctorily asked the jury to do its duty as it saw fit, the defense attorney, Colonel Lourenço Alves Feitosa e Castro, was given the floor. The Inhamuns' most distinguished citizen, in his mild and unassuming manner, told the jury that the case against his clients was based on unproved testimony offered by unreliable informants. To prove that a crime had been ordered by others, he stated, the prosecution had to show the time and place of the alleged conspiracy. The colonel then produced a sworn statement by Joaquim Leopoldino de Araujo Chaves, a morador at Varzea de Estreito and a brother of Cazé's widow, to the effect that no conferences of any kind had been held on that fazenda. Later in his appeal for acquittal, Colonel Lourenço described Cazé as a violent man and protector of criminals, who had made many enemies in the course of his life. The aim of his arguments was to show that the deaths of Cazé and his assassins resulted from a battle in which only they were involved and which was waged for reasons known only to them. The defendants, he concluded, had been unjustly accused. The jury agreed.

The trial of Luiz Pereira de Sousa followed immediately. When arrested shortly after the slaying of Cazé, he had informed the authorities that he was an illiterate, 21-year-old native of Bebedouro who lived from working as an agricultural laborer. His trial proceeded much in the same manner as had the previous one. Although no transcript was kept of Colonel Lourenço's defense of the accused, the legal scribe, Joaquim de Moraes Feitosa, admiringly wrote that his remarks were succinct and clear. In a positive response to the colonel's appeal, the jury unanimously agreed that the defendant had in no way contributed to the infliction of the wounds resulting in the death of Cazé. Juiz de

Direito Adalberto Cícero Correia Lima disagreed in this instance, and he appealed the case to the state tribunal. The state attorney general (procurador geral), Sabino do Monte, recommended to the tribunal in February, 1915, that the case be retried. Although only the acquittal of Luiz Pereira de Sousa was under review, he declared that the entire affair was a case of pure and simple murder contrived by members of the Feitosa family. In the trial, he charged, the jury had completely ignored the facts, and, in addition, he noted that two of the jurymen served illegally, since their names were not found on the list from which the jury was supposed to have been selected. The tribunal ordered a retrial. On September 21, 1916, Luiz Pereira de Sousa again faced an Arneirões jury and again he was exonerated.

The case of the murder of Francisco das Chagas Cazé was closed. Insofar as the great majority of the Feitosa family was concerned, justice had triumphed.

Conclusion

The concepts of crime, justice, and law enforcement are fundamental aspects of human social organization, although in their contents they may vary greatly from one society to another. The Inhamuns in the years embraced by this study lay within an area of western culture where all of these concepts were highly developed and, in theory, institutionalized. Justice, as retribution for crime, was based on a code of law; and, by law, it was to be administered through governmental agencies. But, as the case histories presented in this chapter indicate, a vast gulf separated written laws and actual practices. This situation resulted, in large part, from a set of conditions which structured power along monolithic lines. The Feitosa family dominated much of the Inhamuns

throughout the period covered by this chapter. Since the jury, the crucial element in the judicial system, was subject to local pressures, the Feitosas dominated its decisions in those cases they deemed important. Decisions were not determined according to codes of law, but by a complex of interacting factors which, at the least, often included considerations of family loyalty and honor, expediency, and vengeance. Although the jury, in some instances, convicted a person who was guilty of the crime with which he was charged, the action was incidental to considerations of just retribution for wrong done; for the decision was made on quite another basis. In the succeeding instance, a guilty party might go free or an innocent person be judged guilty because the same set of considerations determined that it was the expedient or desirable course. In short, a system of impartially administered justice did not exist in the Inhamuns.

IV. GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS DURING THE OLD REPUBLIC

At three o'clock in the afternoon of December 8, 1889, the citizens of São João do Príncipe formally acknowledged that the nation had passed a milestone in its history. In response to news from Fortaleza telling of Ceará's adhesion to the Republic more than three weeks earlier, over 100 residents of Tauá gathered at the meeting house of the câmara to swear their loyalty to the new government. Dr. Plácido de Pinho Pessoa, the juiz de direito of the comarca, was popularly proclaimed chairman of the meeting, and he, in turn, asked Lieutenant Lourenço Alves Feitosa e Castro to serve as secretary. The formalities of organization concluded, Dr. Pessoa solemnly narrated the "gloriosos sucessos" of the end of the Empire and the proclamation of the Republic on the previous November 15. Bringing his address to a close with the affirmation that he was a republican, he invited all those present to join him in signing the oath to the new government. After the judge had been warmly applauded, "Cidadão" Lourenço Alves Feitosa e Castro took the floor, terminating his remarks with three cheers to Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. He was followed by Dr. Francisco Primeiro de Araujo Citó, local lawyer, judge, and fazendeiro, who gave an eloquent speech on the principles of liberty, in the course of which he stated with pride that Brazil had undergone a great revolutionary change without the shedding of blood. At four o'clock the chairman joined the convention in a lusty viva to Marechal Presidente Manoel Deodoro da Fonseca, Dcm Pedro's successor,

and invited the crowd to disperse.¹

The Inhamuns had entered the Republican Era.

The Structure

The changes introduced by the republicans with respect to local government were not generally of deep-seated significance, for the decentralizing elements in their program touched local government only briefly and in an incomplete manner. Mostly, when the republicans spoke of decentralization and self-government, they were referring to an increase in the power of the states at the expense of the central government. Although municipal autonomy was a topic of frequent discussion among them, the principal change made by the new regime was the transferral of authority over the local situation from Rio de Janeiro to the stato capital.² The shift was most clearly seen in the provision for an elected state president endowed with broad powers. The state, having the authority in its hands, could delegate it to the município as it saw fit. The following outline of changes made in Ceará in the organization of local government in the Old Republic indicates the extent to which local autonomy was granted to the municípios in that state.

Few changes of importance were made in judicial and police organization. In regard to the former, the major difference was the assumption by the state president of appointive powers--formerly exercised by the emperor--over juizes de direito, juizes municipaes, and promotores. Similarly, the appointment of delegados also passed from the national government to the state president. There was an attempt in the early

1. Offícios, SJP, Dec. 8, 1889.

2. Local, Coronelismo, pp. 50-53.

years of the period to place a part of the responsibility for local policing on the município, but it was of short duration. Law 33 of November 10, 1892, instructed the municípios to establish a local police force to be known as the guarda municipal, but this legislation was soon followed by Law 159 of September 10, 1894, which authorized the president to organize a company of the state military force to substitute the local police where deemed necessary. Finally, Law 721 of August 14, 1903, revoked the 1892 provision, vesting the state with all power over the local police. It was reported from Tauá in 1895 that the guarda municipal in São João dos Inhamuns--the name was changed in 1892 to erase references to royalty--had been dissolved by the câmara as a result of the lack of confidence in the performance of that body.³ With respect to the National Guard, which in the last decades of the monarchy had practically ceased to function, it was continued by the federal constitution of 1891 but, in reality, had no military or police duties. In Ceará it served only as a means by which the state president bestowed military titles upon friends of the government.

The main alteration in regard to the administration of the município was the creation of a chief executive, an office which had not existed in municipal government as previously constituted. The new post, at least in part, evolved from the office of president of the câmara. Various regulatory acts passed during the Old Republic in regard to the office indicated its growing importance, as viewed from both the município and the state capital. Law 33 of November 10, 1892, the first general state law in regard to municipal organization,

3. Offícios, São João dos Inhamuns, Aug. 5, 1895.

provided for an intendente as the head of the município. In accordance with that law, he was one of the vereadores and was elected to the post by the câmara for a term of one year. Subsequently, Law 264 of September 26, 1895, altered the previous act to the extent that the state president would name the intendente from among the vereadores. Five years later, Law 588 of July 24, 1900, stated that the intendente would be elected by the voters and that he could be either a vereador or any other qualified voter. In 1904, in accordance with Law 764 of August 12 of that year, the state president reassumed the power to name the intendente. In 1914 the name of the official was changed to prefeito,⁴ and the state constitutional reform of 1921, in theory, entrusted to the voters the task of filling the office biennially,⁵ although, in practice, the provision was not implemented until 1926. The same constitutional reform also provided that the câmara would be separately constituted and would have its own president and secretary. In short, the município came to be administered by an executive officer who functioned independently of the câmara and its president.

Evidence points to the conclusion that the post became increasingly important as the period progressed. During the first years of the Old Republic, its importance was magnified by the greatly enlarged municipal income which resulted from the designation of the dízimos on cattle as municipal revenue. The fact that the município had considerable income at its disposal made the post of intendente attractive, both to those who hoped to profit personally and to those who wanted to manipulate the revenue for political ends. And with money went influence. In 1902 the

4. Law 1190 of Aug. 5, 1914.

5. Law 1924 of Nov. 14, 1921.

Secretário dos Negócios do Interior of Ceará stated that all power in the municípios was concentrated in the hands of the intendente. The câmaras, he said, had practically ceased to function. He also noted that even though recent legislation prohibited a salary for the intendente that official was the recipient of exorbitant remuneration which never appeared on the municipal budget.⁶ In 1903 the dízimos reverted to the state,⁷ and, although this move may have decreased the attractiveness of the post to some degree,⁸ the interest with which it was sought after that year is evidence that it continued to be regarded as an office of importance. It appears that during the earlier period it acquired a political significance which remained with it even after financial rewards were less lucrative. Even though during a part of the period the intendente was an elected official, he appears to have functioned as the local arm of the state political machine centered in the capital. This significance of the post alone made it attractive to interior political chiefs.

Colonel Lourenço, 1889-1912

The political history of the Inhamuns during the Old Republic may be conveniently divided into three periods, the first breaking point falling in 1912. The first period coincides--and not incidentally so--with the Acioli Oligarchy. With the end of the monarchy, the liberal and conservative parties, already badly fragmented, disappeared. This situation left the republicans as the only organized political group. There being

6. Relatório do Secretário dos Negócios do Interior, 1902, pp. 6-7.

7. The dízimos were awarded to the municípios by Law 33 of Nov. 10, 1892, and were retracted by Law 721 of Aug. 14, 1903.

8. See Montenegro, História dos Partidos, p. 39.

no ideological questions of deep significance separating politicians and with all desiring to share in the benefits of rule, old line political figures joined sertanejo chiefs and Fortaleza commercial men, intellectuals, and poets to form the Partido Republicano Conservador, the only party of significance in the state until 1912. Well before the end of the decade of the 1890's, Antonio Pinto Nogueira Acioli emerged as the dominant voice in the new political grouping. An influential figure during the last years of the monarchy, he was the son-in-law of Senator Pompeu, the liberal party chieftain. The 1900-1904 term excepted, Acioli reigned as the chief executive of Ceará from 1896 to 1912. His political machine was but one of the state oligarchies of the period which entered into pacts with the federal government for mutual support. Indeed, the period was one of interlocking oligarchies on the state and national levels.⁹

A similar relationship generally was formed between the dominant local faction and the state regime. Whereas during the monarchy two opposing political groups functioned in the community, each one enjoying at least some of the prerogatives of power as ministries in Rio de Janeiro changed, conditions for an opposition became extremely unfavorable during the oligarchy. The state assumed control of the police forces, and, during much of the period, appointed the intendentes. Elections were effectively controlled by the police in concert with the dominant local faction, which lent its support to the state machine in order to have a free hand in the community. With elections so rigidly controlled, little short of a revolution could dislodge the entrenched groups. An opposition had no tenable

9. Ibid., p. 38.

position in the political system. Consequently, those who had been bitterly partisan during the monarchy entered into an alliance with their worst enemies or, in some cases, passed into political inaction. Some, it would seem, bided their time. If, on occasion, rancor broke out in the local camp, few dared oppose the state machine; the principal fight was over who would receive its favors.

Of all the local chiefs in the sertão who supported Acioli, none was more distinguished or more reliable than Colonel Lourenço Alves Feitosa e Castro of the Inhamuns.¹⁰ Born in Cocoy on December 13, 1844, he was the son of Lourenço Alves de Castro and the grandson of Leandro Custódio de Oliveira Castro of Rio Grande do Norte. His mother was a daughter of Capitão-mor José Alves Feitosa, and his wife was a granddaughter of that noted colonial figure. In 1853, the year after his father was convicted on a homicide charge, young Lourenço went to Fortaleza to begin his studies. During the next few years he attended school intermittently, returning frequently to Cocoy to spend a few months on the family fazenda, as was the custom of most youthful sertanejos who studied in the capital. Late in 1861, at the age of 17, he was sent to Recife to commence preparatory studies for entrance into the law school. The outbreak of war with Paraguay found him in Recife attending classes in the law course as an auditor, a status which resulted from his failure to obtain a satisfactory score on the entrance examination in rhetoric. Enlisting in the army with two of his friends, he spent most of the war in Mato Grosso and was discharged in 1870 with the rank of lieutenant. Photographs indicate that he was a well-built, dark-haired young man with a neatly trimmed mustache who cut a dashing

10. On the life of Colonel Lourenço see: Feitosa: Tratado Genealógico, pp. 72-73, and Guimarães, Deputados, pp. 405-406.

figure in his officer's uniform. Returning to the Inhamuns at the end of the war, he became a fazendeiro and politician and practiced law as a non-graduate attorney (advogado provisório). As a member of the most influential branch of his family, he easily entered political life, serving before the end of the Empire as subdelegado, vereador, acting promotor, and provincial deputy. In the early years of his political career he cooperated with Colonel Joaquim Alves Feitosa, the liberal chieftain of that period; but as a result of the split in the liberal party in the 1880's he broke with Colonel Joaquim and allied himself with the Pompeu liberals, commanded by Antonio Pinto Nogueira Acioli. Thus, for Lourenço the transition from liberal monarchist to Acioli republican entailed few difficulties.

From 1889 to 1912 Lourenço's position as political chief of Arneirós and Tauá¹¹ was unchallenged. He, with the aid of his political lieutenants, regularly delivered the entire vote of the area to Acioli candidates. In addition to serving as a member of the state legislature from 1892 until 1912, he was intendente of Tauá from 1899 until 1912. Although some aspiring young politicians chafed under his control, Colonel Lourenço was a respected figure. Joaquim Pimenta, a son of Tauá who left there in 1909 and went on to become a nationally-known leftist intellectual and a distinguished teacher and writer, remembered the colonel as a benevolent leader who was set apart from the common run of sortanejo chiefs by his mild manner and his regard for learning.¹² In an epoch when political leaders of the interior were scarcely distinguishable from illiterate chieftains of carraceiros, a Fortaleza journal wrote in 1915 on the

11. São João dos Inhamuns became Tauá by Law 485 of Oct. 14, 1898.

12. Joaquim Pimenta, Retalhos do Passado (Rio de Janeiro, 1949), p. 10.

death of Colonel Lourenço that he was noted for his integrity and tolerance.¹³ Although no one claimed that the colonel rebelled against the sordid aspects of political life in his time, it appears that, at the least, he was no worse than the average politician of his day and that, in comparison with his fellow chiefs of the interior, he possessed some admirable qualities which most of them totally lacked.

Based on the support it received from the federal government and on interior chiefs who often ruled less mildly than Colonel Lourenço, the Acioli regime faced only minor threats until 1911-1912. Prior to those years, open opposition was limited to isolated individuals and a few intellectuals such as João Brígido, the erratic publisher of Unitário who began to fight Acioli in 1904.¹⁴ But a tightly knit and nepotic regime usually generates opposition in time, and the situation in Ceará by the end of the first decade of the 20th century was nearing a crisis. Hopes for the end of the oligarchy were raised in 1910 with the election of Marshal Hermes da Fonseca as national president, for many people believed that he would break the hold of the oligarchies in the states. But when he turned out to be no less an oligarch than his predecessors, Ceará's restless elements became aware that the force to depose Acioli would have to come from within the state. The state election scheduled for April, 1912, served as an appropriate event for the formation of an opposition. In December preceding the election, the Acioli party chose as its candidate for state president an elderly desembargador who, it was reasoned, would dutifully continue the oligarchy. Selected as two of the three candidates for the vice presidential positions on the Acioli slate were

13. Correio do Ceará, Dec. 16, 1915.

14. A laudatory sketch of the life of João Brígido is found in A Tribuna (Fortaleza), Oct. 14, 1921.

Padre Cícero of Juazeiro and Colonel Lourenço of the Inhamuns. The burgeoning opposition, led by João Drígido, Manoel Moreira da Rocha, and Francisco de Paula Rodrigues, proposed as its candidate Lieutenant Colonel Marcos Franco Rabelo, a little known cearense who was a professor at the Military School in Rio de Janeiro.

The warm reception which the candidacy of Franco Rabelo received was ample demonstration that Ceará was tired of the oligarchy. Even from the Inhamuns came a message of support. On January 6 a number of Tauá's leading citizens in a telegram to Unitário stated that the "Povo tauháense em massa pelas ruas aclama incessantemente o nosso candidato dr. Marcos Franco Rabello...abaixo a oligarchia."¹⁵ Signing the message were six members of a rising generation of political leaders. Heading the list was Joaquim Alves Feitosa Sobrinho, a son of Major Francisco Alves Feitosa and a nephew of Colonel Joaquim Alves Feitosa, the political chiefs whom Colonel Lourenço had opposed in the 1880's. Two other Feitosas affixed their signatures: Major Joaquim Citó de Sousa Vale and Captain Manoel Ferreira Ferro. Captain Luiz Napoleão Moreira, Luiz Chaves e Melo, and Eufrásio Alves de Oliveira also joined in sending the message of support. Other political leaders in the Inhamuns also opposed Acioli. Over in Saboeiro, the Carcarás, still proud but reduced to a shadow of their former might, gave support to Franco Rabelo, while the Arrais family, their old enemies, stayed with the Aciolis. And, it will be remembered, Francisco das Chagas Cazé in Cococó proclaimed himself a rabelista.

As a result of the rising tide of opposition to the Acioli candidate and an unfortunate event, the oligarchy was deposed sooner than was

15. The telegram appeared in Unitário (Fortaleza), Jan. 11, 1912.

expected. The last straw was added on January 14, 1912, when police intervention in a rabelista parade composed of children resulted in injuries and deaths. While Acioli remained adamant in the face of popular anger and indignation and disregarded military warnings that his position was precarious, the rabelistas dug trenches and amassed the weapons of war. Firing on the presidential palace commenced January 22, and on the 24th the old oligarch at last ordered the raising of a white flag. With his departure, a provisional government under the vice president was set up. Efforts of the Acioli party to present a more appealing presidential candidate notwithstanding, the oligarchy appears to have been soundly defeated at the polls on April 11, although it claimed victory as a result of the two sets of election returns sent from many municípios. In the Inhamuns, the rabelistas carried Saboeiro and Tauá but Arneirós remained faithful to Colonel Lourenço and his party. In Saboeiro 301 votes were cast for Franco Rabelo and none for his opponent; Tauá gave 300 to Franco Rabelo and 181 to General José Bezerril Fontenele, the final Acioli candidate; and Arneirós voted 88 to 23 in favor of Bezerril. In both Arneirós and Tauá Colonel Lourenço ran ahead of his ticket, but he was, nonetheless, defeated in the latter município, where he had lived for many years.¹⁶ After the April 11 election, one hurdle remained for the rabelistas; the state assembly, with which rested the formal declaration of the winner, contained more supporters of the oligarchy than of Franco Rabelo. But as a result of

16. Election returns were given in Unitário, Apr. 16 and 25, 1912, and, for Arneirós, in Livro de Notas No. 1 (Arneirós), entry of Apr. 11, 1912, Cartório No. 1, Tauá. The livros de notas, registers of documents, usually are found in a cartório in the seat of the município. Arneirós to 1930 is an exception, since the archival holdings were transferred to Tauá when the município was abolished following the 1930 revolution.

the strong popular support which the apparent winner had received and of negotiations which stretched from the interior of Ceará all the way to Rio de Janeiro, Franco Rabelo was proclaimed the victor.¹⁷

Transition, 1912-1919

The defeat of the Acioli party had both immediate and long range significance for the Inhamuns, particularly in the Município of Tauá, the economic and population center of the region. On April 13, 1912, Colonel Lourenço was replaced as intendente by Eufrásio Alves de Oliveira,¹⁸ an early supporter of Franco Rabelo and a member of the Campo Preto clan from the Rio Favelas. During the period in which Franco Rabelo ruled the state, the rabelistas held all the elective positions in the município, although Colonel Lourenço and his followers sponsored a rival municipal câmara and always claimed victory in elections by producing their own set of returns.¹⁹ The long range significance to Tauá of Franco Rabelo's regime lay in the fact that for the first time in its history the município was under the direction of a political group in which the Feitosas were not the dominant element. In previous years the Feitosas had not excluded other families from the ring of power; but there had never been any mistaking of who stood in the center. As noted earlier, some Feitosas joined the struggle against the oligarchy, but in Tauá their participation was secondary in comparison with that of José do Oliveira d'Mascimento, the chief of the Gomes family of the Rio Trici,

17. An account of the events leading to the election of Franco Rabelo, covering the years 1910-1912, is found in Hermenegildo Firmeza, "A Revolução de 1912 no Ceará," *PIC*, LXXVII (1963), 25-59.

18. Almanaque do Ceará 1914 (Fortaleza, n.d.), p. 103.

19. Livro de Notas No. 64, entries of Dec. 1, 1912, Dec. 2, 1912, and June 9, 1912, Cartório No. 1, Tauá; Ofícios, Tauá, Nov. 21, 1912.

or of the new intendente. Although it must be pointed out that the new group came to power under the protection of a friendly state administration and, therefore, friendly state police, its assumption of the dominant role in the município was not entirely a consequence of exterior influences. The defeat of Colonel Lourenço's party was indicative of an alteration in the balance of power in the area. In the Município of Tauá the Feitosas were no longer the most numerous nor the most influential family grouping.²⁰ The year 1912 stood as a turning point in the history of the município. In Arneirós, in contrast, the Feitosas remained dominant, this being adequate explanation of why the município was abolished in 1913. Law 1084 of that year reduced Arneirós to a district of Tauá. By this move, the rule of the rabelistas in Tauá was extended to that area.

In Saboeiro, the fall of the oligarchy produced an immediate and clear cut victory for no one. During the long years of Acioli's rule the Carcarás and the Arrais had established an uneasy truce, but once the oligarch's power began to crumble the former family, led by 31-year-old Symphrônio Braga, joined the opposition. After the deposition of Acioli in January, 1912, Alexandre de Mattos Arrais Filho, the intendente, was removed and replaced by José da Costa Braga, a Carcará. But things did not proceed as the Carcarás had hoped. According to Symphrônio, advisors of the rabelistas counseled the provisional president to withdraw recognition from the Carcarás and to favor the Arrais, who, following their defeat, were scrambling to get on the winning side. As a result, Alexandre Arrais returned as intendente in February, 1912, and the Carcarás once again found themselves outside the circle of power.²¹

20. See pp. 187-188 in this chapter, and Ch. VII, pp. 248-249.

21. Unitário, Mar. 2, 1912.

After the April 11 election, the reins of government were returned to Symphrônio's group and José Gomes Fernandes Vieira Leal was appointed intendente.²² The Arrais did not take their defeat gracefully. On the 11th and 12th of May, according to Unitário, Alexandre Arrais attacked Saboeiro with a band of cangaceiros and 20 state troopers from Assaré in an attempt to intimidate the Carcarás. The band also raided the house of the câmara, taking documents regarding a recent disputed election for vereadores.²³ The Carcará return to power was brief, for on August 31, 1912, Franco Rabelo named Alexandre Arrais the intendente.²⁴ Symphrônio and his family went permanently into the opposition, waiting for the opportunity to avenge their defeat. As a result of the struggle in Saboeiro, the município was abolished by Law 1084 of April 19, 1913, and the area was annexed to Assaré. The Arrais were strengthened by this move, for they had close political connections as well as kinship relations with the dominant element in that município.²⁵

It is not clear why the Franco Rabelo regime chose to bestow its favors on the Arrais family which had been so closely allied with the oligarchy. But such an occurrence was not rare in the period under whatever regime. Many times the defeated incumbents maneuvered the victors out of position, in this manner maintaining their participation in power. In Ceará the leopard often did change his spots if such a move appeared to be advantageous to him.

The turmoil in Saboeiro and the duplicate elections in Tauá were

22. Ofícios, Saboeiro, June 12, 1912.

23. Unitário, May 16 and June 1, 1912.

24. Ofícios, Saboeiro, Aug. 31, 1912.

25. Information was also obtained on the 1912 conflict in Saboeiro from Symphrônio Braga, Personal Interview, Saboeiro, June 11, 1966.

somewhat analagous to what was happening all over the state. In reality, Franco Rabelo never consolidated his regime. In part, the situation may have been a consequence of his own inexperience in politics and his inability to weld his amorphous movement into a functioning political machine; but, in large part, he appears to have failed simply because he had too many powerful political forces working against him. Short of a sell-out to the national political machine and a capitulation to the oligarchy in Ceará, there seems to have been no way for him to stay in power. Opposition came from many sides. In the sertão, the new regime's campaign against lawlessness generated much enmity, and charges were rife that the rabelistas used their authority more to avenge old grievances than to prosecute criminals impartially. Indeed, it would have been surprising if such had not been the case. Boanerges Vianna do Amaral, a young rabelista law student who served as promotor in Tauá, stated that he was removed from the post when he insisted on prosecuting criminals without regard to their political affiliation.²⁶ The most powerful center of opposition in the interior was at Juazeiro, where Padre Cícero, an Acioli mainstay, and Floro Bartholomeu, an adventurer from Bahia who served as the padre's political advisor, awaited the signal of revolt. In the capital, Franco Rabelo's performance produced little enthusiasm among many professional politicians, particularly in the case of the wing of the Acioli party which had thrown its support to the rabelistas during the post election negotiations. João Erígido, a liberal who never reconciled himself to things as they were, soon broke with the government and lent his editorial voice to the growing unrest. But, most of all, the end came for Franco Rabelo as a result of his decision to

²⁶. Boanerges Vianna do Amaral, Personal Interview, Rio de Janeiro, Oct. 3, 1966.

participate in a move to oppose the federal regime in its selection of the national president to be elected in 1914. By mid-1913, a Juazeiro-Fortaleza-Rio de Janeiro axis had been formed to depose Ceará's president. Juazeiro was selected as the starting point of revolt.

The sedition commenced on December 9, 1913, with the full cooperation of the Saint of Juazeiro. The local unit of the state police was disarmed, Floro Bartholomeu was declared the state president, and the rebels decreed that the capital was moved from Fortaleza to Juazeiro. The federal authorities moved hastily to recognize the new regime. Although Franco Rabelo quickly took steps to contain and extinguish the rebellion, he fought a losing battle. Not only did the anti-government forces have federal army officers to direct their attacks and ample military supplies sent from neighboring states, they had the support of the most ferocious cangaceiros of the Northeast. And, above all, they had Padre Cícero. What his hordes of fanatics lacked in training and military discipline, they more than made up for in enthusiasm. Never doubting that they would be revived with greater vigor on the third day in the event they were killed, they dauntlessly went to battle. Success generated momentum, and by late February the rebels threatened Fortaleza. Among those waiting on the outskirts of the capital for the signal to attack was Symphrônio Braga of Saboeiro. The young Carcarã chief and his 30 capangas had deposed rabelista authorities in Saboeiro, Maria Pereira, and Pedra Branca before spurring their horses on toward Fortaleza.²⁷ With the rabelista regime barely clinging to a portion of the coast, the federal government decreed a state of siege in Ceará on

27. Symphrônio Braga, Interview.

March 14, removed Franco Rabelo from office, and appointed a military governor for the state. As had been previously agreed on, Padre Cícero withdrew his army.²⁸

The fall of Franco Rabelo's government brought changes to the Inhamuns. One result was the return to power in Tauá of Colonel Lourenço, who in 1914 completed his 70th year. Having remained firm in opposition during a time when many in the Acioli party deserted to the rabelistas, he was rewarded with an appointment to the post of intendente on April 1, 1914. In the elections of the next month he was returned to his old seat in the state assembly. After the death of Colonel Lourenço in December, 1915, one of his close political associates, Francisco Alves Ferreira, was named intendente. Ferreira, who requested dismissal in 1917, was followed by José Alves de Araujo Feitosa.²⁹ The Feitosas in Arneirós also benefited from the new regime by the restoration of the district to the status of município in July, 1914. Saboeiro was again made a município at the same time, and the Carcarás returned to power.³⁰

After 1915 Colonel Lourenço's position of leadership was partially filled by his younger brother, Padre Francisco Máximo Feitosa e Castro.³¹ Following ordination in 1873, Padre Máximo served as vigário in Cococy (1873-1886), Ipueiras (1886-1893), Ipu (1893-1911), Tauá (1913-1917),

28. The story of the 1913-1914 sedition in Ceará is told in M. Bergstrom Lourenço Filho, Joaseiro do Pe. Cícero (São Paulo, 1927), pp. 151-208. Also see: Raimundo Girão, Pequena História do Ceará (2nd ed.; Fortaleza, 1962), pp. 254-261; and Edmar Morel, Padre Cícero (2nd ed.; Rio de Janeiro, 1966), pp. 65-78.

29. Relatório da Secretaria do Interior e da Justiça do Ceará, 1917, pp. 19-20.

30. Both Arneirós and Saboeiro were restored by Law 1181 of July 23, 1914.

31. His life is sketched in Guimarães, Deputados, pp. 265-266. Also see: Leonardo Mota, "O Centenário do Pe. M. Feitosa," Unitário, July 7, 1947.

and again in Cocoy from 1917 until 1923. Having a liking for politics which at least equaled his regard for celestial matters, he was one of the celebrated political figures in the sertão of his time. First elected to the provincial assembly in 1888, he sat in the legislature during most of the sessions until his death over 30 years later. From 1913 until his death in 1923 he was a figure of importance in the Inhamuns. A state political leader wrote in 1922 that with respect to nominations for offices in Cocoy Padre Feitosa had to be satisfied. His escapades in the political and social life of the sertão were so colorful and well known that he became a folkloric figure. In addition to his fondness for beer, dancing, and poker, the padre was renowned for the dash and bravado with which he participated in the often violent political drama of his time. As was written of him, "com o missal num bolso da batina, uma garrafa de cerveja do outro lado e o punhal no cós da ceroula, o padre Feitosa era um tipo singular...."³²

Colonel Domingos, 1919-1930

The faction which followed the political orientation of Colonel Lourenço until his death in 1915, and after that year of Padre Máximo and other Feitosa leaders, remained in power in Tauá until 1919. All of the vereadores elected in 1916 were from that group. Its fall in 1919 was more a result of events in Fortaleza than in the Inhamuns. For this reason, a discussion of the general political situation in the state is again necessary. The situation in regard to political parties between 1914 and 1930 was fluid and confused, but, in general terms, two parties or factions dominated Ceará during the last two decades of the Old

³². "Padre Feitosa," Unitário, Dec. 15, 1956.

Republic.³³ The Partido Republicano Conservador or conservative party drew within its ranks most of those who had supported the Acioli candidate in the 1912 election, as well as many who had initially given support to Franco Rabelo. Prominent among its leaders was José Acioli, a son of the state's former president. The Feitosas generally aligned themselves with the conservative party or with one of the dissident groups associated with it. Also found in the party was Padre Cícero, who, it was said, furnished valuable support with the assistance of numerous romeiros from neighboring states who always seemed to choose election day for their pilgrimage to Juazeiro. The other political organization of importance was the Partido Republicano Democrata or democratic party, the election vehicle of the rabelistas. It was led by João Thomé de Saboia e Silva, Tomas de Paula Rodrigues, and Manoel Moreira da Rocha, among others. The democrats had a strong following in Tauá.

These parties had no ideological political programs. Participation in the distribution of prestige, power, positions, and public funds was their one aim; and, to achieve this, they had to win the election or, failing to do so, find an accommodation with the victors as quickly as possible. To remain outside the government in opposition meant political exile and eventual extinction. Only insurmountable enmity or principles commonly support a sustained opposition; and in that epoch when favoritism, empreguismo or job giving, and corruption were the most conspicuous elements in the reality of politics, enmity often dissolved and few were those who stood on principle. With respect to the national

33. On political parties see: Montenegro, História dos Partidos, pp. 45-49. A perceptive article by J. M. Ibiapina, analyzing the behavior of the parties on the state level in Ceará, is reprinted on pp. 55-59 of Montenegro's study.

scene, each of the larger factions in the state sought to be the favored representative of the federal regime, with the result that all of them could usually agree on a united front to support official candidates for federal office and to divide federal favors.

In contrast, on many a local scene, where remembrances of past wrongs died slowly and daily proximity resulted in new wounds, such harmony was not always easy to achieve. It may also have been that the amount of favors available for distribution to the interior municipios was so small (after the politicians in the capital had taken their cuts) that it was insufficient to deaden local rivalry. At any rate, it was on the local level where political fights during this period were most bitter and where opposition often was consistently sustained. But opposition was directed against the other political faction in the community instead of against the state administration. Generally, the losing local group maneuvered to establish a harmonious relationship with the state regime, without, at the same time, appearing to embrace its local enemies who were the original supporters of that regime. The move to receive the blessing of the state faction in power was necessary, not just to share in the distribution of whatever favors were available but, more importantly, to be in the position to win the next local election. The crucial vote in many contests was cast by the state controlled police who, on the orders of the state president, united with the favored local faction to produce a victory. In addition, the incumbents freely dipped into the municipio's income to support their campaign for reelection. Faced by both the police and a fat campaign chest, the opposition often was forced to travel a rocky road on its way back to power. Thus it was that the route to power for a political faction lay more through gaining the favor of the state

administration than through convincing the voters that its program or candidates were superior. In general, it was to the obvious advantage of the state regime to ally itself with the most powerful of the local factions.

The fall of the Feitosa faction in Tauá in 1919 was a consequence of the breaking up of a state wide party coalition formed in 1916. In that latter year the major political parties united to elect João Thomé de Saboia e Silva the state president. When in 1919, preceding the state election in 1920, the coalition fell apart, the state president went with the democrats.³⁴ As long as the coalition held together, the Feitosa faction in Tauá managed to maintain the upper hand through its connections with the conservatives; but when the union was dissolved José Alves de Araujo Feitosa, a conservative, was replaced as prefeito by Domingos Gomes de Freitas, a democrat.³⁵ In 1920 the Tauá democrats elected their candidates to the municipal câmara and delivered the município's vote to the successful candidate for state president, Justiniano de Serpa, a democrat.³⁶

34. Girão, Pequena História, pp. 263-264.

35. A copy of the letter of nomination, dated July 29, 1919, is found in Actas da Câmara Municipal de Tauá, 1920-1925, held by Antonio Gomes de Freitas, Fortaleza.

36. Ibid., entry of Apr. 11, 1920. Arneirós, under the political direction of Leandro Custódio de Oliveira Castro of the Fazenda Barra, gave its vote in 1920 to the opposition candidate, Belisário da Silva Távora, as a consequence of which the state assembly once again reduced it to the status of a district of Tauá. But in 1922 the Feitosas of Arneirós, after having successfully maneuvered to improve relations with the winning faction, managed to obtain the reestablishment of the município. The conservatives in Arneirós were in a much better position than their counterparts in Tauá to bargain with whatever party was in power. As the only political organization of consequence in the município, they did not face the threat that a rival faction would gain the favors of the state government. The greatest threat to the security of Colonel Leandro and his partisans lay in the desire of the Tauá democrats to reduce Arneirós to a district under their control.

The Tauá democratic party had its beginnings in the 1912 campaign in support of Franco Rabelo, and until its demise with the fall of the Old Republic in 1930 its members proudly referred to themselves as rabelistas. By the time the democrats returned to power in Tauá in 1919-1920, the Feitosas who had accompanied Franco Rabelo in 1912 had long since entered the opposition. The new group was, in effect, an anti-Feitosa party, and it was composed of those who had remained loyal to Franco Rabelo until he was overthrown. Two family groupings, both with roots deep in the Inhamuns, were especially conspicuous in its organization and support. First, there was the Campo Preto clan, a related group of families bearing the names, among others, of Oliveira, Neta, Ferreira de Sousa, Teixeira, and Cavalcante, which was found in the Rio Favelas-Marruás area. Eufrásio Alves de Oliveira, the intendente of Tauá during the Franco Rabelo regime, came from this group. The Gomes family of the Rio Trici-Flores community was the other important group in the party. Prominent among its members in the first decades of the 20th century were José do Oliveira d'Nascimento and Domingos Gomes de Freitas. The latter, who was 49 years old when he was named prefeito in 1919, was a wealthy fazendeiro and merchant. Apart from Colonel Lourenço, he was the most influential political leader of Tauá in the Old Republic.³⁷

Following the deaths of Colonel Lourenço in 1915 and Padre Máximo in 1923, the Feitosas produced no political leaders of the stature of those two distinguished personages. Prominent among the leading voices in the family in the 1920's was Colonel Joaquim Alves Feitosa Sobrinho

37. A laudatory pamphlet, published by the family, contains some valuable data on Colonel Domingos: Antonio Gomes de Freitas, ed., Memórias de Domingos Gomes de Freitas (Fortaleza, 1956).

of Cococã, who, after his brief flirtation with the rabelistas in 1912, returned to his old associates. Other figures of importance in Tauã who followed the Feitosa political orientation were Pedro Alves Feitosa, Joaquim Alves Ferreira, and Joaquim Citó de Sousa Vale.

In view of the tendency toward cooperation among political factions which often existed in the Old Republic in Ceará and in spite of local rivalries, the Feitosa leaders and the chiefs of the other important families could have been expected to work together, as, indeed, some of them did in support of Franco Rabelo in 1912. But serving as a barrier to such an alliance for many years was the bitterness created by the circumstances of the death of Joaquim Citó de Sousa Vale in 1921.³⁸ The 35-year-old Citó, himself a Feitosa as well as a son-in-law of Colonel Joaquim of Cococã, was shot to death by a military policeman on August 27, 1921, in the public market at Tauã. His vaqueiro, Antonio Lama, died in the same encounter. Testimony given at the inquiries which were held in the investigation of the event was in agreement on most essential points. The delegado, José Lúcio do Oliveira d'Nascimento, and his immediate predecessor in the post, Henrique Andrade, had forbidden the wearing of weapons--both firearms and knives--within the vila. In addition, they had ordered the soldiers of the military detachment to shoot anyone who refused to surrender his weapon. Such an order was usually resented in the sertão, where violence was commonplace and self-defense a necessity of survival; and in this case it was looked upon with suspicion by the Feitosas, who saw in Delegado José Lúcio, a 23-year-old member of the Gomes family, only an instrument of rabelista control.

³⁸. The following account is based on the autos found in Cartório No. 1, Tauã.

August 27 in 1921 came on Saturday, the day of the feira or weekly market. Since the day fell in the harvest season, a large crowd was expected to come in from the fazendas to trade, visit, and, in many cases, drink cachaça. In preparation for the event, the promotor, Armando de Sousa Leão, loaned one of the two soldiers in the military detachment his revolver, an action taken, it was said, because the detachment was furnished with two rifles only, one of them unusable. In addition, Manoel Gomes de Freitas, a vereador and a 23-year-old son of the prefeito, ordered one of the soldiers to police the market. The morning passed without difficulty, except for a confrontation with one young member of the Campo Preto clan who stated that he would die defending his revolver. His threat notwithstanding, he was arrested, jailed, and soon released. Then, in mid-afternoon an unfortunate series of events resulted in the two killings. Antonio Lama, Citó's vaqueiro, had picked up his knife in preparation for returning to the fazenda and was riding out of town when he remembered an errand which took him back to the market. There, he was disarmed by the soldier on duty and his knife was turned over to the delegado. When Citó, who on previous occasions had entered into disputes with the military police, was informed of the occurrence at the market, he went there with Lama and grabbed the arm of the soldier, indignantly asking him if he had disarmed his vaqueiro. Upon being told that it was, indeed, as he had been informed, Citó, who had only one arm, ordered Lama to take the soldier's saber and break it. In the struggle which followed, the soldier, Zacharias Rodrigues da Rocha, pulled out the promotor's revolver and shot and killed both Citó and Lama.

As could be expected, news of the killings produced considerable consternation in the community. Accusations were hurled to the effect

that the event was politically motivated, and rumors that the Feitosas would avenge the killings were abundant. The youthful delegado, fearing for his life, left town. The widow of Citô, Maria da Glória Feitosa Vale, brought charges against both of the soldiers in the detachment and, in addition, against the delegado, the ex-delegado, the substitute delegado, the promotor, and Vereador Manoel Gomes de Freitas. All of these men, she charged, were implicated in the illegal acts which led to the death of her husband. To press her case, she hired a Fortaleza lawyer, Raymundo Brasil Pinheiro de Melo. When the controversy had not abated after the passing of several weeks, President Serpa in early October sent the state police chief to Tauá to investigate the case. He held new inquiries and submitted a report which indicated that the officials in Tauá had acted legally. An opposition journal in Fortaleza, A Tribuna, in support of the Feitosas charged that the police chief's journey to Tauá was for the purpose of producing a political whitewash. The inquiries he had conducted, it said, were staged performances which sought only information favorable to the accused.³⁹

The case came to trial in late October. The most eloquent address was given by the defense lawyer, Colonel Manoel de Castro Paiva. In a far-reaching review of the development of society in the Inhamuns, he spoke of the unfavorable effects on the population of miscegenation and isolation, the continuance of the mentality of the colonial era, and the excessive sense of honor which the leading families exhibited. The case in point, he said, was a perfect example of their backwardness. Antonio Lama, he pointed out, could have finished his errand at the

³⁹. Oct. 13, 1921. Also see the Oct. 19 and 26 issues.

market and reclaimed his knife as he departed from town. But, Paiva stated, Joaquim Citó, imbued with that excessive and "mal entendido culto da honra e da dignidade," went to the market to seek redress. The actions of the civil and military authorities were, he argued, solely motivated by a desire to enforce the law. Turning to the aftermath of the killings, the defense attorney charged that the Feitosas and their allies were attempting to use the events for political ends. It was their intention, he stated, to embarrass the local rabelistas to the end that the state authorities would dismiss them and choose officials friendly to the Feitosas. Moreover, he said, Citó and his family had found themselves in the opposition only as the result of a miscalculation as to who would win the 1920 state elections.

Pinheiro de Melo, the lawyer for Citó's widow, argued that the killing was not an incidental occurrence but a result of a planned and provoked attack. He narrated the events preceding the encounter in the market in an attempt to show a conspiracy involving the public officials on trial. Apart from the alleged conspiracy, he charged that the orders to shoot anyone refusing to hand over his weapon were excessively violent and illegal.

Clodoaldo Pinto, the promotor at the trial, recommended that Delegado José Lúcio and ex-Delegado Henrique Andrade be absolved of guilt in regard to the killing, since, he said, their orders were of a general nature and were not directed specifically at Citó. He added that they were guilty of giving illegal orders but that they should be tried on that charge in a separate proceeding. The soldier, he said, had acted only in the line of duty. As to the other defendants, he argued that their roles in the events did not warrant prosecution. The case not falling into the

category of ordinary homicide, the decision as to innocence or guilt lay with the juiz de direito, Arnaud Ferreira Baltar. He absolved all of the accused, except for the soldier. He said that the killing of Lama was justified, if, in fact, the vaqueiro did take the soldier's saber. But he ruled that the shooting of Citô, who wore no weapons and who was one-armed, was unwarranted. The judge ordered the soldier sent to prison.

Two appeals were made from the trial, one by the soldier, Zacharias, and the other by Citô's widow. The state tribunal handed down its decision in December, 1925, denying any recourse to Zacharias and ordering that José Lúcio and Henrique Andrade be tried on the charge of giving illegal orders. But, as the initiation of proceedings rested with local judicial officials generally friendly to the rabelistas, the tribunal's order was never executed.

The antagonism which divided the two political groups in Tauá--an antagonism resulting at least in part from the bitterness engendered by the death of Citô--was most evident in the election for prefeito in 1926. In that year, as a consequence of the implementation of the 1921 constitutional reform, the office was filled by election for the first time in over two decades. Although Colonel Domingos Gomes de Freitas, the local rabelista chief, remained in the post until the new prefeito was selected, the state administration of José Moreira da Rocha, in an action typical of the period, switched its support to the Feitosa faction. The democrats chose as their candidate Benevenuto de Oliveira Sousa of Marruás, a brother of the 1912-1914 intendente, Eufrásio Alves de Oliveira. The conservatives launched the candidacy of Joaquim Alves Ferreira, a merchant in the vila, with a rousing display of fireworks in mid-September. When on September 23 Ferreira was returning from the capital where he had

consulted with conservative leaders, he was welcomed some nine miles from Taubá by what the Jornal do Comércio of Fortaleza described as "innumerous" automobiles.⁴⁰ When the chief arrived in the vila, a rally was held at which a large glass of beer was distributed to all those present. According to the Jornal do Comércio, a conservative paper, Ferreira's supporters were anxiously awaiting the November 10 contest, which they were convinced would demonstrate their electoral majority. The Fortaleza rabelista organ, Diário do Ceará, reported on September 27 that Colonel Domingos and other local officials--not to be outdone by their opponents--had covered the more than 200 miles from Taubá to the capital by automobile in less than three days. That, the paper said, was a record.

As the November election day approached, tempers and determination in the heart of the Inhamuns reached explosive heights. In late October the rabelistas charged that two of their partisans had been murdered by the military delegado, Lieutenant Aristides Rozal. One of those killed was José Maria of Marruás. According to the acciolinos, as the conservatives were called, José Maria was a cangaceiro and bandoleiro in the hire of the rabelistas. A chronic disturber of the peace who had begun his career in crime at the age of 14, they said, he was shot while resisting arrest.⁴¹ The rabelistas, in contrast, stated that José Maria was shot in a manner "barbara, covardo e perversa" after he had indicated that he would submit to arrest peacefully.⁴² The conservative press on October 27 reported that the rabelistas in Taubá were importing arms because they feared the results of a free and fair election. Benevenuto de Oliveira and his party, it was charged, had turned the

40. Sept. 25, 1926.

41. Jornal do Comércio, Oct. 23, 1926.

42. Diário do Ceará, Oct. 22, 1926.

portion of the município which they controlled into a nest of bandits. And on November 1 a telegram from Tauá stated that an attack on the police by armed capangas hired by the rabelistas was imminent.⁴³ Similar accusations were hurled by the rabelistas. They claimed that from the first day of November until after the election the vila was filled with cangaceiros imported by the conservatives from as far away as Missão Velha and Padre Cícero's Juazeiro. Moreover, they stated, these capangas of "acciolismo sanguinario" were working hand in glove with the state police to intimidate the electorate and guarantee a rabelista defeat.⁴⁴

The Tauá acciolinos, shortly before the election, reported that the rabelista cangaceiros had been defeated and that, as a result, a free and fair plebiscite would be conducted.⁴⁵ And sure enough, in a brief notice sent to the Fortaleza press, the supporters of Joaquim Alves Ferreira reported that in an election in which reigned the most perfect order and liberty their candidate emerged as victor by a vote of 459 to zero.⁴⁶ The rabelistas, in their reports to the press, supplied the details as to how it came about. For eight days before the election, they said, Colonel Domingos had been imprisoned in his home by a contingent of state police and cangaceiros, in this manner being prevented from making any efforts to rally his forces. In addition, they charged, prospective rabelista voters were warned that they would be greeted with bullets should they have the temerity to appear at the polls on election day. In the face of such odds, the reports said, the democrats had thought it advisable to retire to their fazendas in the country, convinced that it would be

⁴³. Jornal do Comércio, Oct. 27 and Nov. 4, 1926.

⁴⁴. Correio do Ceará (Fortaleza), Nov. 11 and 12, 1926.

⁴⁵. Jornal do Comércio, Nov. 13, 1926.

⁴⁶. Ibid., Nov. 17, 1926.

both dangerous and futile to contest the election.⁴⁷

A report was also received from Symphrônio Braga, the acciolino chief in Saboeiro, stating that his party had easily won the contest in that município.⁴⁸ Such was the picture generally throughout the state. The conservative party carried 63 of the 69 municípios reporting elections.⁴⁹ The victory, Diário do Ceará charged, was gained only by threats, beatings, killings, destruction of property, and "outras barbaridades."⁵⁰

The November, 1928, election for prefeito in Tauá was the last local contest held there in the Old Republic, and it seemed to close out the period on a note of optimism. In a plebiscite in which neither side made charges of fraud nor coercion, Joel Marques, the rabelista candidate, defeated his conservative opponent, Francisco Feitosa, by a vote of 922 to 655. On hand to witness the election was an observer sent by the state president, José Carlos de Matos Peixoto.⁵¹ Matos Peixoto had been elected to the post just a few months previously on a conciliation ticket composed of both the rabelistas and the acciolinos. It was his influence, at least in part, which prevented another violent contest in 1928.

When the Old Republic came to a close in 1930 the Gomes family had largely supplanted the Feitosas as the most influential political force in Tauá. Standing as a symbol of the shift of power from the Feitosas to the Gomes was the fact that by 1930 Colonel Domingos was the owner of the Fazenda São Bento, once the property of the Feitosa-Araujo chieftain

47. Diário do Ceará, Nov. 12, 1926. Information was also obtained on the events associated with the election from Antonio Vieira Gomes, who was with Colonel Domingos during the siege, in a personal interview in Tauá on July 1, 1966.

48. Jornal do Comércio, Nov. 19, 1926.

49. Ibid., Nov. 20, 1926.

50. Nov. 17, 1926.

51. Diário do Ceará, Nov. 20, 1926.

and last capitão-mor of São João do Príncipe, Antonio Martins Chaves. The Feitosas, by no means, lost all of their influence--for they continued to be one of the powerful elements in the area--but they no longer dominated the community as they had done for over two centuries. Their once all-pervasive influence had been countered by the rise of other family groupings to positions of importance. Only in their bastion along the Rio Jucã in Arneirós did the Feitosas retain their dominant position. Their decline in Tauá was attributable, in part, to their success in obtaining municipal status for Arneirós, for, as a result of the dismemberment of that district, Feitosa influence in Tauá was greatly reduced. To be sure, the Feitosas controlled Tauá for many years after Arneirós became independent of it, but their power appears to have rested largely on the influence which Colonel Lourenço was able to exert, an influence, it should be added, which, in turn, rested on his relationship with the state government. Indeed, it appears that the colonel's power in Tauá rested more on his personal ability and strength than on his family's actual influence. Once Lourenço's grip was initially broken in 1912, the Feitosas were never able to fully recoup their losses. Although this fact was evident before 1930, it was more clearly revealed after that date; for the Gomes and their allies were seldom effectively challenged by the Feitosas after 1930. Whatever victories individual members of the Feitosa family won were more a consequence of alliances with other groups than of the power of the family.⁵²

52. In the mid-1960's the Feitosas still controlled the area of Arneirós--by then divided into the Municípios of Arneirós and Cococó--but in Tauá and Parambu (the latter being a new município in the north-east corner of the Inhamuns) their influence was not decisive. In Tauá, the Gomes were still the most powerful political element. For a discussion of another probable contributing factor to the decline of the Feitosas, see Ch. VII, pp. 248-249.

V. THE SOCIETY AND ECONOMY

The basic forms of society in the Inhamuns were largely structured by the area's natural characteristics and its dedication to cattle raising and subsistence agriculture. These interrelated factors produced a social and economic structure which was little altered during a period encompassing more than 200 years. In the course of these centuries, Brazil passed from Portuguese rule into independent monarchy and then embraced republicanism, but whatever effects these changes produced in the Inhamuns were, in the main, superficial. On the fazenda, where the vast majority of the area's inhabitants played their parts in the drama of existence, the past lived on into the future.

The Distribution of the Land

Basic to a discussion of the economic and social structure of the Inhamuns is a consideration of the original pattern of the latifúndio and its subsequent evolution. As noted before, the sesmarias, each one generally granting a minimum of a one by three league holding or approximately 9,000 hectares, early set the pattern of land distribution. The Feitosas, Araujos, and other families, by acquiring many grants, were able to amass holdings of enormous size by the middle of the 18th century. Once set, this pattern was not easily altered, although the system of dividing inheritances theoretically provided the means for altering it. Property, on the death of its owner, was divided among all the legitimate offspring; and, as a result of the large families, estates

tended to become considerably fragmented within two or three generations.¹ But many fazendas did not continue to fragment, for a counteracting tendency worked in favor of a regrouping of the properties. Persons who held only small amounts of land often sold it, for the extensive system of cattle raising practiced in the Inhamuns was not propitious to small holdings. Generally, these lands were sold to fazendeiros who already possessed considerable amounts of land and cattle. It was a simple fact that only such persons could purchase land, for cattle raising provided the only basis for wealth in the area. There is no evidence to suggest that moradores (landless agriculturists) ever purchased land. Thus, the system of dividing inheritances temporarily broke up concentrations of land, but, by fragmenting the land into uneconomical units, it produced conditions which resulted in regrouping.

The two movements, fragmentation and regrouping, occurred simultaneously. By luck, capacity, ambition or a combination of these and other factors, some members of the society were on the economic ascendancy while others were in decline, the former purchasing the property of the latter. Individual family fortunes rose and fell, but the latifúndio remained, for it was rooted in the social and economic realities of the society. The effects of the movements were harsh and they produced many casualties. By the 20th century, many of the Feitosas were little above the most dispossessed elements in the society while others of them owned many large estates. Yet, the poor and the rich alike were descendants of the Inhamuns' largest latifundiário, Francisco Alves Feitosa, and all of them or their immediate ancestors had shared in the continuing

1. The effects of inheritance on the subdivision of land in Brazil are discussed in: T. Lynn Smith, Brazil: People and Institutions (Rev. ed.; Baton Rouge, 1963), pp. 337-342.

distribution of his wealth. This instability in landholding, it might be noted, was instrumental in producing many of the marriages between close relatives, for such a marriage often provided an economic base sufficient to start or maintain an ascendancy, in one case, or halt or retard a decline, in another.

Specific cases of family fortunes in holdings serve to illustrate the general pattern. José do Vale Pedrosa of Cocoy accumulated one of the largest fortunes in the history of the Inhamuns, possessing at the time of his death in 1843 at least 64 separate properties. Among these were not less than two dozen fazendas whose sizes exceeded 10,000 hectares, and some of them were at least two and three times the size of that base figure.² Although his capacity for accumulating wealth should not be discounted, he was able to acquire such holdings at least in part because he was the only offspring of Capitão-mor José Alves Feitosa, from whom he inherited many of the properties. The size of José do Vale's holdings served to perpetuate the prosperity of many of his descendants for more than one generation, even though his property was shared by 10 offspring. The handiwork of that landed baron of Cocoy could still be seen many years later when in the 20th century his wealth in land was approached by the accumulations of Major Eufrásio Alves Feitosa. Eufrásio, of the prestigious Cococã branch of the family, married Eufrásia Alves Feitosa, of José do Vale's Cocoy branch. A part of the wealth which constituted the basis for the new fortune was Dona Eufrásia's inheritance of properties once owned by José do Vale.

The case of the fortune of Capitão-mor Antonio Martins Chaves of

2. Inventory, José do Vale Pedrosa, Cartório No. 1, Taubá.

São Bento presents a slightly different story. When that illustrious figure died in 1873, he left 75 separate properties, among them fazendas rivaling or exceeding in size those of José do Vale.³ In contrast to the story above, no descendent of the patriarch of São Bento halted the disintegration of the fortune. The Fazenda São Bento was itself lost to the family in the early 20th century when Colonel Domingos Gomes de Freitas began to purchase the fragments from the impoverished descendents of its proud founder. Colonel Domingos, a member of an old and prosperous but not spectacularly wealthy Flores family, was on the economic ascendancy; his accumulations of land were made possible by the decline of another family. Such was the evolution of the phenomenon of the latifúndio in the Inhamuns.

A determination of land distribution among owners in the Inhamuns at any given time is rendered impossible, it seems, by two related difficulties. (1) Few landowners themselves knew how much land they possessed. (2) Contemporary surveys furnished only grossly inadequate data. The first situation resulted from the lack of demarcations. To be sure, regulations governing sesmarias called for the demarcation of grants within a period of two years under penalty of losing the holding, but the regulations were not enforced.⁴ The language of the sesmarias was itself vague, speaking of boundaries in terms of rivers, riachos, watersheds, springs, serras, other natural formations, and, the most complicating of all, other sesmarias and unmarked properties. The sesmarias were granted, it should be noted, by a capitão-mor or governor of the captaincy who

3. Inventory, Antonio Martins Chaves, Cartório No. 1, Tauá.

4. Araripe, História do Ceará, p. 98.

know nothing of the lands requested and who awarded them on the basis of descriptions given by petitioners. Although, under such conditions, grants often overlapped, the *sosmeiros* left decisions as to boundaries with future generations.

Subsequent generations were little more disposed toward confronting the problem of unraveling the tangles bequeathed to them. Properties often were inherited and sold on the basis of descriptions of sortes (portions) of lands of unknown size within sítios (fazendas) of unmarked boundaries, which, in turn, were contiguous with *sortes* and *sítios* of similarly vague dimensions. If several persons inherited a fazenda, they often avoided formal division by holding it as co-proprietors. As succeeding generations multiplied the number of owners, the problems involved in the eventual division of the property became more difficult. Illustrative of descriptions of boundaries are the following:

Uma legoa e meia de terra, ou o que na verdade se achar, no sitio Jardim, da parte do poente, com os fundos que se acharem, extremado com terras dos fundos da Fazenda Arraial compreendendo a situação do Angico, o Sacco e o Veado da outra parte do rio pelo poente, extremado no cumprimento no lugar denominado Vertente em uma aroeira secca que tem na ponta d'um maçapê pelo rio abaixo até a barra do Puiú e com todas as suas bemfeitorias.⁵

Uma sorte de terras no sitio Motta, da parte do Sul, de valor de cem mil reis, em comum com outros coproprietarios; limita o sitio (sem extensão sabida) em cima com terras de Cocodá, em baixo com terras da Varzinha da Onça, na ilharga com terras da Varzea da Onça e Cruz.⁶

The attempts made before 1930 to furnish information with respect to land distribution merit only brief consideration. The Freguesia of Tauá, it was reported in the 1850's, contained 164 cattle fazendas while Arneirós was said to have 181 and Saboeiro, 128.⁷ That the total number

5. Registro de Terras da Freguesia de Arneirós, 1854, Arquivo Publico, Fortaleza.

6. Inventory, José do Vale Pedrosa.

7. Pompeu, Ensaio Estatístico, Vol. II, 91, 140-141.

of properties was larger than these figures was indicated by a survey made by the vigário of Arneirós in that freguesia in 1854 which reported the existence of 315 properties,⁸ the difference between the two figures resulting from the inclusion of small holdings devoted to agriculture in the vigário's calculation. No information was given in either instance which would indicate the total number of hectares possessed by each landowner. It is known only that properties exceeded proprietors in number, for some landowners possessed more than one holding, as available inventories and other sources demonstrate.

The 1920 national census--reporting 125 properties in Arneirós, 259 in Tauá, and 131 in Saboeiro--was little better, even though an attempt was made to present figures in regard to land distribution. The chief faults of the census lay in the small percentage of total land area included in the survey and, again, in the failure to indicate the total number of hectares possessed by individuals owning more than one property. With respect to size--disregarding the question of how many properties were held by multi-property landowners and the vast land area left out of the census--it indicated that over half of the holdings in each of the three municípios varied from 200 to 2,000 hectares.⁹ That this was an approximation of the truth is borne out by available inventories which, to the extent that their descriptions permit quantification, suggest that properties of these sizes were common. In addition, the inventories indicate that the number of persons who held one, two, or three such properties by the mid-19th century was high in relation to the total

8. Registro de Terras da Freguesia de Arneirós, 1854.

9. Ministério de Agricultura, Indústria e Comércio, Recenseamento do Brasil Realizado em 1 de Setembro de 1920, Vol. III, Pt. 1 (Rio de Janeiro, 1923), 134-135, 138-139.

number of landowners. They also indicate, as noted earlier, that some few persons possessed enormous amounts of land.

Before concluding the discussion of land distribution in the Inhamuns, it should be mentioned that most land possessed only limited economic value. A fazenda of 1,000 hectares, located in the sertão (as opposed to a better-watered serra), sustained from 50 to 150 head of cattle in years of normal rainfall. A herd of less than this number probably did not constitute a rational or self-perpetuating economic unit. The largest fazendas, approaching or exceeding 10,000 hectares, supported herds of approximately 1,000 head of cattle in normal years. Some of the land in the area was of greater value--at least potentially--because of its location in serras where rain fell with greater regularity. But, in practice, utilization of this land was long retarded by lack of markets and adequate transportation. It usually was given to subsistence agriculture.

Conclusions in regard to land distribution following the first generations of settlers can be stated only in general terms, as the preceding discussion indicates. (1) A few dozen individuals amassed large numbers of properties by inheritance and purchase. Those persons constituted the class of latifundiários in the Inhamuns. (2) A considerably larger number of persons possessed total amounts of land varying from a few hundred to 2,000 hectares. These amounts of land constituted the minimum in rational economic units in a semi-arid area devoted to cattle raising. (3) Proprietors with holdings of less than 500 hectares existed. In general, their production--whether in crops or animals--was small and their level of living was little above that of the landless class. (4) The vast majority of the population of the Inhamuns was

without land, comprising the morador and, before the 1880's, slave classes.

The Fazenda and Its Inhabitants

The most important unit of social and economic organization in the Inhamuns was the cattle fazenda. The human population of a fazenda varied from one family to several hundred persons, consisting in the latter case largely of slaves (before the 1880's), moradores, and, perhaps, a few agregados. The chief of a fazenda was its patrão or owner, and he was the supreme authority in all matters. He stood between his people and the law; if they were voters, he took them to the polls and instructed them as to how they should vote; and to the extent that aid was available in times of need or disaster, it came from him or through him. He was their friend, their counselor, their employer, and their ruler.

The physical comforts of the fazenda were few.¹⁰ The home of the owner was a squat, rambling structure generally constructed on an elevated location. For almost the entire period covered by this study, it was a house of taipa, a kind of stud and mud construction. During more recent decades it might be built of rough, locally produced bricks; and in the 20th century the roof--formerly of thatch--was almost always of tile. Generally, there was an alpendre (porch) in front. In addition to serving as a cool resting place from the midday sun, it was a place for saddles to

10. General descriptions of the fazenda in Ceará are found in: Thomaz Pompeu Sobrinho, A Indústria Pastoril no Ceará (Fortaleza, 1917), p. 204 and passim; Gustavo Barroso, Terra do Sol, Natureza e Costumes do Norte (6th ed.; Fortaleza, 1962), pp. 153-156 and passim; and Octávio Domingues, A Pecuária Cearense e Seu Melhoramento (Rio de Janeiro, 1941), 39-41 and passim. With respect to the Inhamuns, much of the following description is based on the author's observations of conditions in 1965-1966, which appear to have changed but little since the 18th century, and on conversations with numerous residents of the area.

repose in the shade, for the sertanejo was convinced that sitting in hot saddles resulted in various ailments of serious consequences. Near the alpendre one or more high posts were embedded in the ground for hitching animals. Simplicity characterized the interior of the dwelling. Furniture consisted of a few stools with seats of leather, wooden benches, trunks made of leather, and a table for eating. Suspended from wooden hooks on the walls were redes (hammocks) for sleeping, these being rolled up when not in use. Honored visitors, no matter what time of day it might be, were invited to rest in a rede while conversing with the host. Heat for cooking was furnished by an open fire built in an elevated pit, from which smoke sought its own route to open air.

Often the fazenda house also served as a storage place for saddles and other harness and for the year's harvest of corn and beans. Wandering chickens, ducks, pigs, dogs, lambs, and small goats shared the earthen or, sometimes, brick or concrete floor with the patrão's latest offspring. Under the direction of the patrão's wife, the work of cooking, cleaning, and caring for children was done by older offspring and slaves, as well as by women, girls, and small boys called from among the families of moradores. The fazenda house was well populated, with offspring numbering as many as a woman could bear and sustain during her productive years and with members of four generations often living under the same roof. Adjoining the house or in its immediate vicinity were found the currais for cattle, horses, and mules and the chiqueiros (pens) for sheep and goats. If the fazendeiro owned slaves, their senzalas usually were located nearby.

The fazenda house was usually located near the riacho or river faced by the property. During the rainy season, the river supplied water for drinking and bathing to both man and beast. When in lay or

June the water began to disappear, shallow wells or holes were dug in the bed of the river, such excavations being known as cacimbas. They were generally fenced in order to prevent animals from dirtying the water. Drinking water was transported to the house on donkeys where it was poured in large earthen jars for cooling and to allow visible impurities to settle to the bottom.

In addition to the main house and its immediate dependencies, the fazenda consisted of the surrounding lands to which the patrão possessed legal title. Although boundaries were vague and fences non-existent, it should not be supposed that range in the Inhamuns was regarded as common property. The landowner had at least a general idea of where the boundaries of his property lay--even though his idea and his neighbor's often were in conflict--and he guarded his claim to it jealously. The many duly-recorded transactions involving the transfer of land ownership stand as proof of the value which the inhabitants of the area accorded to legal possession. In practice, as a result of the lack of fences, cattle occasionally wandered onto the properties of neighboring landowners, particularly in an area in which small fazendas existed. There is some reason to suppose that owners of small properties may have encouraged this, for they had reason to look with longing toward the vast holdings of some of their more eminent neighbors. The municipal câmaras, generally dominated by the most landed element, attempted to prevent such practices by prohibiting the grazing of cattle on alien lands under penalty of fines and jail sentences.¹¹ Actually, the extent to which cattle wandered from their home grounds may be exaggerated, for, generally, fazendas were distant from one another, and, moreover, the

¹¹. Ofícios, SJP, Apr. 19, 1834, and Ofícios, Arneirós, Jan. 12, 1875.

necessity of water and care kept the animals within the general vicinity of the main house. Sometimes ~~some~~ ~~small~~ ~~pastures~~ in the undivided fazendas shared by several owners, but, even in these, grazing lands were not looked upon as common property, for each of the proprietors laid claim to a particular portion on which he located his home and currais and pastured his animals.

Next to the patrão the most important person on a fazenda usually was the vaqueiro. The small fazenda might not have a vaqueiro, the owner assuming his duties, while a large fazenda might have several. Fazendas other than the one on which the owner resided were managed by a vaqueiro. It was his duty to care for the cattle, in return for which he received one of every five calves born to the herd. Often no distinction was made between his cattle and those of the patrão, the vaqueiro receiving the proceeds from one fifth of those sold. In other instances, in contrast, vaqueiros were permitted to develop their own herds with their cattle, in which case they were sometimes able to accumulate sufficient wealth to purchase land and become fazendeiros. The vaqueiro's social position in the community was far higher than that of a morador. Not infrequently he was a relative of the landowner, and, in some cases, he married a woman who had inherited land, in this manner moving into the fazendeiro class. If he lived on the property occupied by the owner, his house was located near the main house, while if he directed an outlying fazenda he resided in its main house. The vaqueiro and his family received the milk from the cows, with which they made cheese during the rainy season, a period when milk was plentiful. They supplied the patrão's home with milk and divided the cheese with him. In addition to caring for the cattle, they opened small roças (fields for

planting) of corn and vegetables and usually possessed chickens, goats, sheep, and pigs. It was generally expected that they would offer occasional gifts from their produce to the patrão.

The moradores usually comprised the largest class on a fazenda. Even the smallest cattle fazenda often had at least one family of moradores, while the largest units sheltered a hundred families or more. They made their living from subsistence agriculture, residing in widely-dispersed cottages on the patrão's lands or, less frequently, in small houses near the main house. Moradores came from several sources. Many of them were descendents of the moradores and other landless persons who accompanied the sesmeiros in the era of colonization, and at least some were descended from the Indians who originally inhabited the area. A considerable portion was composed of liberated Negro slaves and their descendents. This group continually grew in numbers by virtue of the manumission of slaves, and it was greatly augmented in the 1880's by the end of slavery. The other morador element, which was particularly significant by the 20th century, was composed of former landowners. Most members of this group were victims of the fragmentation of properties and the sêcas. Their properties becoming so small as to be uneconomical, they sold them and sank into the morador class. When Colonel Domingos Gomes de Freitas began to purchase the fragments of São Bento in the 1920's, he acquired moradores who were second generation descendents of Capitão-mor Antonio Martins Chaves. Greatly contributing to such an occurrence were the sêcas, which so impoverished many small property owners that they were unable to recover from the disaster.

The life of the moradores was simple, and their obligations and possessions were few. They lived in huts owned by the patrão and they

tended their small fields on which they paid no rent, only occasionally contributing some of their produce to the table of the patrão. If they owned any animals at all, these consisted of a few chickens and, perhaps, a goat or a pig. If they left the immediate area of the fazenda, they went on foot, for the possession of a beast of burden--even a donkey--was beyond their means. They were not bound to the land; nor were they debt peons. Although several generations of some families remained on the same fazenda, many moradores moved frequently from one fazenda to another. Particularly severe sôcas, which necessitated flight from the area, resulted in many permanent dislocations. If the obligations of the moradores were few, so were their rights. They could be expelled from the fazenda at any time; and, if this occurred during the middle of the planting season, they possessed no right of compensation for the crops they were cultivating. Their chief value to the landowner was the occasional labor they furnished him on request, for which they expected to be paid small wages. But since such labor was required only a few times a year, the moradores had very little to do.

Moradores in the Inhamuns, at least until the 20th century, were little more than a landless class which eked out a meager living from the soil with the owner's permission, contributing almost nothing in return. The patrão-morador relationship was a largely non-economic device which enabled the society to offer the means of life to its most numerous but totally dispossessed element. The relationship, at the same time, encouraged the integration of the landless class into the social organization in a manner which contributed to order and stability. The society, in effect, adjusted to accommodate a class which had no secure economic position in a cattle raising economy requiring few hands.

Only in the 20th century did the morador class begin to assume a position of some importance in the economic structure of the Inhamuns. As early as the first decade of the century, some fazendeiros began to require that a certain portion of the harvest of corn and beans be given to them as payment for rent. Initially, the amount usually was quite small, but, as the years passed, there was a tendency to increase the rent, some landowners requiring as much as 25 percent of the production. The year of the introduction of the requirement and the percentage demanded, it should be emphasized, varied greatly from one fazenda to another. Two reasons may be advanced to account for the new obligations of the morador to his patrão, the first of which was taxes in money on small animal (sheep and goats) and agricultural production. Such taxes had long been levied, but the first objections to payment of them appear to have come in 1903 when these taxes, along with dízimos on cattle, were taken from the município and given to the state, a transfer which resulted in an increase of the rates. At that time, the câmara of Tauá complained to the state president that the 10 percent tax on agricultural production was unjust. The vereadores pointed out that some 90 percent of the population of the município lived from plantings they made on land owned by others and that it would be almost impossible for them to pay a tax in money.¹² The vereadores probably were more concerned for the landowners than for the poor, for the landowners ultimately were responsible for payment of taxes on products grown on their land. Subsequently, in 1907 the first tax on rural property was levied by the state,¹³ an action which was often given as the reason for the rent required of moradores.

12. Ofícios, Tauá, Dec. 26, 1903.

13. Law 878 of Feb. 14, 1907.

Another factor appears to have served as the greater impetus in bringing about the new demands, protests in regard to taxes notwithstanding. This was the first step toward the commercialization of agricultural products--chiefly corn, beans, and farinha--which took place in the Inhamuns in the early 20th century.¹⁴ Tauf began to develop as a market center for the heart of the Inhamuns and as an intermediate point for shipment to the capital, while products from Saboeiro were transported to Iguatú and Crato in increasing amounts. As such commerce developed, agricultural products acquired a sufficiently high value that landowners began to look with interest toward the roças of their moradores. It appears that it was chiefly the increase in the value of products from the soil, rather than taxes, which resulted in the requirement that the morador contribute a portion of his production to the owner of the land. Understandably, demands on moradores were greater on those fazendas which began to emphasize agricultural production than on those where cattle raising remained the chief concern.

The Economy

Agriculture, meaning the tilling of the soil, and criação (cattle raising) were the economic bases of life in the Inhamuns. Generally, the two activities existed side by side, although differences in the nature of the terrain tended to result in a partial separation of them. From the viewpoint of the residents of the Inhamuns, two types of terrain or land existed: sertão and serra. Sertão was relatively flat, open country, which in the rainy season produced abundant natural pastures. Such land comprised great portions of the Inhamuns, particularly in the

¹⁴. See pp. 213-214, later in this chapter.

heart of the area in the vicinity of Tauá. In the main, this land was given over to cattle raising; but, when rain came in sufficient quantities, the soil was capable of producing crops of grain and vegetables. And along the rivers and riachos of the sertão was found rich and moist soil which was particularly suited to plantings. Since cattle, sheep, goats, hogs, and other animals roamed freely in the sertão, plantings had to be protected from them. Moradores and landowning agriculturists, consequently, were forced to construct fences around their small roças, without which they were not permitted to file claims for damages done by invading animals.¹⁵

Serras in the Inhamuns were mountain ridges of low elevation which generally were somewhat better watered by rainfall than the sertão. Although serras were found in many portions of the area, some of them were especially valued for their agricultural production. Among these were: the Guaribas, Flamengo, Serra Grande, and numerous others in Arneirós and Saboeiro. Although crops prospered in the serras in normal seasons, agriculturists faced a serious problem in the foraging herds of cattle and other animals which sometimes ravaged their roças. The vereadores of São João do Príncipe in 1857 noted that the Serra of Guaribas produced abundant harvests of cereals and vegetables, but that cattle frequently entered the area, causing great damage to crops.¹⁶ The problem arose because agriculturists usually did not construct fences around their fields in the serras as they did in the sertão. Actually, cattle generally

15. Posturas to this end for São João do Príncipe and Saboeiro were approved, respectively, by Law 489 of Aug. 14, 1849, and Law 878 of Sept. 16, 1858.

16. Ofícios, SJP, May 13, 1857.

grazed in the lower areas, but particularly when grass in the sertão became sparse and dry they were likely to seek better pastures in the serras.

Conflicts over the raids led the câmaras to attempt to resolve the question by legislation. São João do Príncipe in 1634 adopted a postura prohibiting the pasturing of cattle in any serra of the município in any season of the year under penalty of a fine and payment of damages to the owner of the invaded land. Sabociro and Arneirós also enacted legislation in regard to the problem, declaring specific serras closed to cattle while others remained open to them.¹⁷ There is little reason to believe that the efforts of the câmaras produced satisfactory solutions to the problem, for complaints continued long after the first statutes had been enacted. The only practical solution, in reality, was the construction of fences around all roças. Arneirós in 1875 attempted to bring this about by providing that no damages could be collected for the invasion of any roça in the município which was not protected by a fence of at least 1.76 meters in altitude.¹⁸

There is evidence that agriculture became increasingly important in the Inhamuns from the first decades of colonisation. The reasons for this trend appear to be the following. (1) Cattle raising employed few hands and could not sustain a large population. Consequently, as the population grew an increasingly larger percentage of it was forced to turn to agriculture for its livelihood. (2) Most of the inhabitants could not become fazendeiros because the investment in land and animals was far beyond their capacity. That industry was largely restricted to

17. Idem., Apr. 19, 1634; Law 507 of Aug. 25, 1657; and Ofícios, Arneirós, Jan. 12, 1675.

18. Ofícios, Arneirós, Jan. 12, 1675.

the sesmeiros and their descendents. (3) The periodic sêcas ruined many ranchers, especially the smaller ones whose resources did not permit recovery. They then turned to agriculturo, tilling their own land if they were fortunate enough to be able to retain it. Many of them, losing their land, remained on it as moradores of the new proprietor. (4) Agriculture required little or no investment; and, although it was even more susceptible to the disastrous effects of sêcas than cattle, recovery was much easier. (5) Finally, the increase in the value of products from the soil in the 20th century resulted in an expansion of agriculture.

It is not suggested that agriculture ever displaced cattle raising as the most highly regarded industry in the Inhamuns, for the greater portion by far of the land continued to be dedicated to the latter, and the value of its products, in terms of exports from the area, was never rivaled by that of agriculture. Yet, the fact remains--if we accept the 1903 figure of the câmara of Tauá as a base--that agriculture, and not cattle raising, provided the livings of over 90 percent of the area's inhabitants.¹⁹ Cattle supported a very small class of fazendeiros, but it was agriculture which sustained the people. This generalization should not obscure the fact that control of agriculture and cattle raising generally was not separated, for the criadores (ranchers) usually owned the land on which the lavradores (agriculturists) made their plantings. Only the small group of lavradores who possessed their own land constituted exceptions. Other than for this group, agriculture was carried on by moradores.

Knowledge and practices, with respect to both agriculture and cattle raising, registered few significant advances in the Inhamuns

19. Offícios, Tauá, Dec. 26, 1903.

during the almost two and one quarter centuries embraced by this study. One perceptive observer, Antonio Beserra, after visiting the Inhamuns in the 1830's, wrote that even though the leaders of the area avidly and intelligently discussed political affairs of national import they answered references to the latest advances in agriculture and animal care with silence, for, he added, they knew nothing to say of these matters.²⁰

Agriculture, as practiced by both morador and independent lavrador, employed, in the words of the câmara of Arneirões in 1875, the methods "primitivamente usados pelos descobridores."²¹ Work on the proposed roça, which only rarely approached a hectare in size, commenced after the end of the harvest with the cutting of trees and underbrush found on it. Normally in November or so preparation for planting was completed by burning the trees and brush which had remained lying where they fell. If it was judged necessary, a cerca (fence) was constructed to protect the roça from marauding animals. Such an enclosure was built of small pliable tree trunks and branches, thickly woven either vertically or horizontally with stronger tree trunks and posts for support. If well built to a height of six to seven feet, it presented a formidable barrier to even the most dexterous goat. These tasks done, the lavrador, with some foreboding, awaited the first rains. If the season was regular,

20. Notas de Viagem ao Porto do Ceará (2nd ed.; Lisbon, 1915), p. 248.

21. Offícios, Arneirões, June 19, 1875. The following description of agriculture and cattle raising is based chiefly on the author's observations in 1965-1966 of practices which have changed very little in many years. For general accounts of Ceará, see: Barroso, Terra de Sol, pp. 17-59; Pompeu, Estado Estatístico, Vol. I, 377-378; Thomas Pompeu, O Ceará no Contexto do Século XIX (Fortaleza, 1909), pp. 16-19; Pompeu, A Indústria Pastoral, pp. 197-198, 210-213, and passim. In addition, information on crops and practices occasionally is found in the offícios of the municípios.

the rains came in January, at which time he and his family made small excavations in rows with a hoe and dropped the seed in them, covering them with soil. The seed, usually consisting of corn, beans, and, perhaps, squash or melons, were all deposited in the same hill. Rice, sugar cane, and manioc were sometimes planted, but less frequently so, since they required special terrain and preparations. Both rice and cane were planted in the more humid areas, such as alongside a riacho or river, while manioc was extensively grown in some serras, especially in the Serra Grande. In addition, tobacco was cultivated in some areas, particularly in Saboeiro.

With the seed in the ground, the lavrador's apprehension did not end, for the first rains might be followed by weeks of clear skies, in which case the planting was lost. In this eventuality, he awaited another rain and, if it came, planted more seed, but with considerably less anticipation of a good harvest than he had the first time, for he began to suspect that the winter might not be a good one. The lavrador's chronic concern for the weather was justified by his experiences. Even in seasons in which normal amounts of rain fell, the pattern of distribution determined the success or failure of crops, and that pattern might vary greatly from year to year. If by mid- to late March sufficient rains had not come to nurture his plants, he and his family faced the certainty of a long and hungry year. Assuming the season was a regular one of rains from January or February to near the end of May, the plants flourished. Care of the roça consisted of usually two cleanings done with the hoe. Harvest came in June, July, and August. Preparations for the next season were easier, for the same roça was used for as many as 10 consecutive years.

The fact that no changes occurred in methods of tilling the soil resulted largely from the harsh climatic environment and the system of land tenure. In the first place, the ever-present prospect of failure occasioned by the climate discouraged any experimentation requiring an investment. In the second place, in the system of land tenure which predominated in the Inhamuns agriculture was delegated to moradores, the small number of independent agriculturists not constituting significant exceptions. The moradores, being totally deprived of property, opportunity for education or enlightening social experiences, and, for that matter, hope for a substantially better life, did not find the concept of progress within their world view. In short, the conditions under which agriculture was carried on in the Inhamuns were not favorable to innovations.

Cattle raising was equally ancient in its methods. The vaqueiro, dressed in clothes of heavy leather as protection from the spiny vegetation, regularly inspected his charges, paying special attention to cows which were ready to calve. He carried the newborn calf to the curral in order to protect it from the onças and other predatory beasts. The calf's mother arrived daily to the curral to suckle her young, at which time the vaqueiro and his family took advantage of the opportunity to extract a portion of the milk for consumption and making cheese, particularly if the calf came in the winter. Once a year, usually in late winter, all of the calves born during the past 12 months were collected and branded, the mark distinguishing the freguesia being applied to the left hind quarter while the owner's sign was placed on the right. Feeding the cattle in normal years was left to nature during both the rainy and dry seasons. From the coming of the first rains until September or October pastures remained sufficiently abundant so as to sustain the

herd well, but from then until the coming of the next year's rains cattle grew gaunt and hungry, having only the remaining dried grasses to eat. If the winter was unusually short or if a *sêca* occurred, cattle might be saved by feeding them the foliage of the perpetually green trees typical of the area, such as the juazeiro, and certain types of cactuses, from which the thorns were removed by burning. As a last resort, the cattle were driven from the area in search of water and pasture, a journey which sometimes took them many leagues from their home. The retirada, as the flight was called, was approached with dread, for many or even all of the cattle, already weakened by the lack of sustenance and, consequently, unusually susceptible to diseases, never returned to the fazenda.

Cattle were not the only domestic animals in the Inhamuns, although they usually were the most important. Almost all fazendas also had sheep, goats, hogs, donkeys, horses, and mules. Sheep, goats, hogs, and donkeys were always expected to seek their own living, for their value was low. Although it was said in the Inhamuns that in a particularly severe *sêca* only the jumento (donkey) and the padre escaped unscathed, the same could well be said of goats. Adapting with ease to the conditions of the sertão, they could live on even the most arid serrote; and they multiplied so rapidly in the Inhamuns that in numbers they surpassed cattle.²² Unfortunately, no market existed for them, although their hide was worth a few reis. Horses and mules, in contrast, were given careful attention, for their value was high. A good horse was worth four to six cows and a mule of similar qualities was valued at even more. Some fazendeiros specialized in the breeding of horses and mules, among them Capitão-mor

22. The census of 1920 gave the number of goats and cattle in Tauá as 27,321 and 20,877 respectively.

Antonio Martins Chaves of São Bento. His inventory, done in 1873, indicated that he owned 1,057 horses and 239 mules, a fortune in animal flesh which far exceeded the value of his herd of 2,430 head of cattle.

Innovations in animal breeding and care before 1930 were few in number, the chief one being the introduction of new breeds of cattle. Although the importation of foreign breeds began in Ceará as early as the turn of the century,²³ they reached the Inhamuns only in the 1920's and then in very small numbers. Generally, the breed brought to the Inhamuns was the zebu of Asiatic origin. Reception of the new animals in the area was mixed; breeding them with the small native cattle of Portuguese descent produced heavier animals, but, contrary to some enthusiastic predictions, they suffered and died in *sêcas* just like common cattle. In addition, there were complaints that the crossbred cows bore fewer calves than their native counterparts. Acudes, small reservoirs made by the construction of an earthen dam on a *riacho*, could also be considered as innovations in regard to cattle raising, for they provided a more reliable source of water for the herd. Although they had long been built in the Inhamuns, the number of them increased greatly after the *sêca* of 1877-1879 demonstrated once again the need for more effective preparations for such disasters. The enclosing of fazendas and pastures in the Inhamuns, permitting a more rational use of available food--a move long advocated by Ceará's writers on rural economy--was a post-1930 development.

Closely linked to the state of the agricultural and animal raising economy of the Inhamuns were the related matters of markets and

23. Pompeu, A Indústria Pastoril, p. 141.

communications. Cattle, as late as the first decades of the 19th century, were sold in Bahia and Pernambuco, but after the middle portion of the century they were driven to Fortaleza, a much closer market. Bois or steers--actually they were bulls, since castration was not generally practiced in the Inhamuns--were usually sold at an age varying between four to six years. Even at that age, they were small, but they enjoyed the reputation, it was reported in the early 1800's, of being especially resistant to the ill-effects of the long drives.²⁴

Transportation, with respect to agricultural products, was much more difficult, for no roads which could be considered graded or improved were found in the Inhamuns. To be sure, communications with Piauí, Ipu, Crato, Icó, Fortaleza, and Pernambuco and Bahia existed from the early 18th century,²⁵ but they were carried on over trails which were not generally suitable for the passage of any type of vehicle. Consequently, almost all cargo in the Inhamuns was transported by the stolid and durable donkeys, usually in small leather trunks or bags hung on a wooden frame on the animals' backs. Such a means of transportation did not encourage commerce in agricultural products; and, moreover, the distance of the Inhamuns from markets, in comparison with more centrally located areas producing the same products, effectively stifled attempts to compete. These difficulties aside, the Inhamuns was quite capable in normal seasons of producing for export, for sizeable quantities of tobacco, corn, beans, manioc, and sugar cane could be grown. To be found in the area were numerous mills for making farinha, the meal made from manioc,

24. Luiz dos Santos Vilhena, "Carta XIX, em que Se dá Notícia da Comarca do Ceará Grande," RIC, XXI, Nos. 1 and 2 (1907), 162.

25. Studart, "Vias de Comunicação do Ceará Colonial," pp. 31-34, 40-41, 44-46.

and rapadura, which resembled more than anything else a cake of hardened molasses.²⁶ Both of these products, as well as corn, beans, and tobacco, were staple items in Northeast Brazil; but in the Inhamuns, because of market and transportation problems, they were produced only for local consumption. This appears to have been the case also with respect to cotton, which was grown profitably in many areas of Ceará from the 1700's. Cotton was planted in the Inhamuns at various times in the 19th century, and a number of boi-operated gins were established to process it, but eventually all was abandoned, according to reports from the area, as a result of the difficulties of transportation.²⁷

Only in the 20th century, as stated before, did the production of agricultural items in the Inhamuns attain any commercial importance beyond the immediate area. That development appears to have been closely related to the construction of Ceará's first railroad. Coming from Fortaleza and eventually reaching Crato--thus linking the state's two principal cities--it arrived at Senador Pompeu in 1900.²⁸ Senador Pompeu, located some 125 kilometers from the city of Tauá, was the area's closest link with the new line. The journey from Tauá to the railroad could be made by horse in three days, and, at that, it was the Inhamuns' best connection with the outside world until the coming of the automobile. Even with the difficulties of transporting cargo by donkey over the rugged route from Tauá to the rail connection, agricultural products from the Inhamuns were able to compete for the first time in a wider

26. Pompeu, Ensaio Estatístico, Vol. I, 363; Ofícios, Arneirós, June 19, 1875, and Rev. c., 1884.

27. Ofícios, SJP, July 28, 1853, and Ofícios, Arneirós, June 19, 1875.

28. Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, Enciclopédia dos Municípios Brasileiros, Vol. XVI (Rio de Janeiro, 1959), 507.

market. Among those who engaged in the exportation of products from the area was Colonel Domingos Gomes de Freitas, Tauá's most powerful political chief after 1915. His rise to a position of economic prominence appears to have been related to the increasing commercial importance of the Inhamuns' agricultural products.

Except for the arrival of the railroad in Senador Pompeu, no significant developments in transportation in the Inhamuns occurred in the years before 1930. In spite of the bragging referred to earlier of the Fortaleza political journals in regard to automobiles in the Inhamuns in 1926, gas-powered vehicles remained very much of a novelty in the area until some 20 years or more after the close of the period being considered. True it was that the first automobiles reached the Inhamuns in the 1920's, but such journeys, performed only in the dry seasons, were more in the nature of frolics or endurance tests than demonstrations of the worth of the vehicles for practical transportation. Decades would pass before Tauá approached the condition existing in Fortaleza in 1912 when Unitário complained that, with a dozen cars in the city, every citizen was in danger of becoming a traffic fatality.²⁹

Culture: The School and the Church

Education of the young in the Inhamuns was a matter unthinkingly left chiefly to the fazenda, where a member of the younger generation was given the training to prepare him for the position he would occupy in the society, be it fazendeiro, vaqueiro or morador. This was the only education received by the vast majority of the residents of the area. Opportunities for formal education were limited to children who lived in the

²⁹. Issue of June 4.

seats of the municípios and to those privileged few whose parents could afford the cost of sending them beyond the region to study. Some type of school, either public or private, existed in Taubá from the first decades of the 19th century; and Saboeiro and Arneirós also generally had schools, particularly after they became municípios.³⁰ These schools, both public and private, functioned only intermittently and were poorly attended. Teachers were few in number and ill-prepared, with the result that schools either were closed for lack of a teacher or conducted by one who usually was unsuited to the task. At best, a very small percentage of each generation learned the rudiments of literacy in such schools, while an occasional student with desire and capacity acquired the basic knowledge of reading which enabled him to educate himself. Among these latter was Joaquim Pimenta, the only son of Taubá to become a nationally-known intellectual figure. By the time he left the Inhamuns to prepare for the study of law while still a teenager, he had probably moved well beyond the intellectual level of his teachers.³¹ Outside the vilas, ignorance prevailed, although an examination of legislation indicates that public primary schools were frequently provided for in such places as Bebedouro, Cococó, Flores, Marrecas, and Marruás as early as the mid-19th century. But this legislation served little purpose beyond granting a small stipend to one of the politically faithful who received the appointment as professor. In reality, the schools seldom functioned

30. Castelo, "História da Instrução e da Educação do Ceará," pp. 56-58. Also see: *Ofícios*, SJP, Oct. 3, 1829, and the *relatórios* and *falas* (annual messages) of the provincial and state presidents.

31. Observations on Taubá's educational facilities around 1900 are found in Pimenta's *Retalhos do Passado*, p. 9 and *passim*.

and the professor often was dismissed when the opposition party assumed power.³²

Some of the more prosperous residents sent their sons to Fortaleza and Recife to receive instruction, a practice which produced a goodly number of priests and lawyers, as well as others who, failing to pursue a course of higher education to its conclusion, attained a measure of culture. In the 19th century, the Fernandes Vieiras were noted for the frequency of educated persons among their ranks, while an occasional member of the Araujo-Feitosa family also became a "doutor." In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a few members of other families also went beyond the Inhamuns to pursue their studies, among them the sons of Colonels Nicolau Arrais and Domingos Gomes de Freitas. Most of these persons never returned to reside permanently in the Inhamuns, for the opportunities and cultural attractions of the area were few. Those who did spend significant portions of their lives there were either officials of justice or priests, most of whom also possessed considerable holdings of land in the area. It was this small group of persons, joined by other officials and priests who served in the Inhamuns during the course of their careers, which comprised the area's educated elite. Joaquim Pimenta wrote that Tauá's cultural circle in the early 20th century was comprised of the vigário, juiz de direito, juiz municipal, promotor, and legal scribe. Its members, he recalled, read the Fortaleza papers, when they were fortunate enough to receive them, and talked much, always of

32. Complaints with respect to political motives in the administration of public education in Ceará were common in the political press and legislative body. On the Inhamuns, see: Pedro II, Nov. 24, 1867; Cearense, Mar. 27, 1873; and Anuário da Assembleia Provincial do Ceará, Vol. IV (1873), 2, and Vol. XII (1885), 72-73, 120.

the same thing.³³

The church was somewhat more firmly established in the Inhamuns than the school, but whether or not it had a more profound influence on the area would be a difficult question to answer. In terms of organization and the founding of churches, only a few significant developments occurred after the end of the colonial era, the chief of which, the establishment of the Freguesia of Saboeiro in 1851, has already been mentioned. Freguesias also were established during the 19th century at Flores and Cococy, but only the latter survived into the 20th century.³⁴ The conservative-dominated provincial assembly in 1870, answering the appeals of the Carcarás, provided for the creation of a freguesia in Marrecas, but the bishop refused to issue the order to actually establish the new freguesia.³⁵ In addition, capelas were built at Marruás, São Nicolau, located near Bebedouro, and on the Fazenda São Bento. There is little reason for suggesting that those moves promoted the church's progress. Generally, priests were sent only to Tauá, Saboeiro, and Arneirós, and their visits to the other matrizes and capelas were infrequent. In addition, the Freguesia of Arneirós after 1891 ceased to have a resident priest, being served by the vigário of Saboeiro.³⁶ Two or three priests, however dedicated, were insufficient to minister to the dispersed population of the Inhamuns; and some who came never made the attempt, spending most of their time engaged in politics and other

33. Pimenta, *Ratallhos do Passado*, p. 9.

34. On Flores, see: Leonardo Neta, "Notas para a História Eclesiástica do Ceará," *REC*, LX (1946), 204. The Freguesia de Nossa Senhora da Conceição do Cococy was created under the provisions of Provincial Resolution 1279 of Sept. 28, 1869.

35. *Anuário da Assembleia Provincial*, Vol. I (1870), 83, and Vol. V (1874), 78.

36. Moraes, "Apontamentos sobre as Freguesias de Arneirós e de Saboeiro," p. 80.

secular matters, while they served the church only in the most routine manner.

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that many persons in the Inhamuns entered the world, bogat, and died without churchly blessing. Whatever instruction they were given in regard to spiritual matters was received on the fazenda, and it consisted of that body of folk beliefs which in the Inhamuns passed as the doctrines of the church.³⁷ Even if they had received their instruction in regard to religion from a priest, the beliefs might not have been much different, for many of that calling in the sertão were themselves of little training and culture. In practice, most residents of the Inhamuns were given the opportunity to see the priest only on those infrequent but valued occasions when he came to an outlying village or fazenda to say mass. By long-standing custom, his visit occasioned a day of festivities which hardly provided the appropriate atmosphere for a sermon on the correct doctrines of sin and redemption, even had the priest himself been properly schooled in such matters. To be sure, he said his mass for those who cared to attend, but most of the multitude dedicated themselves to cachaca, women,³⁸ and the adjustment of accounts with enemies whom they had not seen since the padre's last visit. Flores was particularly famous for its celebrations of the occasion, for the day invariably ended in a bloody brawl.³⁹

37. Gustavo Barroso briefly discusses the religion of the sertanejo in Terra de Sol, pp. 144-146.

38. References to prostitution are found frequently in the history of the Inhamuns. Antonio Bezerra, who traveled there in the 1880's, wrote that the large number of women who dedicated themselves to that activity--included, he noted, daughters of families of "certa ordem"--was the aspect of the area which most seriously impressed him. The Fortaleza intellectual, adding that the situation was taken as a matter of course by the inhabitants, opined that it all was attributable to the demands of the climate. Notas de Viagem, p. 247.

39. Pimenta, Retalhos do Passado, p. 30.

VI. NEGRO SLAVERY

Negro slavery as a labor system never had the importance in the Inhamuns that it did in the sugar growing regions of the Northeast. This situation resulted from the area's emphasis on cattle raising, an activity which requires only a few workers. Yet, slavery was not insignificant in the Inhamuns, for the numbers of slaves in the area and the financial investment which they represented stood as proof of the importance of the institution.

References to slaves in Ceará exist from the earliest attempts at colonization, and it seems likely that the sesmeiros of the Inhamuns brought slaves with them from their former homes in Pernambuco and Bahia. The censuses taken in the late colonial period indicate that Negro slaves comprised some 20 percent of the total population of São João do Príncipe. Although their relative numerical position declined as the 19th century passed, they still remained a significant element in the society. The 1872 census, whose figures generally agree with other censuses of the period in regard to the number of slaves, gave for São João do Príncipe (including Arneirós) 2,149 slaves, approximately nine percent of the total population of 25,063. The proportion in Saboeiro in 1872 was near 10 percent, there being 496 slaves in a population of 5,126.¹ It was demonstrated in all the

1. Directoria Geral de Estatística, Recenseamento da População do Império do Brasil a que Se Procedeu no Dia 1 de Agosto de 1872, Vol. III (Rio de Janeiro, n.d.), 53, 121-135.

censuses that São João do Príncipe was among the municípios in the province having the most slaves.²

Some indication of the nature of slavery in the Inhamuns is given in inventories of properties and in other legal documents. The numbers of slaves held varied widely from one fazenda to another. The largest slaveholder in the 19th century Inhamuns was probably José do Vale Pedrosa, the only son of Capitão-mor José Alves Foitosa. When José do Vale died in 1843 in Cococó, 263 slaves were inventoried prior to the distribution of his property among the heirs.³ All of these slaves, it should be noted, were not held on one fazenda, for he was the owner of many properties, some of which were located outside the Inhamuns. The wealth in slaves of José do Vale was unusually large, for other persons of considerable means owned fewer slaves. The inventory of the property of Francisco Fernandes Vieira and his wife, executed in 1859 on the death of the latter, listed 40 slaves.⁴ Antonio Martins Chaves, who died in 1873, left only 18. Less wealthy fazendeiros owned fewer: José da Paiva Brito, who died in 1860, bequeathed nine slaves to his heirs. Francisco Alves de Castro left four slaves on his death in the same year; and José

2. The total number of slaves in Ceará in any period of the 19th century was less than 35,000. No satisfactory study of slavery in Ceará exists. Raimundo Girão's A Abolição no Ceará (Fortaleza, 1956), dealing chiefly with the campaign against the institution, partially fills the gap.

3. All of the inventories referred to in this chapter, except where noted, are found in Cartório No. 1, Tauá. By law, inventories were executed on the death of both husband and wife. One half of the property remained with the surviving spouse, while one half was divided among the heirs. The half held by the remaining partner went to the heirs on his death. For two reasons, the inventories do not usually indicate the total wealth possessed by the deceased. First, a person was permitted to give away one third of his property prior to his death; this portion of the property was not included in the inventory. Second, since an advalorem tax was exacted from the property listed in the inventory, it was the general practice to underestimate and undervalue the wealth of the deceased.

4. Cartório No. 1, Saboeiro.

Beserra Cavalcante on his death in 1875 possessed only one slave.

Insufficient records in the cartórios preclude quantification as to the percentage of landowners who held slaves, but these documents do indicate that slaveholding was by no means rare. Incomplete records, for example, of sales and purchases of slaves in São João do Príncipe for the seven years following 1863 contain the names of 79 different residents of the município who were engaged in such transactions.⁵ But such a statistic would be more significant if the number of landowners in the município could be given. An estimate in the 1850's placed the number of fazendas at 164, but this figure is an inexact indication of the number of owners, since many fazendeiros held more than one property.⁶ A more definitive statement not being warranted by the evidence, it appears judicious to conclude that the holding of one or more slaves was common within that small proportion of residents which comprised the fazendeiro class.

Although it is generally thought that slaves in the cattle growing sertão were used only as house servants or as workers in the small sugar engenhos,⁷ evidence fails to lend credence to these assumptions in regard to the Inhamuns. Homes, being small and generally crude, did not require large numbers of servants, especially males; and the growing and processing of the small amount of sugar cane cultivated in the Inhamuns required only a few days of labor per year. Rather, slaves appear to have been involved in most types of work which were carried on in the Inhamuns.

5. Records of sales of slaves transacted within the município are found in the livros de notas in the cartórios. All such volumes referred to in this chapter are found in Cartório No. 1, Taubá.

6. See Ch. V, pp. 189-196.

7. Girão, A Abolição, pp. 40-44; Pierre Denis, Brasil (London, 1911), p. 327.

Among the residents of Josê do Vale's senzalas were tailors, seamstresses, blacksmiths, masons, carpenters, saddle and harness makers, and vaqueiros. With respect to the last named, general commentaries on slavery in Ceará state that the Negro was little suited to the life of a vaqueiro; but there are traditions in the Inhamuns which record that it was precisely the work of a vaqueiro to which the Negro was most suited. To be sure, most slaves were not vaqueiros, nor did they possess any other special skills. In general, they were employed in diverse tasks involving domestic labor, care of animals, and subsistence agriculture, exactly the same work in which the great majority of the free population was engaged.

The value of slaves in the Inhamuns--always high in relation to other forms of property--showed a steady increase in the 19th century, at least until abolitionist successes made slaveholding a risky matter.⁸ In 1815, Felix, a 16-year-old male, was given the value in an inventory of 100\$000 reis, the equivalent of 25 cows. Isabel, aged 38, and her six children, aged one to 12 sold for 1:800\$000 reis in 1838, a year in which cows sold for around 12\$000 reis each. In the 1860's, when a cow was valued at approximately 25\$000 reis, able bodied slaves, aged 15 to 25, sold regularly for around 1:000\$000 reis. Some few brought even more. The vigário of Tauá, Padre João Felipe Pereira, in 1860 paid 1:500\$000 reis for Benedicta, a 22-year-old cabra, a price equivalent to the value of Antonio Martins Chaves' Fazenda São Bento, of undetermined size but totalling at least some several thousand hectares.

Throughout the 19th century the number of slaves in the Inhamuns declined relative to the total population, and in the early 1880's

8. The following data are drawn from the inventories and livros de notas in Cartório No. 1, Tauá. On the abolitionist efforts see pp. 227-233.

slavery came to an end. Three factors contributed in large measure to the decline and eventual demise of the institution: (1) manumissions, (2) sales of slaves from the area, and (3) the abolitionist campaign. The records of the cartório in Taubaté indicate that a small but steady stream of liberated Negroes was fed into the free population by means of the granting of letters of liberty. From 1795, when the cartório was established, until the 1830's, the number of slaves freed annually appears to have ranged from five to 15.⁹ Slaves were manumitted for various reasons. In instances involving small children, affection appears to have furnished the chief motivation. Illustrative was Isabel Ferreira of Flores who granted a letter of liberty in 1822 to Joanna, aged 4, "pela ter criado com grande amor."¹⁰ Although women most frequently freed small children, men not uncommonly did so, particularly in instances, it appears, in which the child was their offspring. Cohabitation between slave women and slave owners and their sons was common; and sexual mores were such that men were little loathe to recognize the fruits of these unions, as in the case of Joaquim Vieira Barbosa who freed Maria, a parda, aged 6, "por ser minha filha."¹¹

Fewer adult slaves were liberated because of affection. Letters granted to young adult slaves who were able bodied generally noted that freedom had been purchased. Slaves paid for their liberty in money, horses, cows, and, sometimes, other slaves. To what extent this is an indication that they were able to accumulate wealth and property is difficult to ascertain; for in at least some, if not most, instances of

9. A conclusion based on an examination of the livros de notas, in which letters of liberty were recorded.

10. Livro de Notas No. 11, entry dated Jan. 1, 1822.

11. Livro de Notas No. 2, entry dated Sept. 17, 1796.

this, funds for the slave's liberty were furnished by a free person. Marriages between free persons and slaves were contracted, and in some cases the free partner in the union purchased the liberty of the one in bondage. In other instances, liberated slaves purchased the freedom of their spouses and offspring. When adult slaves were freed gratuitously, it was generally because they were old or disabled, or because the owners themselves were growing old and wished to grant liberty to one or more of their slaves while there was still time. Many slave owners in the latter case granted conditional letters of liberty, stipulating that the slave was legally free upon receipt of the letter but that his services were required until the owner's death. At the least, such a letter protected the recipient against being sold. Finally, it is to be wondered if liberation was always a beneficial move, as in the case of a 13-year-old mulatto, João, who was freed in 1869 by reason of having "delirios no Juízo."¹²

Manumissions of the character described above clearly were not of sufficient frequency to bring about the extinction of the institution of slavery. On the other hand, they did occupy a position of some significance in the relative decline of slavery during the 19th century, especially as the liberation of any slave of child bearing capability helped to prevent a potential increase in the slave population. At the least, they helped to hold the number of slaves at a fairly stationary level.

Some few slaves sought their liberty by flight. Cases of runaway slaves are noted in documents appointing a procurador to apprehend the escapee. Illustrative was the case of 1795 when Eufrásio Alves Feitosa

12. Livro de Notas No. 26, entry dated Mar. 24, 1869.

of Arneirós appointed seven persons in Piauí and Maranhão to act legally in his place in regard to the search for four male slaves who had fled from his properties.¹³ By the mid-19th century, if Tauá's liberals can be believed, there was no need for an escaped slave to flee to Piauí or Maranhão; he could simply join the Carcarás in Marrecas. Reports to Cearange repeatedly complained that runaway slaves were hired as free laborers there under the protection of the Carcarás. A Tauá correspondent to the liberal journal, referring to Marrecas as the "Carcarazal" of the Inhamuns, charged in the July 20, 1858, issue that nothing less than a "quilombo de negros" existed in that area of the município.

The second contributing factor to the decline of slavery in the Inhamuns was the sale of slaves from the area, particularly during the sêcas. During normal years, a few slaves were sold to buyers, both slave traders and fazendeiros, who lived outside the Inhamuns; but, at the same time, slaves were brought in from other areas. Although it appears that the number exported was greater than the number imported, definite quantification would be difficult to establish, since the cartórios in the Inhamuns contain records of only those transactions which took place in the area. In general, it appears that transactions in normal years were not of sufficient frequency to greatly reduce the number of slaves in the area over the long run; on the other hand, they appear to have contributed toward holding the number of slaves at a stationary level by providing a means of disposal of the natural increase.

In the sêcas, in contrast, the actual number of slaves declined. During these times, when crops failed and herds dwindled, a dependent

13. Livro de Notas No. 1, entry dated Nov. 28, 1795.

population which the patrão was expected to sustain was a handicap. It is not surprising that he sought to salvage his investment in human flesh by sales to other regions, a proposition which became especially attractive as the demand for slaves by the coffee planters of the south during the 1850's and after drove up prices. The sêca of the three consecutive years of 1877, 1878, and 1879 serves to illustrate the effects of such a crisis on the sale of slaves, although the number of such transactions in this period was larger than could be expected in a sêca of shorter duration. Records show the exportation for sale of 241 slaves from São João do Príncipe during the 18 months between July, 1877, and December, 1878. Records for 1879 are incomplete, but it appears that exportations decreased, an occurrence which would seem likely in view of the fact that by that year a large portion of the population had left the area.¹⁴ Although the number of exportations given above represents only approximately 10 percent of the slave population of the município in 1872, it is several times larger than the sales of a similar time span in normal years, when more than 30 sales were seldom registered. And not included in the number are those slaves who were taken from the area by their masters and sold in Fortaleza, in Piauí, and other places, a number which must have been significant as a result of the large scale flight of fazendeiros from the area. Thus, it appears that the sêca of 1877-1879 substantially reduced the number of slaves in the Inhamuns. Lending weight to the conclusion are the reports listing 1,157 slaves in Arneirós and São João do Príncipe in 1882,¹⁵ this being almost one thousand less than the 1872 figure of 2,149.

14. Data drawn from the livros de notas, volumes numbered 32, 34-36.

15. See Pedro II, June 1, 1882.

Of the three factors which contributed to the end of slavery, the abolitionist movement was the most effective. The abolitionists, working on both the provincial and national levels and, to a lesser degree, on the local level, attacked the problem of slavery from various sides. First, there was imperial legislation, the most important being the 1871 free birth law, which also included a provision for slave emancipation funds,¹⁶ and the all-embracing emancipation proclamation of 1888. Second, the provincial assembly employed both taxes and emancipation funds against slavery, although in the case of the latter its efforts were of little consequence. Taxes were more effective. Levies for revenue on sales of slaves were exacted during the colonial period, and after 1832 they fell under the regulatory action of the province.¹⁷ Using their powers, the legislators of Ceará began to raise such taxes as early as the 1850's for the purpose, especially, of stemming the sale of slaves to the coffee planters of the south. Later, the abolitionists, angered by the spectacle of profitable slave trading during the *sêca* of the late 1870's, began to agitate for taxes which would virtually eliminate the institution of slavery. In the early 1880's, the provincial assembly began to respond to their appeals. In 1881, a year in which able bodied young adults sold at prices exceeding 1:000\$000 reis, the assembly levied a 1:000\$000 reis tax on each slave entering the province and a tax of 50\$000 reis on transactions involving the movement of a slave across municipal boundaries within the province.¹⁸ In the following year the tax on the export of slaves from the province was raised to 1:500\$000

16. Law 2040 of 1871.

17. Pompeu, *Ensaio Estatístico*, Vol. I, 613.

18. Law 1937 of Aug. 5, 1881.

reis per head,¹⁹ a move which resulted in the end of legal exportation and a consequent drastic lowering of prices. The final measure came in October, 1883, when the assembly elevated the annual tax on the possession of slaves to 100\$000 reis for each one held.²⁰ Since the value of a slave had dropped to less than that figure as a result of the end of exportation, the possession of a slave became a liability. In most cases, the owner, being able neither to sell his slaves nor keep them, granted them letters of liberty. Some slaveholders managed to redeem a portion of their investment by the use of the emancipation funds.

As noted above, emancipation funds were supported by both the imperial and provincial treasuries. At best, the provincial funds, established by Resolution 1254 of December 28, 1868, resulted in only a few dozen freeings in the Inhamuns. The imperial emancipation funds, provided for in the legislation of 1871, were more effective. They became increasingly so as the confiscatory taxes and fear of impending liberation drove down prices. Five to 10 slaves by 1882-1883 could be freed with the same amount used to liberate one slave a few years earlier. As was typical of the period, fraud and favoritism limited the effectiveness of the program. In the scramble to participate in the distribution of funds, the slaveholder sought to persuade the local emancipation commission, composed of the vigário, the juiz municipal, and the president of the câmara, to accept as many as possible of his slaves at the highest possible price. Libertador, Fortaleza's abolitionist newspaper, reported on October 19, 1883, that 22 slaves had been granted letters of liberty in São João do Príncipe as a result of the

19. Law 2027 of Sept. 15, 1882.

20. Law 2034 of Oct. 19, 1883.

latest distribution of the emancipation funds. The journal noted that the average compensation per slave paid by the commission there was 199\$000 reis, the highest figure of any município in the province. Any price above 50\$000 reis, the journal claimed, was a "verdadeiro oscandalo."

Further employment of the emancipation funds in the Inhamuns provided additional insights into the administration of the program. Of the 37 slaves freed in São João do Príncipe on December 26, 1883, all but two belonged to the Feitosas. Eight were the property of Joaquim Alves Feitosa, the liberal party chieftain who was also the president of the câmara, and eight more belonged to his wife. Five were owned by Lourenço Alves Feitosa e Castro, while the remaining--two excepted--were the property of various other members of the family. Prices paid for the emancipation of the great majority of those freed ranged from 110\$000 to 150\$000 reis.²¹ Near the same time, the Carcarãs in Saboeiro charged that the Arrais, whose friends composed the local commission, were engaging in similar favoritism. Although 12 slaves were offered for emancipation at prices permitting the freeing of all of them, the Carcarãs claimed, the commission chose to liberate two slaves owned by Nicolau Arrais and Joaquim Saldanha Arrais at prices which expended the entire amount of available funds.²²

Before bringing the story of slavery in the Inhamuns to a close, some mention should be made of the local abolitionist movement, which also made a contribution to liberation. Societies dedicated to the

21. Document entitled "Audiência Pública," Dec. 27, 1883, Cartório No. 1, Taubá.

22. Pedro II, Oct. 13 and 14, 1883.

emancipation of slaves existed in Ceará from the early 1870's, but an important and aggressive abolitionist movement originated only in December, 1880, with the formation in Fortaleza of the Sociedade Cearense Libertadora, the publisher of Libertador.²³ The abolitionists produced their first notable success in the efforts to make Ceará free territory when on January 1, 1883, the Município of Acaripe (later named Redenção), located near the capital, proclaimed to the nation that all slaves within its boundaries had been liberated. This action came, it should be noted, only after the value of slaves in Ceará had fallen drastically as a result of the levying of the high duties on the exportation of slaves from the province.

The redemption of other municípios and vilas soon followed, among them the Vila of São João do Príncipe. That vila, meaning only the seat of the município, celebrated the extinction of slavery within its confines on April 25, 1883. According to reports sent to Libertador, a large number of distinguished citizens congregated in the house of the câmara at five o'clock on the afternoon of the 25th to grant letters of liberty to the last of the vila's slaves. Presiding over the gathering was Juiz de Direito José Balthazar Ferreira Facó, assisted by other officials, including Promotor Público Francisco Primeiro d'Araujo Chaves and Major Joaquim Alves Feitosa, the president of the câmara. Dr. Facó gave the principal address. He told his listeners in the opening lines of his oration:

Se o campo me desse as flores, se o mar me desse as perolas, se o ceo me desse as estrellas, com as flores eu cobriria os vossos regaços, com as perolas eu cingiria os vossos collos, com as estrellas eu coroaria as vossas fronteiras.

23. Girão's A Abolição is the most competent work on the abolitionist movement in Ceará.

And in closing:

Christo, O'Christo, tu que foste o martyr das ideias, o redemptor dos povos...fazei descer sobre nossas cabeças um raio do teu divino amor, que illumine nossas almas, e una os nossos corações, em prol da causa santa da redempção dos captivos.

Following the address, a group of girls, dressed in white and carrying a banner of green silk reading "Viva a redempção dos captivos," sang a hymn. Letters of freedom were then granted to 40 slaves--37 of whom were liberated without compensation to their owners--after which the national anthem was sung and the meeting was brought to a close.²⁴

Tauá thus joined the nine municípios and vilas reported to be free of slaves. Although no slaves may have existed in the Vila of São João do Príncipe after April 25, 1883, it should be pointed out that some of those on whom Dr. Facó showered such eloquent and poetic praise were not yet out of the ranks of slaveholders. Among them was Major Joaquim Alves Feitosa, who, it will be recalled, held on to a large number of his slaves until the government paid him to free them. In part--but only in part, since 40 slaves were liberated--Dr. Facó's praise had a hollow ring; if, indeed, no slaves existed in the vila, some of the vila's residents owned slaves on their fazendas.

Over in Saboeiro, abolitionism was also gaining adherents. On July 10, 1883, shortly after the redemption of Tauá in April, the Sociedade Libertadora Saboeirense was founded. The Saboeiro abolitionists appear to have consisted mostly of Carcarás, and elected president of the group was a member of that family, Anibal Fernandes Vieira. Not one member of the Arrais family appears to have been associated with the society's activities. Thirty-two slaves were given their freedom

24. A description of the occasion was carried in Libertador on May 12 and 14, 1883. Facó's address was printed in full in the issues of June 7 and 9.

at the first meeting of the group, an action taken, it was said, to give meaning to the demand for the total extinction of slavery in the município. Among those freed were 14 slaves, aged 13 to 38, who comprised the entire holding of the society's president.²⁵ During the following months the group continued to work for the emancipation of slaves, reporting occasional successes in the abolitionist press.²⁶ They also succeeded in portraying their political enemies, the Arrais, in unfavorable light. They charged that the Arrais had long engaged in slave trading and that even after the majority of the município's citizens embraced abolitionism that family continued to hold on to its human captives. They claimed, moreover, that Nicolau Arrais had ordered one of his slaves clandestinely transported for sale to Bahia by way of Piauí in order to avoid payment of the prohibitive export tax.²⁷

As a result of the legislative measures described above, slavery in the Inhamuns, as well as in the entire province, appears to have been reduced to very small proportions, if not totally extinguished, by March 25, 1884. On that day the provincial president declared that slavery had been totally eliminated in the province, and from that day forward Ceará laid claim to the honor of being the first province in the nation to abolish slavery. The president's declaration was based on reports received from abolitionists and public officials in the municípios. The municípios in the Inhamuns were among the last to report the end of slavery within their borders. São João do Príncipe was listed by Libertador as free territory on February 29, 1884, and Saboeiro joined

25. Libertador, July 24, 1883.

26. Ibid., Oct. 24 and 26, 1883.

27. Ibid., Sept. 12, 1883.

the ranks of liberated municípios by March 17. The date for the redemption of Arnoirós was never reported in the anti-slavery journal's roll of emancipated municípios, although the abolitionists and provincial officials claimed that no slaves existed there. Whatever lingering incidents of slavery may have persisted in the Inhamuns and in other areas of the province after March 25, 1884--and evidence demonstrates that slavery did continue on a significant scale in one município outside the Inhamuns²⁸--were legally ended by the Princess Regent's sanctioning of the general emancipation act of May 13, 1888.

A lasting contribution of the institution destroyed by the Princess Regent was the large Negro element in Brazil. In works on Ceará little attention has been given to the Negro in the formation of the area's population. When members of that race have been mentioned, other than in connection with slavery and abolitionism, usually it has been only a brief statement to the effect that they never formed a numerically significant portion of the population.²⁹ Yet, Negroes and other persons of partial Negro ancestry were active on a major scale in the propagation of the population of the Inhamuns, as the following census data

28. In the Município of Milagres, located near Crato, slaves totaling between 200 and 350--estimates varied--were not granted letters of liberty until at least late in 1887, a situation resulting from the failure of the authorities to enforce the collection of the onerous taxes in regard to slaves. When letters of liberty were granted, some slaveholders of that município exercised their privilege of requiring three years of additional services from their ex-slaves, an action which prolonged legalized servitude in the province until the Princess Regent sanctioned the 1888 law abolishing slavery in the nation. The Milagres slaveholders were violating no laws by their continued possession of slaves after 1884, for no provision making slavery illegal had been enacted. They were in difficulty only by reason of not having paid their taxes. B. J. Chandler, "Os Escravistas de Milagres," *Unitário*, Apr. 17, 1966; "Documentos Históricos sobre a Libertação dos Escravos no Ceará," *Correio do Ceará* (Fortaleza), Apr. 23, 1966.

29. Typical examples are found in: Barroso, *Terra de Sol*, p. 136; and Girão, *Pequena História*, pp. 100-101.

demonstrate. The census of 1804 gave for São João do Príncipe: 5,361 brancos; 3,231 free pretos and pardos; 1,856 enslaved pretos and pardos; and a total of 10,448.³⁰ The next census, taken in 1808, reported 3,535 brancos, 1,372 pretos, 2,525 mulattos, and 117 Indians, with a total of 7,549, providing no differentiation as to the servile or free status of the pretos and mulattos.³¹ The 1813 census provided the following figures: 3,294 brancos; 465 free pretos; 973 enslaved pretos; 1,798 free mulattos; 572 enslaved mulattos; and a total of 7,102.³² The 1872 national census reported a total population for the Inhamuns (the freguesias of Saboeiro, Tauá, Flores, Marrecas, Arneirós, and Cococy) of 25,063, a figure which included 7,864 brancos, 14,232 pardos, 1,894 pretos, and 1,073 caboclos.³³

The foregoing data indicate that persons possessing recognizable Negro ancestry exceeded the white population in the Inhamuns in the census of 1872, as they had also done in the 1808 and 1813 counts. In 1804, the only exception, whites outnumbered pretos and pardos 5,361 to 5,087, an insignificant variation. Even allowing for considerable error in the census data of that era, the evidence demonstrates that Negroes contributed in large measure to the formation of the population of the Inhamuns.³⁴

30. "Administração de João Carlos Augusto de Oeynhausen no Ceará (Documentos da Collecção Studart)," RIC, XXXIX (1925), 278.

31. Monozes, "Memória," p. 276.

32. "Mapa da População da Capitania do Ceará no Anno de 1813," SC.

33. Recenseamento 1872, Vol. III, pp. 53, 121-135. Data were reported according to the freguesias then existing in the area. A caboclo, as the term is used here, was either an Indian or a halfbreed. These included descendents of the aboriginal inhabitants of the Inhamuns, as well as others who had come into the area from other places.

34. The 1940 census gave the following results for Saboeiro: 5,782 brancos, 1,918 pretos, and 8,944 pardos; and for Tauá: 14,723 brancos, 2,554 pretos, and 11,766 pardos. Serviço Nacional do Recenseamento, Recenseamento Geral do Brasil 1940, Pt. VI, Vol. I (Rio de Janeiro, 1950), 52.

VII. THE SÊCAS

The sêcas constituted an integral part of the environment for man in the Inhamuns, as indeed they also did in most other areas of Brazil's vast Northeast. Their periodic occurrences, combined with the constant threat of their recurrence, hung as a shadow over the area, producing a strain of fatalism which, in large part, characterized the sertanejo's outlook on life. That his foreboding in regard to the future was not ungrounded in reality is indicated by the events related in these following pages.

Some general comments on weather in the Inhamuns are necessary to provide a background for a discussion of the sêcas. Rainfall, in whatever year, is relatively scarce in comparison with more humid areas of Ceará. While in some parts of the Serra of Ibiapaba annual precipitation reaches 1500 millimeters, annual rainfall in Tauá averages some 650. Of this figure, near 90 percent, on the average, falls in the months from January to May or June.¹ Averages often belie reality, and, in fact, the winter seasons range from moderately wet to very dry, although none is ever completely devoid of rainfall. Within this variation, considerable differences often exist in the area in the same year, parts of it being blessed with adequate rainfall while others suffer from the lack of it. Even a relatively high amount of precipitation is not a

1. Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, Enciclopédia dos Municípios Brasileiros, Vol. V (Rio de Janeiro, 1960), 174-177.

guarantee of a prosperous year, for, apart from the total rainfall, its distribution in relation to the needs of crops and pastures is a crucial factor. Here, we are concerned chiefly with those winters which brought precipitation in amounts and distribution insufficient to provide a year's minimum sustenance of crops and pastures for the area's human and animal inhabitants. It is this condition which constitutes a *sêca*.

The first *sêca* recorded in Ceará occurred in 1605-1606. Subsequently, the area was assaulted by such disasters at average intervals of less than 10 years, 11 *sêcas* falling in the 18th century, 12 in the 19th, and five in the first three decades of the 20th century.² They differed considerably in intensity, and in duration they lasted from one to four years, intervals between them varying from two to 32 years. Available evidence does not permit a judgment as to whether or not all of the *sêcas* affected the Inhamuns as severely as they did more centrally located areas of Ceará, but it does indicate that some of them took a heavy toll in that region. Ouvidor Carvalho reported that the *sêcas* of 1809-1810 and 1814 left many fazendas in the captaincy completely destitute of cattle, especially, he noted, in São João do Príncipe.³ Appeals of vereadores of that same municipality to the provincial government in 1846 demonstrate that the *sêca* of that year, which followed two seasons of scarce rainfall, was also severe in the Inhamuns. In early June it

2. Pompeu, *O Ceará*, pp. 282-283; Maria da Glória Campos Hereda and Alfredo José Porto Domingues, eds., *Grandes Secas Meio-Norte e Nordeste*, Vol. III of *Geografia do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro, 1962), 129. The best general historical work on the *sêcas* in Ceará is: Joaquim Alves, *História das Sêcas* (Fortaleza, 1953). Unfortunately, it covers only the 18th and 19th centuries. Upon the untimely death of Alves, the continuation of the story fell to Thomaz Pompeu Sobrinho. His *História das Sêcas* (Fortaleza, 1958), covering the 20th century, is chiefly a technical account of engineering proposals and measures to reduce the effects of the *sêcas*.

3. "Descrição Geográfica," pp. 8-10.

was reported that the câmara had suspended its normal business as a result of the absence from the region of a majority of the vereadores, the president of the body himself having moved temporarily to the Cariri. The remaining vereadores appealed to the provincial government for regular army troops to protect the few cattle still surviving, which, they said, were being decimated rapidly by stealings.⁴ Their appeals going unheeded, they again asked for troops in December, saying that attacks on homes had commenced.⁵ These statements indicate that not only had law and order broken down, the dispossessed population which remained was desperate enough to resort to attacks on the few who still had resources.

In addition, the Inhamuns experienced at least light sêcas when conditions in other portions of Ceará were considered normal. The câmara of São João do Príncipe in July, 1853--a year in which no general sêca was recorded--informed the provincial president that rainfall had been so scarce in the preceding winter the poor people would be suffering from hunger by October. After that, the vereadores added, they would resort to wild plants and roots--some of which had toxic effects--to sustain life. They further noted that, after a few more weeks, no animals would be available to transport food to the area, since pastures and water supplies were rapidly disappearing.⁶ Five years later in 1858, a year which followed a scant harvest, rainfall again was inadequate in São João do Príncipe. Cattle began to die of hunger and thirst by December, 1857, the situation being only partially bettered by a rainshower

4. Ofícios, SJP, June 7, 1846.

5. Ibid., Dec. 1, 1846.

6. Ibid., July 26, 1853.

in early February. Then for more than six weeks the skies produced no moisture. Only in late March did the rains start, but they served to produce only late pastures and very inadequate crops, for the main planting season had passed.⁷ Meanwhile, in a circumstance which the residents of São João do Príncipe must have regarded as a diabolical twist of nature, Saboeiro was enjoying a fabulous winter.⁸

The satisfaction that a good winter could bring to the people of the Inhamuns is indicated by an enthusiastic report sent from Tauá to Pedro II in February of 1869:

Vamos gosando d'um famoso inverno, graças a Divina Providencia, desde o dia 8 do corrente mez, dando uma cheia extraordinaria, nunca vista pela geração presente, que excede a de 1839, inundando a ponta debaixo da rua, e cahindo casas e quintaes: apesar de tudo isso, está o povo alegre e animado, esperando abundancia, consequencia de bom inverno.⁹

But that the following year could bring a reversal of fortune is indicated in a notice appearing in Cearense in February, 1870, stating that the fazendeiros of the Inhamuns had begun to drive their cattle from the area in search of water as a result of the tardiness of the rains.¹⁰ It was conditions such as these which made weather in the Inhamuns more than a topic of idle conversation.

The most severe sêca in Ceará for which a large amount of data is available occurred from 1877 to 1879, embracing three winters. Affecting almost all of Northeast Brazil, the havoc that it wrought in the Inhamuns was pronounced. Although it lasted longer than most, this sêca serves to illustrate in some detail the general type of disaster which every person in the area faced several times during his life. As

7. Cearense, Dec. 4, Mar. 2, Mar. 30, and Apr. 13, 1857.

8. Ibid., Apr. 27, 1857.

9. Pedro II, Mar. 11, 1869.

10. Cearense, Feb. 4, 1870.

was usually the case, the *sêca* came on with no clearly visible pattern. Even in early January of 1877 fazendeiros were concerned about the lack of rains, for the pastures of the previous season were gone and cattle had begun to die.¹¹ January was generally dry in all parts of the province, but in February a few scattered rains came, including one in Saboeiro, to give hope to the population.¹² March was dry, and the plantings, green foliage, and grass occasioned by the earlier rains withered and died. By the early part of that month, the poor in the Inhamuns had begun to suffer, as the stores of corn, beans, and farinha from the last year's harvest were exhausted. For many fazendeiros the time for moving cattle to a more humid region had passed, for the animals were so weakened they could not survive a long drive. Already, many families were talking of fleeing to Piauí, the nearest area lying outside the region most affected by *sêcas*.¹³ When, by the first of April, no substantial rains had fallen, some of them began their pitiful treks from the region, while others remained with hopes that the rains might yet come.¹⁴ By May, with skies still clear, the inhabitants of the Inhamuns no longer doubted that they were in the midst of a major *sêca*.¹⁵

The conditions which reigned during the following months appear to have been typical of any severe *sêca*. Flight from the area was the course chosen by the majority of the inhabitants, especially those of the poorer classes. It was reported in May and June that people had already died of hunger and that large scale migrations were beginning. Padre Germano

11. *Ibid.*, Jan. 6, 1877.

12. *Ibid.*, Mar. 8, 1877.

13. *Ibid.*, Mar. 14 and 25, 1877.

14. *Ibid.*, Apr. 20, 1877.

15. *Ofícios*, Saboeiro, May 14, 1877.

Anthenor de Araujo, the vigário of Saboeiro, wrote Cearense that the roads leading from the vila were filled with people fleeing from the *sêca*. Some of them nude and all of them gaunt and hungry, the padre said, they left in panic and desperation, hoping to find refuge in Piauí, Fortaleza, or other areas.¹⁶ Similar migrations were reported from Tauá, and the correspondent added that even some of the prosperous fazendeiros were beginning to lack food.¹⁷ Generally, it was the poor who migrated in greatest numbers during a *sêca*, for they were dependent entirely on agriculture and their reserves in food stores were small; but, as conditions worsened, the well-to-do class also began to consider that alternative. Captain Salústio Ferrêr wrote from Saboeiro on June 12 that migration was about the only course left open to most of the inhabitants of that município, since it was becoming increasingly difficult to find water. Many leaders of the community, he added, were forming a caravan to depart for Piauí in the following month. "Grandes são, meu amigo, os nossos peccados," Captain Ferrêr wrote of the *sêca*, "que tem merecido tão horrivel castigo!"¹⁸

With the passing of winter and the advent of summer, conditions continued to worsen. Population was further depleted as flights from the area increased in volume. It was reported from Tauá in July that over half of the comarca's population had left and that entire streets in the vila were without a single inhabitant.¹⁹ In late August, according to one estimate, over 4,000 persons had migrated from Saboeiro to Piauí, including the vast majority of the most prosperous citizens.²⁰

16. Cearense, June 10, 1877.

17. Ibid., June 21, 1877.

18. Ibid., July 5, 1877.

19. Ibid., July 26, 1877.

20. Ibid., Sept. 14, 1877.

Those who remained encountered increasingly harsh conditions. Food, when it could be found for sale, was so exorbitantly priced that even the more prosperous inhabitants could little afford it. Farinha was the only food to be found for sale in Sabociro by late August. Any residents who still had animals or food supplies were forced to guard them vigilantly, for hunger and, sometimes, greed for profit were leading some of those remaining to covet their neighbors' possessions.²¹ Cococoy appears to have fared somewhat better during the early part of the *sêca* than other areas of the Inhamuns, a situation resulting in part from the resources of the wealthiest branch of the Feitosa family which lived there. Lourenço Alves Feitosa e Castro reported in October that the homes of most *fazendeiros* were being supplied with food brought from Piauí. He added that some of the poor had been given work constructing a new road to the neighboring province, a project supported by funds from the provincial government. It would become increasingly difficult, he feared, to continue to import food, in view of the disappearance along the roads of pasture and water for pack animals.²²

By the end of 1877 the vast majority of the inhabitants of the Inhamuns had departed. A large number went to Piauí, particularly those who had some resources, while others sought refuge in Ipu, the Cariri, and Fortaleza. The completely destitute tended to go to Fortaleza or some other center where the government gathered large numbers of retirantes, as the refugees were called, in camps. At least an occasional resident of the Inhamuns, it is to be supposed, joined the bands of desperados which roamed the *sertão* in search of plunder throughout

21. Ibid., July 5, Aug. 9, and Sept. 30, 1877.

22. Ibid., Nov. 4, 1877.

the sêca. And some sons of the Inhamuns were among those many Cearenses who became rubber gatherers in the Amazon Valley.

A small number of the inhabitants of the Inhamuns--hardly more than 10 percent of the total population, it appears²³--remained in the area throughout the three years of the sêca. Their struggle against the calamity was waged by their own resourcefulness and with aid sent from the outside. Water for humans and surviving animals usually could be found in some river or riacho if a cacimba was sunk sufficiently deep, and at least one agude, Monte Alegre of Joaquim Alves Feitosa, contained water throughout the disaster.²⁴ Some fazendeiros kept a few animals alive by feeding them cactuses, from which the thorns were removed, and foliage from drought-resistant trees. In addition, the winter of neither 1878 nor 1879 was totally lacking in rainfall. Although rains did not come in sufficient quantities at the proper times to permit any substantial harvests, they did result in grazing for animals.²⁵

That even a small percentage of the population was able to remain in the area throughout the sêca resulted, in part, from aid furnished by provincial and imperial authorities in the forms of public works projects, food, and money. The province sponsored a few construction projects in the Inhamuns, such as road building in Cococó; but provincial funds were very limited and they were soon exhausted. At best, only a few workers were employed for short periods of time.²⁶ Food and money were sent to the area as early as April, 1877,²⁷ and in that same

23. See p. 247, in this chapter.

24. Pedro II, Nov. 3, 1887.

25. Falla do Presidente da Província do Ceará, Nov. 1, 1878, p. 21; Cearense, Apr. 16, 1879; Falla do Presidente da Província do Ceará, July 1, 1880, pp. 61, 68.

26. Cearense, Sept. 24, 1880.

27. Ibid., July 12, 1877.

month a comissão de socorros or relief commission, composed of the vigário and one or two other leading citizens, was set up in each of the freguesias to administer the program.²⁸ The commissions encountered many difficulties and much criticism in the performance of their duties. Money was not the best form of aid, for food was already expensive, and the distribution of funds drove prices even higher.²⁹ The sending of food from the capital entailed great difficulties with respect to transportation, as illustrated by a report appearing in Cearense on November 11, 1877. On October 14 of the previous month, the notice related, the commission in charge of relief in Tauá contracted with an owner of pack animals to go to Quixeramobim to transport supplies sent from Fortaleza; all of the animals died in the course of the journey, the last survivors succumbing more than 60 kilometers from Tauá on the return trip.

Criticism was directed chiefly at the distribution of relief. The liberals were in power during the greater part of the sêca,³⁰ and charges were rife that members of that party were misusing the aid and profiting from it. Complaints from Saboeiro appearing in Pedro II stated that the Arrais, who dominated the relief commission in that freguesia, were enjoying unusual prosperity, even though the great majority of the municípios wealthiest citizens had sold their cattle and slaves and fled from the area in desperation. Nicolau Arrais, it was charged, had acquired, since the beginning of the sêca, a pack team of more than 30 mules and a warehouse in Fortaleza filled with staple foods. In May of 1879, Pedro II continued, Nicolau, along with Luis Antonio Arrais, had

28. Ibid., July 15, 1877.

29. Ibid., Dec. 8, 1877.

30. A liberal ministry assumed leadership of the nation on Jan. 5, 1878.

arranged with the provincial government to deliver between 500 and 600 loads of relief food to Nova Roma, Poço da Pedra, Bebedouro, and Saboeiro, where the commissions were all controlled by their relatives. Yet, the conservative journal claimed, only five people remained in Nova Roma and only two families in Poço da Pedra, one of these in the latter instance headed by the aid commissioner, Salvador Arrais. Some of the supplies, Pedro II charged, were sold in the village of Pio IX, located nearby in Piauí.³¹ Although Saboeiro's conservatives, being out of power, did not have equal opportunities to profit from the relief--nor, for that matter, to acquire their rightful portion--they appear to have made the best of an unfavorable situation. In January of 1879, Cearense reported, an armed band of "desordeiros," under the lead of Cândido Francisco de Oliveira, attacked the storehouse of Salvador Arrais in Poço da Pedra, carrying away 30 sacks of the relief commission's food supplies. Also in January, the liberal journal continued, a group of the Carcarãs' capangas robbed 11 sacks of food from a pack train headed toward Poço da Pedra.³²

Among those implicated in similar charges in São João do Príncipe was Dr. Francisco Primeiro de Araujo Citó, lawyer, public official, and member of the Araujo-Feitosa clan. Among other charges involving mismanagement, he was accused of diverting government food supplies to his fazendas for his own benefit. In the case of Citó, his actions were defended on the floor of the provincial assembly by Lourenço Alves Feitosa e Castro. The deputy from the Inhamuns explained that a considerable number of moradores and other needy persons had remained on

31. Pedro II, July 31, 1879.

32. Cearense, Apr. 16, 1879.

Citô's fazendas in the headwaters of the Carrapateira. The supplies which he transported weekly to that area, Lourenço told his fellow legislators, were destined only for the many needy persons who depended on him. Dr. Citô, he concluded, should not be condemned but congratulated for his act of philanthropy.³³

Accusations of wrongdoing in the administration of the relief program are difficult to judge, as are also defenses of the accused, such as the one made by Lourenço. Yet, even though the validity of specific charges might be impossible to ascertain, they square perfectly with the conditions under which the program operated. In the first place, the times were extremely harsh, when even persons who had been considered wealthy were living on the outer limits of deprivation. Even apart from a consideration of the low standards of public morality which were characteristic of the area in normal times, it would have been surprising indeed if graft and favoritism had not accompanied the distribution of food under the conditions existing in 1878-1879. Secondly, the impersonal, public institutions necessary for an efficient and impartial administration of relief did not exist in the society of the Inhamuns. All important functions were carried out under a complex of circumstances in which regulations and laws were subordinated to private or extralegal considerations of vengeance, class structure, political and familial connections, and personal benefit. The distribution of food, a vital function in the Inhamuns in those critical times, could not but have been effected within those same well-worn channels.

33. Annaes da Assembleia Provincial do Ceará, Vol. XI (1880), 99-100.

By mid-February of 1880, after three years of suffering, it began to appear that a good winter was in the offing. Cearense reported on February 22 that the president had appointed a commission to help the retirantes return to their homes. The notice also stated that seed for planting and a small quantity of provisions would be distributed to each family to promote recovery. With the gradual return of a portion of the inhabitants and the arrival of abundant rains in April, life in the Inhamuns slowly began to approximate normality. Rebuilding the area's herds was a difficult task, for it seems likely that well over 80 percent of the animals had been lost.³⁴ Some few cattle had been carefully guarded as a nucleus for breeding, while others were returned from their places of refuge in Piauí. Although these small numbers provided the means for eventual recovery, they did not permit sales of cattle in significant quantities for several years. In the meantime, almost the entire population of the Inhamuns, criador and lavrador alike, turned to subsistence agriculture for the means of life.³⁵

The long range effects of the *sêca* on the Inhamuns were profound. The exact reduction in population is difficult to estimate, although it appears certain that many years passed before the area regained a population of pre-1877 size. A significant number, it would appear, of those who left during the *sêca* never returned. Some died before they found aid, while others succumbed in refugee camps, where epidemics of various types took heavy tolls. The dead could not return to their

³⁴. The general loss in the province was reported to be 80 percent. Since this figure included areas which, in comparison with the Inhamuns, were not severely affected by the *sêca*, it is assumed that the loss was greater in that area. The figure of 80 percent is from the Falla do Presidente da Província do Ceará, 1887 (no month and day given), p. 86.

³⁵. Ofícios, SJP, Oct. 7, 1881.

homeland, and others remained away from it as a matter of choice. The Arnoirões vereadores provided an indication of the effects of the sêca on population depletion in answer to a provincial questionnaire in 1881. They estimated that 90 percent of the inhabitants left the município during the sêca and that 50 percent of those had not returned by August, 1881, two winter seasons after it ended.³⁶ In regard to the recovery of the cattle industry, the provincial president reported in 1887 that in a few areas herds were beginning to near their 1876 size.³⁷ Within the Inhamuns, there are many who believe that the area never fully recovered from the sêca of 1877-1879, as a result of the havoc wrought on fortunes and herds and the general feeling of demoralization which ensued. The Great Sêca, it is said, cast a long shadow.

Complete and sustained recovery of the society and economy from the disaster was greatly hindered by the frequent recurrence of sêcas in the following decades. Sêcas of moderate to severe intensity assaulted Ceará in 1888-1889, 1891, 1898, 1900, 1902-1903, 1907, 1915, and 1919. The decade of the 1920's was unusually well watered, but it was followed by a severe sêca in the early 1930's. Although all of these sêcas affected the Inhamuns, those of 1888-1889, 1898, 1900, and 1915, in addition to the one in 1932, were of particularly serious import. Illustrative of these disasters was a report from the vereadores of Tauá in mid-March of 1915 stating that half of the município's herds had already been lost.³⁸ Before the effects of the sêca ran their course, it appears that the percentage of loss exceeded two thirds.³⁹

36. Gazeta do Norte, Aug. 29, 1881.

37. Falla, 1887, p. 86.

38. Ofícios, Tauá, Mar. 23, 1915.

39. Calculation of the author, based on data in Pompeu, A Indústria Pastoral, pp. 133, 174.

Substantial numbers of cattle were saved only by driving them to Piauí.⁴⁰

The sêcas in the Inhamuns, in the totality of their effects, periodically destroyed wealth and resources, stifled endeavor and initiative, and effectively barred virtually any advancement in agriculture and cattle raising which, in other circumstances, might have been made. These were the general results of the sêcas. Other effects of a more specific nature might be suggested. Agriculture, to cite one, probably expanded at least in part because of the sêcas, even for reasons other than the one which was previously mentioned of landowners who sank into the morador class as a result of such disasters. Some landowners, who lost their herds in a sêca and turned to agriculture as a temporary expedient in the years following it, found the endeavor profitable, particularly in the 20th century when products from the soil acquired increased value. Although most of them rebuilt at least small herds of cattle, agriculture assumed a new importance in their total economic effort. Subsequent sêcas demonstrated the wisdom of the move, for agriculture could be revived afterwards with much less effort than cattle raising. By distributing seeds and, perhaps, small quantities of provisions to moradores, a fazendeiro could obtain a harvest in a few months; rebuilding a herd, in contrast, was an effort which required considerable investment, if breeding stock had to be purchased, and which, in any case, stretched into years.

The decline of the Feitosas relative to other important families appears to have been related to a combination of circumstances which included, among other factors, as already suggested, the sêcas and the

40. Ofícios, Tauá, Mar. 23, 1915.

growing importance of agriculture. Unlike those many other fazendeiros who turned to products from the soil to bolster their income, the leading members of the Feitosa family continued to dedicate their efforts almost exclusively to cattle raising.⁴¹ Each sêca which occurred decimated their herds and impoverished more of their number. Although sêcas hurt all landowners of the region, they did less permanent damage to those who, by fostering agriculture, achieved a more balanced economic base. For these reasons, the economic position of the Feitosas sank relative to those of the other influential families. It is significant that the family which replaced the Feitosas as the dominant element in Taubá was led by a man whose rise to a position of economic prominence was largely based on an endeavor involving commerce in agricultural products. To be sure, Colonel Domingos Gomes de Freitas was also a criador, but, compared to the Feitosas, he was less dedicated to that activity. It thus appears that the relative decline of the Feitosas was aided by the interlocking factors of: (1) the importance they gave to the prestigious industry of cattle raising, even when others achieved a broader economic base by emphasizing agriculture; and (2) the periodic decimation of their only productive resources--their herds of cattle--by the sêcas.

⁴¹. Eufrásio Alves Feitosa, Personal Interview, Cococoy, June 14, 1966.

VIII. EXTERNAL AUTHORITY AND PRIVATE POWER IN A BRAZILIAN COMMUNITY: AN OVERVIEW

The principal unifying theme in the history of the Inhamuns from the early 18th century until the end of the Old Republic is the Feitosa family. Their power based solidly in the land and prestige which they acquired in the era of colonisation, members of that family exercised the major influence in the area for over two centuries. The story of their changing fortunes serves to illustrate the relationship in the Inhamuns between private power and external authority from the colonial period through the Old Republic.

During the colonial period, the officials of the captaincy gradually asserted their authority, bringing the potentates of the frontier under their influence. This influence, it should be added, generally was nominal, for, in practice, the potentates were given broad authority within their communities. Later, the institutions of the Empire, as they became firm in the 1840's, threatened to terminate this situation. In the first place, the arrival of the delegados and police corps took from the Feitosa chieftains the police authority they had formerly exercised as officers of the ordenanças, and, in return, they were given empty, though prestigious titles in the National Guard. Second, the creation of political parties, coupled with the rotation of tenure from Rio de Janeiro, forced the Feitosas to suffer through periods in which their enemies were elevated to power by imperial mandate. Fortunately for the Feitosas, the threats which these changes posed to

their authority were not usually realized. In practice, the imperial authorities did not exercise their prerogatives to the degree which would have been necessary to upset that family's domination. And the threats to their power were offset, in considerable measure, by the jury system, another innovation of the Empire. Composed of local citizens, the jury was particularly susceptible to domination by the area's most powerful family. In short, the attempted centralization of power during the Empire threatened the influence of the Feitosas but did not unseat them, for their power was rooted in their numbers and wealth, the fear which they inspired, the existence of a subservient population, and, finally, in long-established social relationships. Although legal authority rested, at times, with the opposition, effective power remained with the Feitosas.

By the last decade of the Old Republic, this was no longer the case in Tauá, the largest and most prestigious município in the Inhamuns. In the first years of the Republic, the Acioli Oligarchy gave support to the Feitosas, who, supported by state police power, suffocated the opposition. But after the fall of the oligarchy in 1912, it became clear that the Feitosas had lost their former preeminence in the município. Their domination was effectively challenged by the group led by Colonel Domingos, a political force whose power rested not on external police authority--as had been the case of the Feitosas' opponents in São João do Príncipe during the Empire--but in the power which its members actually wielded in the community.

The following reasons at least partially account for this altered state of affairs. First, other family groupings had reduced or ended the power of the Feitosas in given areas. The upward movement of the

Gomes and Campo Preto families was reminiscent of the rise of the Fernandes Vieiras some 100 years earlier, at which time Saboeiro had been lost to the Feitosas. Second, the dismemberment of Arnoirós from São João do Príncipe in the 1870's weakened the influence of the Feitosas in the older município. Although the move gave them a município which they could dominate absolutely, it contributed in large measure to their downfall in Tauá some forty years hence. Finally, it has been suggested that the economic position of the Feitosas relative to other family groupings hastened their decline.

These locally based changes probably were more influential in the decline of the Feitosa family than the introduction of elements of external authority. Yet, the two factors--the weakening of the Feitosas relative to other families and the increasing importance of external authority--worked reciprocally, for the latter was permitted greater range as private power in the community fragmented. For this reason, in fact, state authority had become the decisive element in Tauá by 1930 in determining which local faction controlled the município. In contrast, this was not the case in Arneirós. In that município, external authority was not in evidence to a significant degree. There is every reason for believing that along the Rio Jucá the descendents of Colonel Francisco Alves Feitosa wielded power much as the colonizer himself had done, a fact which suggests that where private power had remained intact external authority had produced little effect.

For that matter, very little had really changed in any portion of the Inhamuns since Francisco and his family established their dominions in the area, the many pages herein devoted to local power struggles and their relationship to external authority notwithstanding. The members

of that vast class of landless moradores which had its birth on the latifúndio in the 18th century lived their lives much as their forefathers had lived theirs, and whether it was the generation of the 1750's or the 1920's did not make a great deal of difference. In whichever case, the prospect of rainfall to nurture their meager roças was a more vital question to them than the matter of which family enjoyed the favor of authorities in Fortaleza or Rio de Janeiro. The history of the Inhamuns could be written almost without mention of the great majority of its inhabitants, for they were not integrated into the level on which decisions affecting the community were made, and the passing of time did not alter this circumstance. The Inhamuns was a traditional society in a very real sense, for the basic structure of human relationships which was created in the 18th century was brought into the 20th century virtually intact. This fact should not be obscured.

GLOSSARY¹

agregado, a person of some privilege or social status who lives on a fazenda for an extended period by invitation of the owner, even though there is neither a close kinship nor economic relationship involved.
aldeia, Indian village.
alpendre, the porch of a fazenda house.

bandoleiro, outlaw.
boi, an ox or bull.
branco, a person of the white race.

caboclo, an uncultured sertanejo.
cabra, a term applied to a person of partial Negro ancestry, usually implying that he has a violent nature; originally meaning simply a person of partial Negro ancestry.
cachaça, a distilled beverage made from sugar cane.
câmara, the administrative and legislative body of the município (vila).
cangaceiro, outlaw.
capanga, a hired gunman, usually of a sertanejo political chief or other rural potentate.
capela, a church or chapel served occasionally by a visiting priest.
capitão-mor, the chief military and administrative officer of a captaincy; also the commanding officer of the ordenanças in a subdivision of a captaincy.
cartório, an office in which vital statistics and documents are recorded.
cearense, a native of Ceará.
chicote, a short, braided leather whip used by a rider to urge on his steed.
comarca, an important judicial division, comprising from one to several municípios or termos, headed by an ouvidor, in the colonial period, and, thereafter, by a juiz de direito.
criador, a cattle raiser, as distinguished from an agriculturist.
curato, a capela served by a resident priest.
curral (plural: currais), corral or cattle pen.

delegado, the head police officer of a termo.
desembargador, a member of a relação.
distrito de paz, local police and judicial district; subdivision of a termo.
dízimo, a tax which fell most heavily on cattle.
dona, a common title of respect prefixed to the name of a woman.
doutor, title commonly assigned to any university graduate.

1. The definitions and explanations given are closely related to usage in the text. No attempt has been made to include other connotations.

engenho, sugar mill or, simply, mill.

farinha, a flour made from manioc.

fazenda, a large landed estate.

fazendeiro, the owner of a large landed estate.

freguesia, church parish.

gentio, heathen; savages.

igreja matriz, the seat or head church of a freguesia.

intendente, name assigned for a time in the Old Republic to the chief administrative officer of a município.

jerimum, pumpkin.

juiz de direito, the chief judicial officer of a comarca.

juiz de fora, a special judicial officer of the colonial period who was expected to watch after the crown's interests in important vilas.

juiz ordinário, the highest administrative and judicial official of the câmara in the colonial period.

juiz de orfãos, a special judge whose duties pertain to orphans.

juiz de paz, a police and judicial officer of the distrito de paz.

julgado, a local judicial district in the colonial period.

juiz municipal, the chief judicial official of a termo.

latifundiário, owner of one or more very large landed estates.

latifúndio, a very large landed estate.

lavrador, agriculturist.

mesa eleitoral (or mesa), the board which conducts elections.

morador, a landless peasant who derives his living from the soil with the owner's permission; sharecropper.

município, an administrative subdivision of the state (province), consisting of the seat and surrounding territory.

ofício, official letter.

ordenanças, a military unit of the colonial period manned by civilians.

ouvidor, the head of a comarca.

pardo, mulatto.

patrão, common term used in direct address or in reference to one's boss, landlord, and protector.

postura, local ordinance or law.

prefeito, the chief administrative official of a município.

prêto, Negro.

procurador, an attorney or one who holds a power-of-attorney.

promotor público, the prosecuting attorney of a comarca.

reis, the plural of real, the Brazilian monetary unit until 1942. A milreis (1\$000) was the equivalent of approximately \$1.00 (U.S.) in 1825, 0.55 in 1850 and 1875. In the Republic, its value dropped drastically.

relação, a high judicial body, immediately superior to the comarca.

riacho, a creek or small stream.

roça, field for planting.

romeiro, religious pilgrim.

sargento-mor, an officer of the ordenanças.

sêca, drought.

senzala, slave quarters.

sequezes, followers or partisans.

serra, mountain ridge.

serrote, hill or low mountain ridge.

sertanejo, a person who lives in the interior.

sertão, semiarid land as distinguished from land receiving more rainfall; the interior.

sesmaria, a Portuguese land grant, usually awarded to a person of high social status.

sesmeiro, holder of a sesmaria.

subdelegado, a subordinate of the delegado.

tatú, armadillo.

termo, the police and judicial division whose boundaries are usually the same as those of a município; a subdivision of the comarca.

vaqueiro, cowboy.

vereador, a member of the câmara.

vigário, the head priest of a freguesia.

vila, the basic administrative subdivision of a captaincy in the colonial period; afterwards, the seat of a município.

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Sources for a study of the history of the Inhamuns are scattered and incomplete. The oldest cartório in Tauá possesses a large quantity of records, but specific items frequently are missing, particularly in the cases of inventories and criminal proceedings. The archival holdings of the oldest cartório in Saboeiro are much less complete. The Prefeitura in Tauá has the minutes of the meetings of the câmara for only the 16 years following 1860. The holdings of the Arquivo Nacional are too far removed in subject matter from the Inhamuns to be of general help. Only in unusual instances did the provincial presidents report on local happenings. For the period of the Empire, the party press is a valuable source, but, unfortunately, many of the early years of both Pedro II and Cearnense appear to have been lost to posterity. The Biblioteca Pública in Fortaleza has the most complete collections of these journals. Much material for the study of local history is found in the Arquivo Público in Fortaleza, and it seems certain that someday these archives will yield materials which presently are almost inaccessible. In their present state, the archives demand much of the researcher, especially fortitude, patience, and time. With respect to the entire history of the Inhamuns, more sources appear to exist for the period of the Empire than for any other time span. With Dom Pedro's exit, much of the uncertainty and newsworthiness of local politics passed from the scene, for his moderating power no longer fostered an opposition. The oligarchical rule of the republicans was, in comparison, generally colorless and stodgy. The events of many of the years between 1889 and 1930 were apparently too bland to inspire much production of the raw materials of history.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

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Mr. Chandler taught history at Robstown, Texas (1961), Tyler Junior College (1961-1962), and San Antonio College (1962-1963). He spent the summers of 1959, 1960, 1961, and 1963 traveling and studying in Mexico and Guatemala, and in 1962 he attended the summer session at the University of Kansas. In September, 1963, he began work toward the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Florida. During 1965 and 1966 Mr. Chandler spent 15 months doing dissertation research in Brazil on Doherty Foundation and Fulbright-Hays fellowships. Since February, 1967, he has been Lecturer in History at the State University of New York at Albany.

This dissertation was prepared under the direction of the chairman of the candidate's supervisory committee and has been approved by all members of that committee. It was submitted to the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council, and was approved as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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